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ABSTRACT 
 
There are over 28.8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world today 
because of conflict, human rights violations and situations of generalized violence. 
Colombia’s protracted internal armed conflict, which has lasted for over six decades, has 
resulted in the largest population of IDPs – up to 5.4 million as of 2012 – in the world. 
The vast majority migrates from rural areas to cities, settling on the urban periphery in 
historically poor neighborhoods. Taking Cartagena, Colombia as a revelatory case of IDP 
urban settlement, this thesis addresses these questions: In the face of ongoing violence, 
the disruption of spatial and social communities, and the dissolution of trust between 
individuals, organizations and the Colombian state, how do IDPs reconstitute social 
networks as part of integration into host cities? How are those social networks challenged 
and/or bolstered by the status and experience of displacement? 
 
Upon arrival in host cities, IDPs must satisfy basic survival needs (shelter, food, income), 
deal with trauma, and navigate shifting personal and collective identities in the aftermath 
of displacement. The individual and family-level strategies that IDPs develop to respond 
to these challenges ultimately require joining existing or forming new social networks for 
information sharing, economic support and emotional connection. Despite obstacles to 
community organizing (including direct threats and violence), these social networks 
sometimes morph into broader political coalitions, which serve as the base for social 
movements that make claims on the state. By learning from IDP settlement strategies, 
policymakers could develop more effective and durable solutions to address internal 
displacement and lay the groundwork for a more just and sustainable peace. I 
recommend: focusing on long-term IDP urban integration rather than on return to 
communities of origin, providing support to complement the foundation laid by IDP civil 
society organizations, and reframing policy away from short-term, household-level aid to 
target and support the social networks that form the basis of IDP resilience.  
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RESUMEN 
 
Actualmente, más de 28.8 millones de personas alrededor del mundo se encuentran en 
situación de desplazamiento forzado debido a conflictos internos, violaciones de los 
derechos humanos y situaciones de violencia generalizada. El conflicto armado de 
Colombia, que ha durado más de seis décadas, ha creado la población más grande de 
desplazados internos – hasta 5.4 millones en 2012 – en el mundo. La gran mayoría de los 
desplazados migran de zonas rurales a zonas urbanas, estableciéndose en las periferias de 
las ciudades en los barrios históricamente marginalizados. Usando a Cartagena, Colombia 
como un caso de estudio de la integración urbana de las poblaciones desplazadas, esta 
tesis responde a las siguientes dos preguntas: Dada la violencia persistente, el trastorno de 
las comunidades tanto espaciales como sociales, y la pérdida de la confianza entre 
individuos, organizaciones y el Estado Colombiano, ¿cómo se reconstituyen las redes 
sociales de los desplazados en el proceso de integración con las ciudades receptoras? 
¿Cómo se retan y/o refuerzan esas redes sociales dado el estatus y la experiencia del 
desplazamiento forzado? 
 
Al llegar a las ciudades receptoras, los desplazados deben satisfacer sus necesidades básicas 
(vivienda, alimentación, ingresos), responder al trauma, y navegar los cambios de 
identidades tanto personales como colectivas. Las estrategias de supervivencia a nivel 
individual y familiar eventualmente requieren anexarse a una red social ya existente o 
formar una nueva para acceder a información, generar ingresos, y encontrar apoyo 
emocional. A pesar de los grandes obstáculos a la organización comunitaria (incluyendo a 
las amenazas directas y la violencia), las redes sociales de desplazados a veces llegan a 
convertirse en amplias coaliciones políticas, que sirven como base para movimientos 
sociales que reclaman al Estado. Mediante el aprendizaje de estrategias de integración 
urbana, los políticos pueden desarrollar soluciones duraderas al desplazamiento forzado. 
Recomendamos un nuevo enfoque en la integración de largo plazo de los desplazados en 
lugar del retorno a las comunidades de origen, el apoyo a las organizaciones de la sociedad 
civil, y una nueva política pública que apoye a las redes sociales de desplazados en lugar  
de sólo proveer ayuda humanitaria de corto plazo a nivel familar o individual. 
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Tejiendo1 una red de resiliencia / Weaving a web of resilience 
Internal displacement, social networks and urban integration in Cartagena, Colombia 
 
Prologue 
 
The first time Isabel was displaced, she and her family were threatened at 
gunpoint after being accused of working with guerrilla groups. The paramilitaries came at 
midnight, guns in hand. They said they only spared her life because she held her ten-
month-old son in her arms. They gave her a few hours to leave. So Isabel and her family 
ran, abandoning everything. 
The second time they were displaced, Isabel was pregnant. A group of armed 
actors (whose affiliation was unclear) accused her husband of being an informant for the 
Colombian army, the Fuerzas Armadas. The only options were to run again or to die.  
Isabel and her family are neither guerrillas nor paramilitaries nor members of the 
Fuerzas Armadas. But as a result of these groups (and her family’s false associations with 
them), Isabel is now an internally displaced person (IDP), the victim of forced 
displacement within the borders of her own country. She is among the millions of IDPs 
in Colombia as a result of the internal armed conflict that has been waged there for the 
past six decades. Colombia is now the country with the largest population of IDPs in the 
world. 
After being forced to flee their rural village, leaving behind home, land and 
community, Isabel and her family settled in the coastal city of Cartagena. They shared a 
cramped makeshift house on the periphery of the city, moving into a historically poor and 
marginalized neighborhood. Isabel scraped together the money to feed her children by 
begging door-to-door. “I’ve lost so many things,” she says. “I left behind my animals, my 
harvests went to seed – I can’t get any of that back. I left behind my mother and my 
father, and my son died. I will never forget what it’s been like to raise my children in so 
much suffering.” 
With time, Isabel got to know her new neighbors in Cartagena, many of whom 
were also IDPs, and she started to attend the meetings of various community 
organizations. She began earning a small income by joining an agricultural collective. She 
became a lidereza [a woman community leader] with LIMPAL, a women’s rights 
organization that works with victims of the armed conflict. She later joined a civil society 
group that monitors the implementation of a national law.    
 “My life has changed a lot,” says Isabel. “I don’t know how I’ve become involved 
in so many organizations because I didn’t think I was a woman capable of that. I was shy. 
I was scared. I didn’t speak. I slept in the meetings.”  
How did Isabel – who arrived to an unknown city with few contacts, no 
belongings, the trauma of multiple displacements, and the burden of not just her own 
survival but that of her family’s – make this transformation?  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The use of the Spanish word “tejer” [to weave] is intentional: It reflects both the Colombian artisan skill 
of weaving, a common livelihoods strategy for many IDP women, as well as an oft-used way to describe 
how IDPs “weave together” social networks. The dual use of this word is reflected throughout this thesis.  
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“What changed?” Isabel asks. “Everything changed. I don’t spend my days crying. 
I participate and I speak. The trust that the women in these groups gave me allowed me 
to lose my fear. Me despertaron [They woke me up].” 
 
As IDPs in Colombia struggle with the direct and indirect trauma of violence, the 
loss of livelihoods and property, and the disruption of social networks upon which they 
previously relied, they are also confronted with the unfamiliar spatial, economic, social 
and political environments in host cities. But, as this thesis will show, rather than waiting 
for government (or divine) intervention, IDPs like Isabel develop response strategies to 
urban settlement, complementing or fortifying those strategies through social networks 
and collective action. IDPs are not just victims of the cruel logics of armed conflict they 
are also – like most migrants to urban areas, but in distinctive ways – the agents of their 
own survival, resilience and ultimately, change. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Internal displacement in global context 
 
“Flight [from violence] can mean survival but, very often, flight is also the first step on a fast and slippery 
slope towards separation, impoverishment, destitution, exploitation and disease.” 
– Hugo Slim, Killing Civilians 
 
Around the world today, over 28.8 million people have been forcibly displaced by 
conflict and violence within the borders of their own countries. Though internal 
displacement is not a new phenomenon, the current scale of the problem is unparalleled. 
Worldwide, there has been a steady increase in the number of internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) 2 over the past 15 years. In 2012 alone, more than 6.5 million people were newly 
displaced, twice as many as in 2011 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2013). 
The causes of internal displacement are manifold. Millions have been forced to 
migrate because of natural disaster, severe food insecurity, or large-scale development 
projects. That said, for the purposes of this paper, the emphasis will be on conflict-
induced displacement, defined as a form of displacement perpetrated by armed conflict, 
human rights violations or situations of generalized violence. Election-related violence in 
Cote d’Ivoire, ethnic strife in the Balkans, political conflict between opposing forces in 
Afghanistan and violent disputes over natural resources in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo are all examples of situations that have resulted in conflict-induced displacement.  
The period of forced displacement may have a clear beginning but not such a clear 
end: the majority of the world’s IDPs live in a state of protracted or severely protracted 
displacement, in which entire generations grow up in temporary or not-so-temporary 
sites of reception (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2012). As one international 
advocate for IDP rights recently said, paraphrasing Hobbes: “Whatever the cause, 
displacement is always nasty, always brutish, but all too rarely is it short.”3 
When IDPs move from rural areas to cities, they settle (often indefinitely) in the 
urban periphery, living as invasores [“invaders”] or slumdwellers alongside the historic 
urban poor and economic migrants. Facing similar structural violence,4 lack of economic 
and political opportunity, and spatial constraints due to limited urban land markets, what 
makes the IDP experience unique from that of their similarly impoverished new 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 As defined by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, IDPs are “persons or 
groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual 
residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of 
generalized violence, violation of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not 
crossed an internally recognized State border” (UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 1998, p. 1). 
3 Said on the occasion of the 2005 adoption of the series of guidelines on post-conflict property restitution 
called the United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced 
Persons, more commonly known as the “Pinheiro Principles.” As quoted in Smit 2012, p. 206. 
4 “Structural violence” is a sociological term that has been in use since the late 1960s to describe 
systematically and institutionally exerted and maintained oppression and social inequality (Farmer 2004). 
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neighbors? How are their response strategies to urban integration shaped or defined by 
their experiences of forced displacement? Knowing the answers to these questions can 
guide policymakers and planners to more effectively address internal displacement in the 
midst of an ongoing internal armed conflict in Colombia.  
Towards a sociology of forced migration 
The migration-displacement nexus 
According to migration experts Khalid Koser and Susan Martin (2011), scholars 
and policymakers have traditionally categorized migrants (both voluntary and forced) 
according to three main characteristics:  
 
1. Place of origin (e.g. though they may flee the same conflict, “refugees” are 
those who cross international borders while “IDPs” remain within the same 
country) 
2. Causes of movement (e.g. “refugees” are those who flee a “well founded fear of 
persecution,” and not those who migrate across borders for economic reasons) 
3. Time or phase of migration (e.g. emergency movement or settlement in a 
refugee camp versus protracted settlement) 
 
Theorizing migration in this way and categorizing by geography, cause and time 
has both raised the visibility of migrants who were previously ignored by the international 
system (e.g. IDPs and human trafficking victims) and also allowed for targeted 
humanitarian and policy responses depending on the nature and scope of migration. But, 
as Koser and Martin argue, this approach is severely limited as the lines between 
voluntary or forced migration, economic or political migration, conflict-induced or 
development-induced migration and so on are increasingly blurred. These categories are 
not neatly mutually exclusive. The points of overlap are what Koser and Martin (2011) 
call the “migration-displacement nexus.” 
For example, many of the root causes of economic migration – inequality, global 
trade liberalization, human rights abuses – are also the root causes of conflict and, 
consequently, forced migration (Castles 2003; Bakewell 2011; Koser and Martin 2011). 
Castles (2003) argues for the need to theorize forced migration (understood broadly to 
include the situations of refugees, both conflict- and development-induced IDPs and 
human trafficking victims) as inherently linked to economic migration.5 Even within the 
category of forced migration, the causes of displacement, while often separated for ease of 
analysis, often go hand-in-hand.6 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In Colombia, economic migration and forced displacement can become difficult to extricate because of 
the centrality of wealth inequality and conflict over land, which will be explored in Chapter 2 (Albuja and 
Ceballos 2010). 
6 For example, in Colombia large agro-industrial development projects can be just as much reason for 
displacement as the armed conflict itself. There is a growing trend of development-induced displacement in 
Cartagena for the sake of building luxury hotels and high-rises. Very often those displaced by development 
are also conflict-induced IDPs.  
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 That said, there are some distinctions that can be drawn between migration and 
displacement when they are considered as conditions of being. Bakewell (2011) offers the 
following three distinguishing features: 
 
1. Unlike migration, “the condition of displacement does not become fixed with 
the end of movement; it remains an ongoing condition which is concerned 
with a separation from ‘home,’ the place of origin from which people were 
compelled to move…It is about not being where one wants to be, and is often 
described in terms of exile, being cut off from one's roots” (p. 22). 
 
2. Unlike migration, displacement can be “reversed.” It can come to an end when 
“people regain their sense of home and become emplaced” either by returning 
to communities of origin or by establishing a new “home” elsewhere (p. 23). 
Displacement, unlike migration, is a subjective experience framed by one's 
sense of past, present and future. This perception can be maintained and 
reproduced through generations as a sense of “lack of home” even if the 
younger generations have not migrated themselves.7 The question about when 
and how displacement comes to an end, if ever, is still very much up for 
debate, while migration comes to a clear end at the moment of settlement. 
 
3. Migration and displacement are experienced differently: migration, as an 
objective state of movement, does not necessarily have a bearing on day-to-
day life, whereas displacement fundamentally shapes the self-perception of 
“being out of place.” As Bakewell summarizes: “To a large extent, I am only 
displaced as long as I feel myself to be displaced. If I make a new home, my 
condition of displacement ends; however, my condition as a migrant remains” 
(p. 23) 
 
To add a key fourth dimension, under international standards, internal 
displacement confers certain responsibilities upon the state, while migration has no such 
clear liabilities for public authorities. In 1998, the United Nations published the 
“Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement,” which have since served as a baseline for 
most international and national policies on internal displacement. Unlike cross-border 
refugees, IDPs ultimately remain the responsibility of the state. As such, most of the 
international protections for refugees do not apply for IDPs. This difference reflects the 
supremacy of national sovereignty within international law. However, in practice, many 
states confronted with internal displacement are often unable or unwilling to bear this 
duty—and, in some cases, have triggered the displacement, as in the current crisis in 
Syria. That said, there is a general consensus that states are responsible at the very least 
for emergency humanitarian aid in the immediate aftermath of forced displacement. 
Given these four distinctions, particularly the unique role of the state in forced 
migration, this thesis seeks to understand the underlying mechanisms of how IDPs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In fact, many of the children of IDPs in Cartagena who were born and raised in the city still self-identify 
as “displaced” though they have never experienced displacement personally, per se. 
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integrate into urban areas. To begin, the following section introduces how internal armed 
conflict transforms social relations, which in turn distorts the processes of IDP 
integration.  
War as a social condition 
Aside from the humanitarian concern for the lives of the millions of IDPs across 
the globe, the study of conflict-induced displacement can also help us understand broader 
social, economic and political struggles. There have been recent calls for developing a 
sociology of forced migration – or a “sociology of ‘exile, displacement and belonging’” – 
grounded within the political economies of specific places (Castles 2003). As Giles and 
Hyndman (2004) write, “studies of the ways in which people’s lives are uprooted and 
homes are forfeited in return for safety provide grounded insights into the otherwise 
abstract concepts of ethnicity, identity, state building and citizenship” (p. 6). In other 
words, a sociology of displacement is ultimately a sociology of place.  
How we define “displacement” depends largely on how we understand what 
“place” means. “Place” is distinct from “space” in that it is constituted not just of location 
but of materiality and meaning, as well. It is not the physicality of space alone that creates 
place—it is physicality in conversation with the malleable and inevitably contested 
meaning of this space. As Gieryn (2000) writes, “place stands in a recursive relation to 
other social and cultural entities: places are made through human practices and 
institutions even as they help make those practices and institutions. Place mediates social 
life; it is something more than just another independent variable” (p. 467).  
Place is social, so displacement can be understood as the deprivation and 
transformation of both physical space as well as social space. The impact of displacement 
has less to do with the actual movement in space and more to do with how this 
movement reconfigures individuals and groups in ways that “deprive them of the social, 
material or symbolic resources once readily available and necessary for realizing common 
strategies of social reproduction” (Lubkemann 2008, p. 193). Displacement represents 
the spatial manifestation of violence and its transformative power over social relations.  
In her 1968 book Imperialism, political theorist Hannah Arendt examines the 
European displacement that took place as a result of WWII through three primary 
lenses. Though Arendt focuses primarily on the situation of cross-border refugees, her 
insight continues to be meaningful in the context of internal displacement.8 The three 
levels of analysis are as follows: 
 
1. Meaning: Displacement is not just the loss of residence but also the loss of frame 
of reference for personal and collective identity. Displacement, therefore, means 
the transformation of “the whole social texture in which one was born and where 
one has organized a particular space in the world” (p. 276, cited in Pécaut 2000).  
 
2. Social connection: Expulsion and displacement is often rooted in belonging to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Since Arendt’s writing in the 1960s, there has been a broader recognition of the human costs of all types 
of displacement, including development-induced and natural-disaster-induced displacement, as well.  
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certain social groups, rather than in political opposition per se. In other words, 
forced migration is often directly the result of social (rather than explicitly 
political) connections.  
 
3. Rights: Displacement is dispossession of property and dispossession of rights and 
institutional relationships. Political and civil rights are threatened if not 
completely revoked by the unclear status of citizenship resulting from 
displacement. The greatest misfortune of refugees, writes Arendt, is "having 
ceased to belong to a community,” thus depriving them of meaningful and 
productive state-citizen relations (p. 280, cited in Pécaut 2000). Though the 
situation of IDPs – who remain within the same borders of their home state and 
thereby ostensibly retain some degree of citizenship – is distinct from that of 
refugees, the disruption of political systems of patronage and power through 
internal armed conflict is just as much a disruption of traditional understandings 
of citizenship. In other words, the citizenship of IDPs is often just as unclear as 
the citizenship of cross-border refugees. 
 
The question really is how do people adapt to forced displacement as the spatial 
manifestation of violence? How do they find new meaning, form social connections and 
claim their rights, if at all?  
Across many cultures, contexts and conflicts, it has been shown that “recovery is 
often best supported by people’s ability to mitigate their predicament with social support, 
land, employment, new relationships and a positive sense of the future” (Slim 2008, p. 
109). Both individual and community survival in the face of violence rest heavily on 
reciprocity, trust and social networks that form the basic “glue” of any society (Lautze and 
Raven-Roberts 2006). There is plenty of literature that identifies social bonding and 
social capital9 as key indicators of capacity for positive adaptations to situations of chronic 
violence (Colletta and Cullen 2000; Moser and Clark 2001; Taylor 2010; Davis 2012). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 “Social capital” can be commonly (if rather ambiguously) defined as “the form of capital [that] arises from 
relationships between individuals, families, groups, or communities that provide access to valuable benefits 
and/or resources” (Schneider 2006). To complicate this picture a bit, Michael Woolcock (1998) plots 
horizontal social capital (strong familial ties and weak ties/linkages among individuals and local groups) 
along with vertical social capital (formal state/market institutions and their organizational capacity and 
interactions with individuals and groups). This is not social capital in the traditional sense as defined by 
Schneider, but rather a broader view of how relationships between individuals, families, groups, 
communities and hierarchical structures of power provide access to benefits and/or resources. Importantly, 
social capital is neither normatively good nor bad: it can be a tool for social cohesion or a tool for social 
exclusion, a source of mutual aid and dependence or a source of division (Colletta and Cullen 2000).  
All in all, “social capital” is a complicated term that has generated vigorous debate among 
economists, social scientists and policymakers since its popularization in the 1990s. Social capital can also 
be understood as what Woolcock (2010) calls an “essentially contested concept” that is less useful for its 
definitional clarity than for its “capacity to draw attention to salient features of the social and political world 
(in this case, the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively) that are of significance in their 
own right and play a role in valued aspects of everyday life” (p. 470). In other words, perhaps the exact 
definition or operationalization of “social capital” matters less than its ability to focus attention and engage 
cross-disciplinary dialogue on the importance and power of social relationships.  
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However, there are few studies of the processes through which IDPs maintain, form and 
renegotiate social relations during settlement into receptor cities.  
Anthropologist Stephen Lubkemann’s study of forced displacement in 
Mozambique (2008) is unique in its examination of the complex reconfiguration of 
everyday social existence in the face of war. He calls this “war as a social condition”: 
sustained conflict, violence and trauma become the defining characteristics of social 
interactions. “For the inhabitants of such places,” he writes, “war has not been an ‘event’ 
that suspends ‘normal’ social processes, but has instead become the normal – in the sense 
of ‘expected’ – context for the unfolding of social life” (p. 1). 
War as a social condition is particularly marked in situations of internal conflict. 
Unlike inter-state conflict, which often mobilizes nation-state unity and social 
cohesiveness in response to the other state (the enemy), violent conflict within a state 
blurs the bounds of who exactly is the “other” and the “enemy” (Colletta and Cullen 
2000; Slim 2008). As in Colombia, the distinction between “combatant” and “civilian” 
becomes increasingly difficult to make – or even meaningless – as civilians are recruited or 
forced to join the fighting ranks of armed actors or to provide food, shelter, transport and 
alibi. In some cases, whether by choice or not, women and girls become romantically or 
sexually involved with armed actors, further blurring boundaries and allegiances. Any 
non-aligned collective action is rendered dangerous simply for its potential to be 
interpreted as aligned with one of many armed actors. Being labeled as a member or 
sympathizer of one group or another carries serious consequences if targeted for attack by 
an opposing force: threats, destruction or theft of property, kidnapping and 
disappearances, sexual violence, assassination (Meertens 2001; Slim 2008).   
The conflict in Colombia has been carried out for the past 60 years as a 
generalized siege primarily directed against civilian populations. Unlike the internal 
conflicts of some Latin American countries, which have seen campaigns directed towards 
ethnic cleansing or silencing political opposition, violence in Colombia is more 
indiscriminate. It is “a decentralized, deinstitutionalized strategy for destroying the social 
fabric and taking over community control” (Meertens 2001, p. 136). In other words, 
social connections are intentionally and strategically targeted.  
The result can be understood as “collective trauma”: traumatic experiences as a 
result of violent conflict become so deeply ingrained into the social texture of a 
community or even nation that they “supply its prevailing mood and temper, dominate its 
imagery and its sense of self, [and] govern the way its members relate to one another” 
(Erikson 1995, p. 190). When conflict has so deeply penetrated every corner of the social 
structure, and when no clear enemy can be identified because anyone could be one, 
violence erodes and transforms social networks, solidarity and trust between neighbors, 
friends and family. Internal conflict divides and conquers by “undermining interpersonal 
and communal trust, destroying the norms and values that underlie cooperation and 
collective action for the common good, and increasing the likelihood of communal strife” 
(Colletta and Cullen 2000, p. 2-3). No social bonds are safe social bonds when anything 
can be judged as grounds for offensive or defensive violent attack. Social connection can 
thus become a liability. 
This dynamic has been called the “asset/liability paradox,” in which violence has 
the unique ability to transform livelihoods (encompassing all forms of capital—human, 
 	   14 
financial, physical, natural and social) into life-threatening liabilities. The ownership 
(whether real or perceived) of assets that are either valued (e.g. money, land, weapons) or 
seen as threatening (e.g. identity, power, education) can make these assets and their 
owners targets of attack (Lautze and Raven-Roberts 2006). For example, being the owner 
of a farm (a form of physical capital) is easily considered an asset in some contexts. 
However, in the context of the territorial struggles in the countryside of Colombia, being 
the owner of a farm might actually put you at great risk for theft, assault or forced 
displacement. The farm thus becomes a liability rather than an asset. Similarly, 
cultivating a social relationship with a local police officer or politician (a form of social 
capital) could be an asset in some situations and a liability in others, depending on the 
perspective from which this relationship is judged. It is the context and the interpretation 
of these forms of capital that often matter more than the actual capital itself.  
Once we recognize that internal conflict and violence undermine and/or 
transform social relationships and communities, we recognize the need for interventions 
that not only address economic and political infrastructure but social infrastructure, as 
well (Moser and McIlwane 2001). Understanding the dynamics of how IDPs rebuild or 
redefine personal and collective identities, social connections and their relationships to 
the state is key for designing appropriate and effective responses to internal displacement, 
which remains a responsibility of the Colombian state. 
Urban integration and resilience in displacement 
In 2009, the United Nations Inter-Agency Standing Committee endorsed “The 
Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons,” a non-binding set of 
human rights-based principles to guide long-term integration policies for IDPs. These 
proposed solutions are comprised of two parts: 1) restoring rights lost – including 
property rights, access to housing, education, health and livelihoods, as well as political 
participation, and 2) remedial justice to address past violations, including access to the 
legal system and victim reparations “in order to restore people's dignity and put them in a 
situation where they can recover their self-sufficiency” (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre 2012, p. 28). Within this framework, there are three main options for 
settlement: return to place of origin, settlement elsewhere in another part of the country 
and local integration into host sites where IDPs have taken refuge. However, in many 
parts of the world, ongoing political and violent conflict in places of origin makes return 
infeasible without a massive mobilization of security and protection for returning IDPs, 
and settlement elsewhere is rarely considered. Local integration, as a result, is the most 
common choice.  
The vast majority of the world’s IDPs settle in cities, generally moving into poor 
and marginalized neighborhoods along the urban periphery. While cities are attractive for 
their (real or perceived) relative safety, access to public services and employment 
opportunities, IDPs are also exposed to a number of risks there, including widespread 
discrimination and ongoing urban violence – often related to the conflict from which they 
fled (Carrillo 2009; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2012).  
For the purposes of this paper, I have chosen to focus on the period of settlement 
and integration into urban areas after the event of displacement. This is not to assume 
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that there is a clear or marked division between the displacement event itself and its 
aftermath, just as there is no such clear difference between periods of conflict and what is 
known euphemistically as post-conflict. Because of the institutionalization of crime, 
corruption and violence, as well as high rates of weapon possession, ongoing poverty and 
lack of economic and livelihoods opportunities, “peace-time” or “post-conflict” periods 
may be just as violent as “war” or “conflict” (Lubkemann 2008; Slim 2008). The 
experience of displacement similarly cannot be captured accurately in a unilinear timeline 
or sequence of independent events. It is a continuum and a multidimensional process of 
loss and reconstruction (Meertens 2001).  
I have chosen to emphasize the experience of integration rather than the 
experience of initial displacement. For too long, Colombia has been associated primarily 
with the hemispheric “War on Drugs,” with the armed internal conflict, with high-profile 
kidnappings and murders, and more recently, with drug-related violence in Mexico. In 
her study of human rights and the armed conflict in Colombia, anthropologist Winifred 
Tate summarizes: "Violence becomes the problem of Colombia, the central issue that 
plagues the body politic, for which other conditions – weak state, repressive state, 
excessive wealth, poverty, inequality – are offered as explanations.”  
But, Tate continues, “the focus [on violence] is distorting, blurring the contours 
of everyday life, the ebb and flow of sleeping, waking, eating, working, playing that 
occupies the vast majority of the nation's citizens” (2007, p. 22). Everyday life continues: 
even as terrible atrocities are committed, children still go to school, fishmongers still sell 
the daily catch at the market, couples still get married. Ignoring everyday social existence 
offers an incomplete analysis of violence, “casting ‘undoing’ as the full drama rather than 
the first act” in a much longer transformation (Lubkemann 2008, p. 23).  
In fact, we can understand violent conflict not as an “undoing,” but rather a 
“remaking.” Violence is not just destructive chaos; it can shake up old systems of 
patronage, power, inclusion and exclusion, and create space for the formation of new 
identities, solidarities, networks and institutions. Violent conflict can be a site of 
significant social transformation, shifting the trajectory and formulation of social relations 
than rather suspending or simply annihilating them (Tilly 1974; Duffield 2001; 
Nordstrom 2004). We have to look at violence not as an end, but as the beginning of new 
challenges and new possibilities, new forms of empowerment and disempowerment, and 
new shifts in identity that take place for different actors in different ways (Lubkemann 
2008). It is through ethnographies that are concerned not only with what happened in 
the past, what atrocities were committed, but also with how individuals, groups and 
communities cope with it in the present, that we can gain a deeper understanding of 
violence in its entirety.  
As Das et al. (2001) write: 
 
…at the level of the ordinary, the everyday social realities, states of rebuilding and 
accommodation are as complex as the networks of individual lives of victims, 
perpetrators, victim-perpetrators, internal resisters, and critics and witnesses. There 
usually is no clear-cut victory, no definitive crossing over to safety and renewal. But if that 
sounds too bleak a conclusion, think of it the other way around: there usually is no 
complete defeat, no ultimate breakdown and dissolution. Even following the most 
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horrendous ethnocides – the Holocaust, the mass murder of Tutsis – social life continues. 
And that is the source both of possibilities and of very deep perplexities (p. 24). 
 
The study of settlement after the event of forced displacement is ultimately a 
study of resilience. It is about the human capacity for survival and trust in the face of so 
much suffering. It is important to make the distinction here that IDPs are not simply 
victims in their displacement (Grabska and Mehta 2008). To ignore the human agency of 
the displaced is to silence them and to render them helpless (Malkki 1996), when in fact 
they are very often the authors of their own survival. As feminist anthropologist Donny 
Meertens, a scholar of displacement in Colombia, writes, IDPs are not passive victims 
but rather “active shapers of their future” (2001, p. 133).  
Though there is a growing body of literature on what some have called “survival 
strategies” or “response strategies” of IDPs (Vincent and Sorensen 2001; Díaz-Granados 
and Sañudo 2003; Taylor 2010; Bryson 2011; Castagna and Jeyte 2011), it is still in its 
early stages. Within this literature, more attention must be paid to collective agency, or 
the active role that social networks – and not just individual choices – play in determining 
outcomes. In his theory of an “actor-oriented” sociology of development, Norman Long 
(2001) defines human agency not only as the individual actor and his or her capacity to 
“process social experience and to devise ways of coping with life, even under the most 
extreme forms of coercion” but also as embodied within networks of social relations 
between those individuals (p. 16).  
To date, little research has been done on the long-term social impact of internal 
displacement and urban settlement, partly because such large-scale, prolonged 
displacement is a relatively recent phenomenon (Vincent and Sorensen 2001; 
Lubkemann 2008; Ferris and Halff 2011a). It is also complicated by the “invisibility” of 
IDPs who integrate into cities alongside other poor and marginalized urban communities 
(Pavanello and Montemurro 2010; Davies and Jacobsen 2011). Unlike large resettlement 
schemes or refugee camps, the kind of household by household integration into urban 
areas that has become more and more common for IDPs around the world means sorting 
out who is who and who deserves what from whom has become increasingly difficult. The 
historic poor live alongside economic migrants who live alongside IDPs. They attend the 
same schools, join some of the same organizations, engage in similar livelihoods coping 
mechanisms – the lines aren’t always so clear or marked.  
In a review of three case studies of urban IDP populations in Khartoum, Sudan, 
Abidjan, Cote D'Ivoire and Santa Marta, Colombia, Davies and Jacobsen (2011) found 
that IDPs and their non-IDP neighbors had similar demographic characteristics and 
experienced the same stresses related to urban poverty (in terms of housing conditions, 
levels of education and employment) and lack of adequate infrastructure and access to 
public services like schools and transportation. But despite these similarities, urban IDPs 
were poorer and more insecure. The depletion of their physical assets (e.g. land, livestock, 
personal documents) as well as social assets (e.g. support networks) in displacement, as 
well as the experience of trauma, put IDPs at greater disadvantage than their equally poor 
but non-IDP neighbors. Urban IDPs also often face the additional obstacles of language 
barriers, lack of knowledge of the urban setting and lack of urban livelihoods skills.  
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Adding to their invisibility, many IDPs never formally register with the public 
authorities (and therefore never receive the special attention or assistance due to them) 
for fear of retribution or for lack of knowledge about the process. To register requires 
both a certain level of self-identification as a victim of forced displacement as well as an 
understanding of the responsibility of the state to those victims. The coexistence (and 
sometimes overlap) of economic rural-to-urban migration and conflict-induced 
displacement further complicates the registration process (Albuja and Ceballos 2010). 
Ultimately, “IDP” is a political designation and not an inherent category of identity. This 
thesis will consider how personal and collective identities are shaped by the unique 
experience of displacement as distinct from that of the historic urban poor and of 
economic migrants.  
The policy implications of forced displacement 
What happens when the emergency period immediately after displacement is 
politically determined over and the process of rebuilding IDPs’ lives and livelihoods, for 
which most states do not claim official responsibility, begins? Given the invisibility of 
IDPs in urban areas, are the kinds of “durable solutions” to internal displacement 
recommended by the United Nations truly achievable?  
Generally speaking, most national public policies around the world have placed 
too much weight on immediate and short-term assistance and paid comparatively little 
attention to long-term sustainable local integration into sites of reception (Ferris 2008b). 
Only recently have some states taken the initiative to draft and pass national legislation 
and/or policy on internal displacement beyond emergency humanitarian aid. Colombia is 
seen as an exemplar for its 2011 Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras, or the Victims’ 
and Land Restitution Law (often referred to simply as the Victims’ Law). On June 10, 
2011, in response to mounting international pressure and a series of court orders issued 
by the Constitutional Court of Colombia that found the lack of an adequate national 
government response to protracted internal displacement to be an “unconstitutional state 
of affairs,” President Juan Manuel Santos signed the Victims’ Law. It is the largest 
victims’ rights and reparations law in Colombia’s history, with sweeping provisions for 
land restitution, compensation and a wide range of guarantees of services like preferential 
housing subsidies for victims of the conflict. Though it is too soon to tell how effective it 
will be when finally implemented, the Victims’ Law10 has already been lauded for being 
one of the most far-reaching attempts at transitional justice11 in the world (Summers 
2012; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2012; United Nations Human Rights 
Council 2012).  
That said, the hard part is translating national law (however promising it may be) 
into local practice. In the context of rapid urbanization and competition over limited 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The Victims’ Law and its potential implications for IDPs are discussed in more detail in Appendix B.   
11 Transitional justice is commonly understood as “institutional initiatives for dealing with past atrocities in 
societies emerging from authoritarian regimes or armed conflict.” These initiatives often include legal and 
institutional mechanisms like truth commissions, criminal prosecutions for past wrongs, reparations 
programs and governance reforms (García-Godos and O. Lid 2010, p. 487). 
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resources, IDPs often face a backlash not only from host communities but also from the 
public institutions charged with protecting their rights. So, being clear about who IDPs 
are and how they cope with urban settlement can help municipal and national authorities 
design context-sensitive, targeted programs that benefit not only IDPs but their non-IDP 
neighbors who share the same scarcity of resources, as well (Davies and Jacobsen 2011). 
What can we learn from studying the ways in which IDPs integrate into cities over time, 
reshaping personal and collective identities, forming new social networks and eventually 
making claims on the state as both “victims” and “rights-holders”? 
Research Question 
In the face of ongoing violence, the disruption of spatial and social communities, 
and the dissolution of trust between individuals, organizations and the Colombian state, 
how do internally displaced persons (IDPs) reconstitute social networks upon integration 
into host cities? How are those social networks challenged and/or bolstered by the status 
and experience of displacement?  
I use the latter question to examine more closely the parallels and contrasts 
between IDPs and other migrants, especially voluntary economic migrants. And I 
conclude this thesis by re-examining policy – the specific approach of the state, as distinct 
from its obligations in principle – through the lens of networks. By law and custom alike, 
public policy generally centers on individuals or families, not networks. 
Methodology 
 Post-conflict and conflict situations present a particular challenge to researchers 
and policymakers because of the great necessity for good data but the great dearth of its 
availability. Quantitative measurements of forced displacement are often way off mark 
given the difficulties of conducting reliable and comprehensive surveys in the face of the 
constantly changing dynamics of internal conflict. This is particularly true when 
quantitative data relies upon self-reporting of displacement status with official entities, 
which many IDPs avoid for a lack of trust in those entities and for fear of retribution or 
discovery by former persecutors.12 Quantitative research can also only provide a snapshot 
of certain indicators without mapping out the processes of change over time. As a result, 
qualitative research (which includes case studies, interviews, focus groups and other 
ethnographic methods) can contribute greatly to a more accurate, current and complete 
picture of the situation as lived by the victims and agents of the conflict (Woolcock 2001; 
Castles 2003; Lubkemann 2008; Davis 2012). 
Given the sensitive and potentially dangerous nature of the research as well as the 
limited time frame of my fieldwork, I partnered with a local organization to more 
effectively gain access to IDPs I wished to interview without putting them or myself at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 This is visible in the lack of even the most basic agreed-upon information regarding the number of IDPs 
in Colombia today (4.9 million according to the Colombian government versus 5.4 million according to 
CODHES, a leading Colombian human rights NGO). Some of the reasons for this disparity will be 
discussed in Chapter 2. 
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risk. From June 2012 to August 2012 I worked as a program associate with the 
Colombian office of Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF, or 
LIMPAL by its Spanish acronym) in Cartagena and Bogotá. WILPF, the oldest 
women’s pacifist organization in the world, has chapters in 38 countries, each of which is 
responsible for its own locally-defined mission within the broader global mission of 
gender equity, peace and disarmament. LIMPAL focuses on women’s human rights in 
Colombia, with a particular emphasis on the rights of victims of the internal armed 
conflict. LIMPAL has been working in Colombia for the past 12 years and is recognized 
as a leading civil society organization on issues of women’s rights. LIMPAL coordinates 
and collaborates with many other similar organizations and has consultative status with 
the United Nations. 
 Throughout the course of this thesis, I pay particular attention to issues of gender 
and power dynamics. A gender analysis is not just about women. Gender refers to 
socially-constructed and socially-maintained relations between men and women 
(including behaviors, expectations, norms and institutions), all of which are contingent 
upon the particular historical and cultural contexts within which they reside. A gender 
analysis of forced displacement allows us to understand the unique experiences and risks 
faced not only by women and girls, but also by men and boys. The gendered dynamics of 
IDP economic coping strategies, social network formation, connection to armed groups, 
and access to institutional and political support surface throughout the course of this 
thesis. For an in-depth review of the gendered implications and experiences of forced 
displacement in Colombia, see Appendix A.  
Through LIMPAL, I spent June and July in Cartagena working with a group of 
ten liderezas [women community leaders] from various neighborhoods from Cartagena 
and from the two neighboring cities of San Jacinto and San Juan de Nepomuceno. The 
liderezas are all IDP women between the ages of 23 and 60. They are responsible for 
disseminating the trainings and workshops of LIMPAL throughout their communities to 
create a broader impact and to mobilize greater support for women’s rights initiatives. 
They also invite members of their neighborhoods (mostly other IDPs) to come to events, 
meetings and public marches.  
During my two months on the Caribbean coast, we ran several human rights and 
capacity building workshops in both Cartagena and San Jacinto, including two that I 
personally designed and facilitated on “Integrated Security Tactics for Human Rights 
Defenders” and on “Social Networks.” At any given LIMPAL meeting or workshop, 
there were between 10 and 50 IDP women, men and children. In all, I attended and/or 
facilitated seven LIMPAL workshops and meetings, all of which served as important 
sites for ethnographic fieldnotes as well as interview recruitment.  
Through my contacts at LIMPAL, I met several key players in various IDP and 
women’s rights civil society organizations in Cartagena, including the Comité de 
Seguimiento de Auto 092, APRODIC, Mesa DESC, FUNSAREP, Red de 
Empoderamiento de Mujeres de Cartagena y Bolívar, among others.13 In addition to 
seven LIMPAL workshops and meetings, I attended two Comité meetings, one 
APRODIC meeting, one two-day Mesa DESC conference, and one citywide meeting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Descriptions of these organizations are provided in the Glossary. 
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with the Mayor of Cartagena. I also participated in a public march organized by many of 
these organizations to raise awareness about violence against women in Cartagena. On 
each of these occasions, I introduced myself and my work before asking permission to 
take handwritten notes and photos, from which I produced extensive fieldnotes and 
memos for my research.  
The contacts I acquired through LIMPAL and these other organizations 
provided informational interviews that led me to other IDP sources through a “snowball” 
technique. For example, I met Tatiana, an IDP woman who provides many of the stories 
in the chapters to come, at a meeting of the Comité, to which Eva, a LIMPAL lidereza, 
invited me. Tatiana went on to introduce me to seven other IDPs, all of whom I 
interviewed for this thesis.  
In all, I interviewed 13 IDP women, 5 IDP men, 5 non-IDP women, and 4 non-
IDP men. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes to an hour and a half, and 
participants were given the option of skipping questions or choosing to end the interview 
at any point. Interview topics included a brief recounting of the event of displacement, 
the process of finding housing, employment and social connections, the process of 
engaging with community organizations and the relationship to the government.  
In conflict and post-conflict situations, security concerns for both the researcher 
and the interviewees are paramount. During the interviews, I asked permission to take 
notes and record with an audio recorder, later to be transcribed and translated for my 
thesis. In all occasions, the interviewees agreed, particularly given the condition that they 
would be given a pseudonym to protect their identities (and sometimes even the identities 
of the organizations to which they belong). As will be detailed in later chapters, the safety 
of IDPs – and particularly that of IDP community organizers or activists – is often at risk 
because of threats or violence from armed actors.  
Some interviews took place in pairs or groups for the comfort and convenience of 
the interviewees, while the rest were one-on-one interviews. On three occasions I 
conducted interviews in private homes on the invitation of the interviewees. Otherwise, 
interviews were conducted in the office of one of the aforementioned organizations or in 
a public space. In each case, the interviewee was asked where she or he would feel safest 
and could access the easiest given transportation and time considerations.  
In August 2012, I moved from the LIMPAL office in Cartagena to the office in 
capital city Bogotá, where I worked on development and public relations materials for 
LIMPAL. Though I continued having exploratory conversations with IDP experts and 
civil society organizations in Bogotá, I chose to focus exclusively on the experience of 
IDPs in Cartagena for the sake of case study clarity. 
 In March 2013, I returned to Cartagena for a week to present my preliminary 
research findings to the liderezas of LIMPAL and to solicit feedback from my sources. As 
a whole, they reported that they found the presentation to be true to their real-life 
experiences. It was also on this return trip that Tatiana took me to the Unidad para la 
Atención y la Reparación Integral a las Víctimas [Unit for the Attention and Integral 
Reparations for Victims] in Cartagena, the official government entity responsible for IDP 
services.  
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Limitations  
 In all, I conducted two months of on-the-ground fieldwork in Cartagena, 
followed by a month of additional exploratory work from Bogotá. Given the difficulty of 
generating trust with IDPs (as will be detailed in the following chapters), this amount of 
time is insufficient for developing the deeper relationships that would have allowed me to 
gain even greater insight into the complexities of IDP social networks. Though my 
affiliation with LIMPAL surely opened many doors, it also lent me a specific identity 
and association that may have prevented me from being exposed to other perspectives or 
opinions.  
 Safety concerns also prevented me from spending more time in the IDP 
neighborhoods on the edges of the city. I was always accompanied by a LIMPAL staff 
member or one of my IDP sources, which may have limited my mobility and ability to 
explore on my own. I spent time in these neighborhoods during daylight hours, so I had 
to rely upon the accounts of my sources to describe nighttime activities.  
 Another limitation of my research is the skewed gender and age distribution of 
my sources. The overwhelming majority of my interviewees were women between the 
ages of 20 and 65, so I cannot as accurately speak to the experiences of children, 
teenagers, or elderly people, though I did my best to unearth these dynamics in some of 
my exploratory conversations. There is a rich research opportunity yet to be explored in 
the dynamics of age (particularly adolescence) and in the specific experiences of men in 
displacement.  
A note on translations 
 Though I am fluent in Spanish and all interviews were conducted in Spanish, it 
was important for me to hire a Colombian woman to transcribe all of my recorded 
interviews, particularly given the use of local slang and references. As a lawyer who has 
worked with LIMPAL in the past and who is well-versed in IDP rights, she was also 
able to offer insight as she transcribed, including helpful explanatory footnotes in the 
transcription documents.  
All of the translations in this thesis are my own, and I did my best to capture the 
feeling of each statement rather than offer literal word-for-word translations. Many of 
the original quotes are left in Spanish (followed by a rough English translation) so as to 
preserve their meaning and nuance as much as possible.  
Plan of the Thesis 
 Chapter 2 reviews the dynamics of the internal armed conflict in Colombia, 
paying particular attention to the tactical use of forced displacement as a tool of war. It 
also provides a brief overview of the historical and current-day context of Cartagena, 
Colombia. Chapter 3 focuses on the individual and family response strategies of IDPs 
upon arrival in Cartagena. It touches upon processes of securing housing, developing new 
sources of income generation, and navigating changing family dynamics and disrupted 
identities. Chapter 4 explores how those response strategies necessitate the formation of 
new (or reception into existing) social networks as sites of information and economic and 
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emotional support. Chapter 5 details the process of coalescing social networks into 
organizations and movements in the face of several obstacles, including the presence of 
armed actors in Cartagena. It also considers why IDPs choose to engage in such high-risk 
activism given the threats to their lives, their families and their newly-formed social 
networks. Chapter 6 reviews the current international, national and local policy 
frameworks that address internal displacement in Colombia. The chapter also looks at 
how IDP organizations and movements make claims on the state despite frustration with 
and a lack of trust in formal government institutions. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes my 
findings, their implications, and my recommendations for policymakers and planners 
interested in addressing the long-term urban integration of IDPs.  
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Chapter 2  
Forced Displacement in Historical Context:  
Cartagena, Colombia 
 
"Space, like truth, is a very early casualty of war."  
– Hugo Slim, Killing Civilians  
 
 
Colombia is a country of 46 million on the northern tip of the South American 
continent with major coastlines on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In addition to 
being the longest uninterrupted democracy in Latin America, Colombia is widely 
considered an economic success story in the region. In 2011, Colombia’s GDP grew at a 
rate of 5.9%, making it the fourth largest GDP in Latin America (DANE 2012b). It is 
second only to Brazil in greatest biodiversity in the world, and as such, it is a major 
exporter of agricultural goods like flowers, coffee, and most infamously, cocaine, a drug 
derived from the coca leaf. Mining is also one of the largest and fastest growing 
industries, making use of Colombia’s ample natural resources like oil, biofuels, emeralds 
and coal. Unfortunately, that growth is not shared by all: Latin America is the region 
with the most unequal distribution of wealth in the world, and Colombia is the worst 
offender within the region (Rodríguez 2012).  
Land, predictably, is a precious asset in Colombia for its abundance of fertile soil, 
natural resources and access to key ground and sea transportation routes. It is also at the 
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heart of the long-running internal armed conflict responsible for the concentration of 
wealth into the hands of few, thousands of deaths, and the vast flows of internal 
displacement that form the basis for this thesis.  
A brief history of the conflict 
Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an in-depth summary of 
Colombian history,14 it is worth briefly reviewing the origins and character of the current 
conflict. Colombia has a long history of violent partisan politics, leading to chronic 
instability, frequent outbursts of violence and war, and ongoing confrontations. From 
1940 to 1957, long-standing hostilities between Liberal and Conservative political parties 
accelerated into a period of political violence known simply as La Violence [The Violence], 
during which as many as 200,000 were killed. The conflict was ushered to a temporary 
solution through the bipartisan power-sharing deal known as the Frente Nacional [the 
National Front], signed into being in 1957. The terms of the agreement included a 
presidency that rotated between the two parties and the equal distribution of all 
government positions.  
Unfortunately, the National Front proved to be an inadequate and partial 
solution, provoking new forms of anti-government protest from those left out of the two-
party system. Widespread discontent, popular student protest and failed land reform 
policies from the 1960s through the 1970s led to the emergence of armed guerrilla groups 
with roots in Marxist peasant agitation, the most famous of which today is Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). Though Colombia is widely considered 
to be the longest-surviving democracy in Latin America, it can also boast the longest-
surviving guerrilla movement in the region.  
Up until the 1980s, the homicide rates averaged around 30 per 100,000 citizens, 
the highest in the region but still comparable with other violent countries at that time, 
including Brazil, Mexico and Nicaragua. But the drug boom of the 1980s introduced new 
economic and political incentives into the equation. As guerrilla groups began targeting 
landowners through extortion and kidnappings, landowners began contracting private 
militias, known as paramilitaries, to protect their property. Very often these paramilitary 
groups were formed in collusion with drug dealers and the Colombian army. The result 
was an uptick in violent conflict between these armed actors, and the death toll began to 
mount. By 1989, the homicide rate had climbed to 86 per 100,000, and six years later it 
was up to 95 per 100,000. The late 1990s and early 2000s continued to see high rates of 
assault, kidnapping and assassination (Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010; Vidal-López 
2012). Currently, according to the Ministry of Defense, which divides the country into 
“red,” “yellow” or “green” zones according to their level of conflict-related danger, over 
half the total population lives in conflict-affected zones15 (United Nations Human Rights 
Council 2012). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For a full account of Colombian history, see (Palacios 2006). 
15 Of the total population of around 46 million, 2 million live in “red” zones and 22 million live in “yellow” 
zones. 
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Contemporary Colombian history is marked by “chronic armed conflict paired 
with chronic peace negotiations” (Vidal-López 2012, p. 5). Even periods of relative peace 
are continually punctured by violence. In 1989, the guerrilla group M-19 officially 
demobilized after signing an accord with President Belisario Betancur’s administration. 
The constitutional reform of 1991 successfully demobilized four other guerrilla groups, 
incorporating them as political parties. Even so, it is generally recognized that such lulls 
in the conflict merely allowed armed actors a chance to re-group and reinforce their ranks 
in the meantime. In 2002, peace talks with FARC came to a rocky end after three years 
of failed negotiations. Under the Justice and Peace Law of 2005, the Autodefensas 
Unidas de Colombia (AUC), the main paramilitary group, officially declared a ceasefire 
and began the process of demobilization – though it is still often criticized as an 
incomplete or false transition16 (Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010; Vidal-López 2012). 
In October 2012, for the first time in ten years, President Juan Manuel Santos’s 
government and FARC began renewed peace talks, which continued through May 2013 
(as of publication). It remains to be seen how successful the most recent round of talks 
will be.  
The battle over land 
The diversity of armed actors and victims (heterogeneous in demographics, 
organization, outlook and interest but sharing at least one form of human rights 
violation) makes the Colombian conflict extremely complex (García-Godos and O. Lid 
2010). Though the Colombian conflict is often simplistically portrayed as a drug war, 
what’s at the heart of the struggle is contestation over land. In the past sixty years, 
guerrilla groups, paramilitaries and state military forces have all been implicated in 
territorial struggles, an obvious result of which has been mass internal displacement. 
Since the 1980s, the rate of growth in the concentration of rural landownership in 
Colombia has been among the fastest in the world (Palacios 2012). 
Several government-led, large-scale land and agrarian reform projects have been 
attempted since the 1930s, but to little effect. From the 1950s to the 1970s, stalemates 
between rival political parties prevented the implementation of any one of a number of 
reforms (Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010). Starting in the 1980s, in Colombia and 
throughout Latin America, policy reforms based on land expropriation and redistribution 
gave way to the neoliberal agenda of strengthening private property rights and private 
markets for land (Friedemann-Sánchez 2012). Perversely, these policies led to drug 
cartels in Colombia investing heavily in land in the 1980s and 1990s, amounting to what 
has been called “counter-agrarian reform.” Narco-traffickers bought up more than 2.5 
million acres of land – or about one-twelfth of Colombia’s productive farmland – 
between 1983 and 1985 alone (Theidon 2009). According to one estimate, another 6 
million hectares were purchased by drug cartels between 1985 and 1995 as a way of 
laundering money and buying into an elite, nouveau riche class of landowners (Tate 2007).  
But drug cartels are not the only actors responsible for the concentration of land 
into the hands of a few and the consequential dispossession of many. Land has been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 For a full account of the sustained presence of the “successor groups” formed mainly from demobilized 
paramilitaries, see (Human Rights Watch 2010).  
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purchased or forcibly seized for a variety of economic, military and political purposes. 
The accumulation and concentration of land by legal (e.g. international agribusiness and 
mining companies) and illicit actors (e.g. drug traffickers, paramilitaries, etc.) is often 
both cause and effect of the conflict. The forcible displacement of rural peasants and 
farmers has become an economic strategy for the accumulation of land. 
Estimates of the scale of land abandoned or forcibly appropriated vary. Official 
estimates, which only include land lost and declared by IDPs, count around 3 million 
hectares total. However, other civil society surveys indicate much higher numbers. One 
estimate is that between 1998 and 2008, about 5.5 million hectares – almost 11 percent 
of all agricultural land in Colombia – were stripped or abandoned (Andreu-Guzmán 
2012). The UN Human Rights Council’s most recent report on Colombia (2012) offers 
an estimate of 6.5 million hectares (though even this more generous number this does not 
include dispossession of collectively-owned land). 
 Though Colombia has a long tradition of protecting individual property rights, 
formal law often clashes with the parallel tradition of informal, non-titled transfer of land 
rights, particularly in the rural areas most prone to conflict and forced displacement. 
Most public policies ignore the informality of land transfer and ownership, which, 
predictably, makes such land claims difficult to prove within the formal court system. The 
policy emphasis on individual private property also comes into conflict with collective 
land rights, made possible by Law 70 of 1993 for certain ethnic groups, including 
indigenous peoples and Afro-Colombians. There have been several documented incidents 
of mass displacement of these communities from their collective land as well as the 
conversion of these lands into large multi-national agro-industrial projects that claim 
individual rights to this property (Alviar García 2012). 
The trends in failed property rights reform and policy, accumulation of land by 
legal and illegal private actors, and the forced dispossession and displacement of peasants 
continue to form the backbone of the conflict today. Land reform remained the most 
central and the most contentious issue for all parties to the recent round of peace talks 
between President Juan Manuel Santos’s government and FARC (Tomaselli 2013). The 
main points on the peace agenda revolved around rural economic development (including 
addressing the pervasive farming of illegal drug crops) and land redistribution. Other 
considerations included the political participation of demobilized guerrillas, negotiations 
over victims’ rights, and an eventual across-the-board end to the conflict (Neuman 
2012b).  
Internal displacement in Colombia 
The struggle over land is not just a story about guerrillas, paramilitaries, drug 
cartels and the Colombian military. It is also a story about massive internal migration and 
forced displacement. Between 4.9 and 5.5 million people (between 10.5 and 11.7% of the 
total national population) have been internally displaced,17 almost all of whom have been 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 The disparity in estimates is a result of differing statistical methodology. The Colombian government 
places the estimate closer to 4.9 million (as of December 2012), cumulative since 1997. It only includes 
those registered in the national IDP registry, which by some counts is under-registered by a quarter of the 
full IDP population. The official government statistic also does not count intra-urban displacement, 
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forced from rural lands into the urban periphery. This is the largest population of 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the world, ousting Sudan from the top spot in 
2011 (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2013). On average, this represents a 
rate of sustained displacement of around 300,000 people per year, or roughly 800 daily for 
the past 15 years (Vidal-López 2012). In 2011 alone, over 259,000 were displaced, a clear 
indication that the conflict continues apace (CODHES 2012). 
To be clear, forced displacement is not a casual by-product of internal conflict; it 
is an instrumental tactic of violence that intentionally intimidates and wages war against 
civilian populations. Armed actors, both paramilitaries and guerrillas, use displacement to 
strengthen and expand their territorial control over strategic areas while amassing 
valuable assets (e.g. land and natural resources) and weakening the opposition (Jackson 
2003; Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Slim 2008; Braun 2009). The Colombian military has also 
used displacement as a tactical strategy of “draining the water to catch the fish,” forcibly 
emptying regions it considers to be social bases of guerilla groups (Andreu-Guzmán 
2012). Business interests are also implicated: confessions of former paramilitary leaders 
(required under the Justice and Peace Law of 2005) revealed that the systematic 
displacement and illegal appropriation of lands often went hand-in-hand with land-
intensive development projects like industrial agricultural and mining (Vidal-López 
2012). As Slim (2008) explains, “The typical purpose of war is create ‘new facts on the 
ground’ – facts of demography, ownership and power. Forced displacement…does this 
very efficiently” (p. 76).  
Though there are documented cases of mass displacements of entire communities 
(particularly Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities), the vast majority (93%) of 
displacement occurs gota a gota [drop by drop], forcing individual families to flee their 
homes one by one. Most displacement is the result of direct threats or violence against 
individuals or families (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011b). 
Colombia has experienced consistent urbanization since La Violencia in the 1950s. 
Back then, around 75% of Colombia’s national population lived in rural areas while only 
25% lived in cities. Today, this trend is reversed at 75% urban and 25% rural, and the past 
decade has seen an intensification of rural-urban migration, whether conflict-related or 
not (Albuja and Ceballos 2010; Taylor 2010). Internal displacement takes place on the 
backdrop of this urbanization. As in the rest of the world, IDPs in Colombia migrate 
from rural areas to urban ones, driven by the perceived greater access to public services 
and infrastructure, opportunities for employment, pre-existing familial or personal 
connections and sometimes even distance from place of origin (made attractive by 
distance from areas considered dangerous or insecure) (Carrillo 2009). 
IDPs settle primarily on the urban periphery, often in informal settlements or 
other poor neighborhoods already suffering from lack of economic opportunity, tight 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
displacement caused by new paramilitary groups or displacement due to crop fumigation. The larger 
estimate, calculated by the independent NGO Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el 
Desplazamiento (CODHES), places the estimate at 5.5 million (as of December 2011), cumulative since 
1985. It takes into account a wider array of sources and reports than the official government statistic 
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2013). 
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land markets and unstable living conditions. The influx of thousands of IDPs has serious 
implications for land management and overcrowding, an increasing burden on municipal 
authorities and service provision, and the integration of a large, low-skilled labor force 
into strained local economies (Carrillo 2009). The population pressure increases the 
physical density and verticality of these urban settlements and creates greater competition 
for already limited resources (Vidal López, Atehortúa Arredondo, and Salcedo 2011). 
In terms of municipal engagement with IDPs, there is a disconnect between the 
national framework for IDP assistance and translating that to on-the-ground service 
provision. Colombia is one of the only countries in the world that has attempted to 
address internal displacement through a comprehensive national policy and legal 
agenda,18 and a relatively progressive one at that (Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre 2012). However, the 1991 Constitution, written in the midst of ongoing internal 
violence, established a policy of what some have called “incomplete decentralization” 
(Ibáñez and Velásquez 2008). Policies and programs are designed at the national level but 
rely on local implementation (often without the necessary accompanying human or 
financial resources). Coordination mechanisms, assignment of responsibilities and 
accountability, and flexibility of policy adaptation to the local context are all murky 
within the current IDP aid system (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011a). As 
a result, local public resources are strained as municipal authorities are tasked with 
absorbing and providing services to thousands of new IDP residents without much 
outside support. Due to a lack of political will and incentives, as well as serious budget 
shortfalls, municipal authorities are often unable or unwilling to address IDP needs and 
rights despite the central government and legal mandate to do so (Ferris and Halff 
2011b).  
Even if city officials were willing and able, the task is complicated by the gota a 
gota [drop by drop] settlement of most IDP households in marginalized neighborhoods, 
making IDPs hard to distinguish from their non-IDP neighbors. Some of that 
“invisibility” is by choice and some is because of a lack of familiarity with the national aid 
system. A 2010 survey ordered by the Constitutional Court of Colombia found that over 
23% of the IDP population is not officially registered in the national aid system either 
because they did not declare their displacement or because their application was rejected. 
Of those not registered, 45% said they did not register because they did not know how 
and 30% said they did not register because of fear of discovery and retribution by those 
they wished to flee in the first place (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011b).  
Translating national policy into action is not a simple feat, but that act of 
translation can be accomplished by a variety of actors – not just the state, but social 
movements and civil society, as well. In addition to significant judicial activism 
(Rodríguez-Garavito 2011), Colombia has a long tradition of popular movements, social 
organizations and active non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Bogotá was initially 
the home base for most major social movements, but in recent years, a number of local 
organizations have cropped up in medium and large towns and cities (Delgado and 
Laegreid 2001). IDPs have followed suit in the past two decades, and as of 2010, there 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Chapter 6 for a longer description and analysis of the current legal and policy framework on internal 
displacement in Colombia. 
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were an estimated 2,000 IDP civil society organizations across the country. This is a level 
of organization unparalleled by any other country in the world with similar refugee or 
IDP situations (Taylor 2010). This thesis will explore not only how IDPs adjust to new 
social environments in cities but also how they begin to form social movements that make 
demands on the state, often taking law as the focal point of their claims.  
Cartagena de Indias: Invisible displacement 
	  
 
Cartagena (by its full name Cartagena de Indias), a coastal city of over 967,000 
residents,19 is the fifth largest urban center in Colombia. It is the capital of the 
departamento [department] of Bolívar and one of the most important industrial ports on 
the Caribbean coast. Cartagena is a center of tourism for both international and 
Colombian vacationers, and in 1984, the old colonial center was named a UNESCO 
World Heritage Site.  
It is often said that Cartagena is actually two cities – one a tourist center and the 
other, the “ciudad popular” (the working class city), lacking in seaside realty and tourist 
attractions. The latter is home to marginalized populations that do not square well with 
the glossy photos used to promote the former (Toro 2010). As one IDP woman explains, 
“When all those presidents came to Cartagena for the Summit of the Americas,20 they 
didn’t walk through the poor neighborhoods. They just saw one side of the city.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 According to the 2012 projections based on the most recent national census in 2005 (DANE 2012a).  
20 She is referring to the Organization of American States (OAS) Summit of the Americas, which took 
place in Cartagena in April 2012. Presidents and other high-ranking officials from across North and South 
 	   30 
Cartagena, like most capital cities of the 32 Colombian departments, is one of the 
main receptor sites for IDPs around the country. The most recent estimates place the 
displaced population at 82,000 since 1985, which would make it over 8 percent of the 
total city population. During that same period, another 10,000 have been displaced from 
Cartagena as a result of the ongoing violence in the urban periphery (Alcaldía Mayor de 
Cartagena de Indias 2013).21 Over 8,700 new IDPs arrived in Cartagena between 2009 
and 2011 alone (CODHES 2012). 
The economic and strategic value of land and natural resources in Bolívar, as well 
as the presence of guerrilla groups like Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) – which, it 
is important to note, was not included in the 2012-2013 round of peace talks – has 
resulted in significant displacement throughout the region. Furthermore, between 2010 
and 2011, Bolívar also had the third highest number of narco and paramilitary actions 
among all Colombian departments (LIMPAL 2011). The southern part of the Bolívar 
department is known for its production of illegal goods and represents a strategic corridor 
to the sea (through the port of Cartagena) for the transportation and trade of arms and 
drugs. It is also the site of 40% of national gold production. From 1996 to 2000, Bolívar 
experienced a period of extreme violence marked by several massacres.22 This rural 
conflict has been identified as one of the main sources of displacement to Cartagena, 
though it is often difficult to name which armed actors are to blame in specific 
circumstances.23 Guerrilla groups, paramilitaries, and state military forces have all been 
implicated (Prada and Mieles 2007; Guerrero Acevedo, Altahona, and Piñeros 2009; 
Defensoría del Pueblo 2011).  
According to a 2007 survey of IDPs, the three most popular reasons for choosing 
to migrate to Cartagena were presence of family member or friend in the city (61%), 
perception of security in the city (17%) and closeness to site of original displacement (9%) 
(Prada and Mieles 2007). Upon arrival to Cartagena, most IDPs settle in the urban 
periphery in the ciudad popular. The neighborhoods with the largest IDP populations are 
some of the poorest in the city (Tapia Góngora 2006). Around 75% of the displaced 
population in Cartagena lives under the national line of extreme poverty (compared to 
62% of the total city population) (ICRC-WFP 2007).  
High levels of poverty, unemployment and informality, as well as a lack of 
political clout (as many recently-arrived or undeclared IDPs are not locally registered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
America come together every few years through OAS to discuss a variety of multilateral issues like 
democratization, economic development and trade relationships.   
21 However, these government estimates may be skewed considering 55% of the displaced population in 
Cartagena has not officially declared their status with the government agency responsible for the national 
IDP registry, according to 2007 survey of 1,200 residents of Cartagena (ICRC-WFP 2007). 
22 Perhaps most famous is the 2000 El Salado massacre in which, over the course of two days, 400 
paramilitaries terrorized a small village in Bolívar, killing over 100 people and dumping their bodies into 
mass graves. 
23 Very often IDP families have no clear idea who or which group was the main perpetrator of their 
displacement. At least 45% of households interviewed in a 2007 survey in Cartagena said they could not 
identify their aggressor. Of those that could, 28% identified paramilitaries, 24% guerrilla groups, 2% the 
Colombian military and 1% common crime (Prada and Mieles 2007). The blame is clearly to be shared 
across multiple armed actors.  
 	   31 
voters), mean that there is little political pressure to address the specific needs of the IDP 
community in Cartagena. Furthermore, because of the desire to brand the city as a tourist 
destination, there is little motivation among city leaders to publicize the severity of the 
situation. Increasingly there have also been reports of IDPs being forcibly displaced yet 
again within city bounds to make way for new development projects.24 The end result is 
the “invisibility” of IDPs in Cartagena (Tapia Góngora 2006; Defensoría del Pueblo 
2011).   
However, in the past few years in Cartagena, as in the rest of country, there are 
newly burgeoning IDP social movements demanding attention, leading marches, and 
negotiating with the city government. How do these movements emerge given the 
vulnerability and relative invisibility of IDPs in Cartagena? The next few chapters will 
seek to answer this question.  
Summary  
 Throughout the course of Colombian history there have been cycles of conflict 
and attempted peace. As Colombia enters the most recent round of peace talks, it is 
important to recognize what lies at the root of the conflict – land – and to recognize who 
benefits and who suffers from accumulation and dispossession. This chapter has provided 
a brief overview of the internal armed conflict in Colombia to set the backdrop for 
understanding internal displacement. Cartagena, a city on the Caribbean coast, will serve 
as the case study site for the remainder of this thesis. Chapter 3 will address IDP 
response strategies to urban settlement after forced displacement. The units of the 
individual or the family cannot be divorced from the political economy within which they 
reside, so the historical trends reviewed in this chapter are important to keep in mind at 
all scales of survival, adaptation and change.   
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This is a clear example of how conflict-induced displacement and development-induced displacement are 
not easily extricable. 
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Chapter 3 
IDPs Respond to Urban Settlement 
 
Maria and her husband used to own a farm in El Carmen del Bolívar in the 
central region of the department of Bolívar, but twenty years ago, her entire village was 
displaced by ongoing violence between guerrillas and paramilitaries.25 Maria and her 
children escaped by walking two hours to the nearest small city, Playón. Many of the men 
stayed behind and several were killed or severely beaten, including her own husband, 
brother and several cousins.  
After a year or so in Playón, the family moved to Cartagena in 1992. Maria’s 
aunt, the only person she knew in the city, offered them a small plot of vacant land 
adjacent to her house, where Maria improvised shelter by filling in a swampy area with 
trash and laying pallets on the ground to keep her eight children above the flood-prone 
ground. Thirteen people lived in that one makeshift house together, including some 
nieces and nephews. Maria, who had only ever been a farmer, began doing whatever she 
could to earn a small income, picking up one-time jobs or selling fish in the city’s central 
market. They often went to bed hungry. Even so, it never occurred to them to return to 
their community of origin. This life in Cartagena, though by no means easy or 
comfortable, was better than certain death back in the countryside. 
 
Though this may be their first time visiting (let alone living in) a big city and 
though their skillsets are largely unsuited to urban labor markets, around 80% of IDPs in 
Colombia prefer local integration to return to place of origin (Carrillo 2009). The most 
recent data on IDPs in Cartagena, compiled from a 2006 University of Cartagena survey, 
reflects similar trends: 73% would prefer to settle in Cartagena for the long term, 14% 
would prefer settlement elsewhere in an unspecified location, and only 8% said they 
would prefer return to place of origin (Tapia Góngora 2006). 
George, an IDP who fled a rural region on the Pacific coast after his life was 
threatened, explains his decision to settle in Cartagena in the following way: 
“Remembering is too hard. What has been lost has been lost. The only thing you can get 
back is your life. I wouldn’t return there for any money in the world.” For George, it is 
best to leave the trauma behind, to create emotional and physical distance from his past. 
Perhaps more importantly, George says that to return would be to invite certain death 
because of the continued presence of armed actors. Everything was burned down when he 
fled – the houses, the stores, the land – and he lost everything. The persistent insecurity 
and violence in rural areas means that for most Colombian IDPs, “urban integration 
constitutes not only the dominant strategy for spontaneous economic and social 
reconstruction, but also the most realistic one” (Meertens 2003, p. 3).  
When IDPs arrive in cities, they face two main struggles: the first is the 
immediate day-to-day survival of their families (including securing shelter, food and 
water), and the second is the struggle for social recognition, both on a micro level at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Maria’s story is particularly interesting for the circumstances of her displacement, which will be explored 
more in Chapter 4.  
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neighborhood scale and on a macro institutional level in their relationship to the state 
(Jiménez Ocampo, Abello Llanos, and Palacio Sañudo 2003). This chapter will focus on 
the former, while the latter will be explored in depth in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Though it is 
impossible to fully separate these two interrelated processes, I have chosen to make the 
distinction here to give adequate space to exploring the survival and response strategies of 
individuals and families.  
No individual or family exists in isolation in the city, and yet, when they arrive, 
they often arrive alone, gota a gota [drop by drop]. Many of the challenges of settling in 
the city are shared between IDPs and economic migrants – securing shelter, finding 
employment, and navigating public services – but the unique experience of displacement 
has profound implications for these otherwise familiar processes of urban integration. 
 In one of the only case studies of urban settlement that differentiates between 
IDPs, the historic poor and economic migrants, Jacobsen and Howe (2008) compare the 
experiences of these three groups all living in the same neighborhoods of Santa Marta, a 
city on the Caribbean coast of Colombia. Their survey found that despite similar reported 
levels of unemployment and poverty, IDPs fare worse than non-IDPs (including both 
historic poor and economic migrants) on almost all indicators of wellbeing, including 
levels of education, contracted work, housing material, size of household, and a range of 
other household difficulties, including number of disabled people in household. Between 
IDPs and economic migrants, IDPs were more likely to have abandoned assets upon 
migration and also anticipated more problems if they were to return to communities of 
origin. George’s story, for example, illustrates the extent to which IDPs arrive with few, if 
any, assets intact, unlike economic migrants who may retain possession not only of 
material belongings but also of the social connections that are so key to survival in a new 
place.  
With few to no contacts in the host city prior to arrival, IDPs must find or 
improvise housing, buy food (often for the first times in their lives as former 
agriculturalists), confront serious shifts in personal and collective identities, and face 
emotional and psychological distress as a result of displacement. These survival and 
response strategies eventually require an engagement with the process of either reception 
into or formation of social networks, which will be explored in future chapters. 
The transition to the city 
 
“I’ve lost everything and I can never get it back, but life goes on as it must.” 
- Ana, an IDP woman in Cartagena 
 
Colombia, one of the most biodiverse countries in the world, is marked by 
ecological and geographical diversity, as well as ethnic and socio-cultural diversity.26 The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 As a public official at the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF), the national agency 
responsible for family welfare, explained to me: “Colombia is very diverse: there are rivers, there are seas, 
there are jungles, there are mountains, there are plains. The particulars are different in each region, each 
population, each neighborhood, each community, each street, each sidewalk…The different climates, the 
different temperaments, the different ways of thinking – that has a big influence.”  
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move from one place to another implies not only changes in physical space and climate, 
but also in accent, diet, custom and social norms (Braun 2009).  
In terms of climate alone, it is not an easy transition from a rural area in the 
Montes de María mountain range in the south of Bolívar into a low-lying coastal city 
with tropical heat like Cartagena – with average temperatures in the high 80s and 90s °F 
with 90% humidity throughout the year. Arriving for the first time in an unfamiliar city, 
several children in tow, having walked for hours (if not days), with no money for food or 
water, the heat and the mosquitos can be brutal.  
Compounding that arduous and abrupt transition, displacement is not just about 
the loss of physical property, but also the loss or rupture of traditional livelihoods, of 
culture, and of life projects (Meertens 2001). For campesinos [farmers or peasants] who 
are used to eating their own harvests, butchering their own livestock, and pulling yucca 
straight from the ground, life in the city can be overwhelming and confusing. Hunger is 
often a completely new phenomenon for people used to working and producing food 
from their land (Bello 2001). Supermarkets are a novelty, prices of food27 and water28 can 
be shocking in comparison to self-sustenance, and there is very little (if any) arable land 
available for farming. One IDP woman says the only things she used to have to buy were 
salt and soap because most everything else she and her family needed came from the earth 
or from her own hands. This sort of self-reliance is impossible in the city, which 
represents a fundamental shift in lifestyle, household expenditures and even identity.  
Diana had arrived in Cartagena just one month before I met her, fleeing the 
countryside where her husband had been murdered and she and her children had been 
violently threatened. Diana chose to move to Cartagena to look for work, knowing no 
one and never having been to the city before. She is thus both IDP and economic 
migrant, though, as Bakewell (2011) predicts, she defines herself more by the subjective 
experience of feeling “out of place” than by the fact of her migration. As Diana explains, 
it has been a drastic shift to leave everything behind, to move from a life where you have 
your own home, your own land, where you have enough to feed and clothe your children, 
where you are not wanting for anything, to city where you know no one, you own 
nothing and you cannot support yourself the only way you know how.  
The emotional devastation and shock of displacement is exacerbated by the loss of 
assets and income that push most IDPs into poverty, if not extreme poverty (Carrillo 
2009). Around the country, IDPs are more than twice as likely29 to live below the 
Colombian national poverty line compared to the general population, and more than four 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In a 2007 study, IDP households around the country identified food as one of the biggest (if not the 
biggest) household expenditures. In Cartagena, IDP households reported they spent around 54% of their 
household expenditures on food, which was the equivalent of monthly expenditures at around $175.52 
USD on average (ICRC-WFP 2007)  
28 As one IDP woman commented to me, “Why should I pay for contaminated water here in the city when 
I used to drink it pure for free back in the countryside?” 
29 In 2010, around 96% of displaced families (both those registered with the government and those not 
registered) reported an income below the poverty line, while around 45% of the general population reported 
income below the poverty line (Human Rights Watch 2012). 
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times as likely30 to live below the extreme poverty line (Human Rights Watch 2012). As 
of the most recent countrywide statistics available in 2012, only 11 percent of IDPs 
reported access to adequate housing and fewer than 5 percent reported access to 
opportunities for income generation (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2012).  
Diana’s story exemplifies the struggles that all IDPs must undergo upon arrival 
and integration into a city: securing housing, scraping out an income, managing changing 
family dynamics and renegotiating personal and collective identity. 
Playing “hopscotch”: Residential instability and securing housing 
The process of displacement tends to take place in two steps: an initial move to a 
small or mid-size town near rural place of origin, followed by a second move to a larger 
city (Carrillo 2009). Over 8% of displaced families report being forcibly displaced two 
times or more (CODHES 2012). More recently, there have been increasing reports of 
intra-urban displacement, or families relocating more than once within the same city. 
Many IDP families in Cartagena report such multiple moves as a result of ongoing 
threats31 and the perceived or actual presence of urban gangs or neo-paramilitary groups 
known as bandas criminales (bacrim for short). Some families move to avoid the 
recruitment of their children into prostitution or armed groups, others because of threats 
to their lives based on their actual or perceived loyalties to one group or another.32 
This “hopscotch” effect not only extends the process of displacement but also 
delays the formation of social safety nets in sites of reception for a longer period of time. 
The longer people have lived in a place, the more “rooted” they become. This place 
attachment facilitates “a sense of security and well-being, defines group boundaries and 
stabilizes memories against the passage of time” (Gieryn 2000, p. 481). Multiple moves, 
whether by choice or by force, prevent the formation of place attachment and residential 
stability, which have been linked to stronger social networks, higher levels of political 
participation, access to higher quality resources and economic livelihoods, and lower 
levels of crime and violence (Kasarda and Janowitz 1974; Sampson, Raudenbush, and 
Earls 1997; Jha, Rao, and Woolcock 2007; Sampson 2008; Vidal López, Atehortúa 
Arredondo, and Salcedo 2011). IDP instability and insecurity can thus reinforce itself in 
a vicious cycle. 
When it comes to finding shelter, there is a dedicated agency in Cartagena, 
Corvivienda, that is responsible for guaranteeing housing33 for IDPs within the district, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 In 2010, almost 79% of the IDP families registered with the government reported incomes below the 
extreme poverty line, compared to only 17% of the general population. Among female-headed IDP 
families, the rate was even higher at 86% (Human Rights Watch 2012). 
31 Humberto, director of APRODIC (the same community organization for which Gloria works), tells me 
about one IDP woman in Cartagena whose husband was disappeared and whose daughter and daughter-
in-law were threatened. When she declared the disappearance to the relevant government authorities, she 
was threatened and forced to move for a second time. Her husband was finally found in a mass grave in 
another department to the east of Bolívar, and the woman was subsequently threatened and displaced yet 
again.  
32 Fears of recruitment and injury because of the presence of armed actors in Cartagena will be examined in 
greater detail in Chapter 5.  
33 I will go into more detail about the state-based aid process in Chapter 6.   
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but the processes through which it allocates financial support and housing units can take 
years, explains Gloria, co-founder of APRODIC, a human rights organization in 
Cartagena. As another community organizer explains, “waiting for help from the 
government would be fatal.” Some IDPs are completely unaware of the aid available to 
them.  
While waiting for as long as multiple years for housing subsidies or homes from 
Corvivienda, IDPs have three main options: live with relatives or friends, secure land and 
improvise their own shelter (legally titled or not), or rent from local residents.  
When IDPs have relatives or friends living in their chosen sites of reception, they 
often stay with them for short periods of time. However, moving into already cramped 
living spaces with multiple family members is not a viable option in the long-run, 
particularly when, as in Maria’s case, there can be up to 13 people living in one house. 
When IDPs leave this initial temporary shelter, they have little choice but to rent 
or to become invasores [literally, invaders], occupying vacant land illegally. Access to the 
formal land and property markets in cities requires far more purchasing power than most 
IDPs can muster, not to mention financial and credit history and documentation. As a 
result, only a small percentage of IDPs own34 their own houses, most of which are of poor 
quality, built of temporary materials35 that do not meet minimum living condition 
standards, and often lack access to public services like water or sewers.36  
Furthermore, some state policies designed to provide housing aid to IDPs can 
inadvertently stand in the way of long-term integration. For example, for those IDPs that 
do manage to build or buy their own houses (legally or not), when their claims in 
Corvivienda are finally processed, state agencies sometimes revoke an offer of aid if they 
see that the claimants already have a “home,” inadequate as it may be. 
In a well-known pattern of slum-led urbanization in many developing country 
cities, as more and more IDPs and other migrants move into city over time, the amount 
of available land quickly depletes and as a result, many resort to living in high-risk areas, 
which are vulnerable to flooding, rockslides, unstable foundations, and other dangers.37 
The growing demand for housing in turn raises property prices even in “undesirable” 
neighborhoods, making the prospect of becoming a homeowner even more remote (Bello 
2001; Meertens 2001; Albuja and Ceballos 2010; Vidal López, Atehortúa Arredondo, 
and Salcedo 2011).  
If they choose instead to rent, as most IDPs do, the lack of income and the 
consequent reliance on temporary and intermittent municipal rental subsidies increases 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 In a 2007 study, only 2% of IDPs in Cartagena owned their homes with legal titles (ICRC-WFP 2007). 
35 In a 2005 study, over 50% of IDP households in Bogotá and Cartagena were made of inappropriate 
materials, such as cloth, cardboard or scraps of wood, compared to 16% of non-IDP households in the 
same areas (Human Rights Watch 2005). Two years later, another survey found that over 67% of IDP 
households reported below minimum standards for flooring materials (compared to 51% of non-IDP 
households) and almost 79% reported below minimum standards for wall materials (compared to 67% of 
non-IDP households) (ICRC-WFP 2007).  
36 In Cartagena in 2005, only 1% of IDP households were connected to a sewer system (Human Rights 
Watch 2005). Two years later, another survey found that in waste collection was also much worse for IDP 
residents of Cartagena than non-IDP residents (ICRC-WFP 2007).  
37 In Cartagena in 2007, 80% of IDP households reported being at risk of flooding and 32% reported risk 
of subsidence (ICRC-WFP 2007).  
 	   37 
the risk of eviction. As a result, the state-based aid programs that are designed to help 
IDPs actually make them “unreliable and undesirable tenants and exposes them to 
conflict and successive evictions, leaving them even more precarious than before” (Vidal 
López, Atehortúa Arredondo, and Salcedo 2011, p. 20). Furthermore, since most IDPs 
rent from homeowners (legally titled or not) who depend upon the additional income 
from leasing extra rooms, these kinds of evictions create ongoing tensions between IDPs 
and host communities. “Sometimes we can’t sleep at night, knowing we may not have the 
money to pay and that they might kick us out,” says one IDP man. 
For many, the loss of the home is one of the greatest and most enduring impacts 
of forced displacement and conflict (Walker 2009). Gloria explains that the loss of 
“home” and the inability to obtain a new one in the city has great symbolic value for IDPs 
– IDP women in particular – who feel unsafe and insecure and who wish to protect their 
families. Not having a roof to call their own increases a sense of uncertainty and 
helplessness. The lack of ownership and private space limits independence and autonomy, 
which have already been diminished by the loss of control in armed conflict and forced 
displacement (Bello 2001). This is what Hugo Slim (2008) has called the “spatial 
suffering” of war: the frustrating, humiliating and disempowering lack of control over 
one’s own mobility (or immobility) and “the costly and subjugating experience of being 
forced to reconfigure…movements in line with the political and military domination of 
their space” (p. 84). The inability to plan for an unclear future because of an unclear 
present is one of the most enduring and most challenging impacts of forced displacement 
(Meertens 2001).  
There is also a wider spatial dimension to the struggle for shelter. IDPs, most of 
whom are used to the relatively open expanses of the countryside must adjust to cramped 
households and dense urban neighborhoods. IDP households tend to be larger, younger 
and more crowded38 than their non-IDP neighbors (Human Rights Watch 2005; ICRC-
WFP 2007). Overcrowding, the lack of privacy and shrinking personal space can be an 
uncomfortable novelty. Eduardo, a community organizer who works with IDP 
communities, explains that families often live in makeshift houses without doors, 
multiple members usually share bedrooms and beds, and bathrooms are often improvised 
in what outdoor space is available.39  
The lack of privacy can be particularly traumatic for women and girls, some of 
whom choose to bathe with their clothes on to avoid prying eyes. Female bodily processes 
– menstruation, gestation, lactation, etc. – become “burdensome, uncomfortable, and 
dangerous” in situations like this, putting women and girls at increased risk for abuse 
(Cockburn 2001, p. 21). Because of this, many young girls never get the chance to learn 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 In a 2005 study undertaken in Bogotá and Cartagena, the average IDP household had 4.6 members 
(compared to 3.6 in non-IDP households). Around 40% of the occupants of IDP households were under 
12 years old (compared to 28% in non-IDP households). Over 60% of IDP households lived in homes 
without at least one room used exclusively as a bedroom (compared to 60% of non-IDP households that 
did have a bedroom) (Human Rights Watch 2005). 
39 In Cartagena in 2005, 85% of IDP households did not have private indoor bathrooms (Human Rights 
Watch 2005). 
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about their own bodies, which may partially explain the high rate of teenage pregnancy40 
among IDP women, says Eduardo.41  
Many IDPs say that their top priority and their biggest hope for the future is to 
own a house of their own, built of higher quality materials and located in safer 
neighborhoods. That said, a house is necessary to begin life anew, but it is not enough. 
Without economic opportunity, sustained security, access to education and medical care, 
and, eventually, social integration into supportive communities, a house is still not a 
“home” (Ballard 2012).  
Livelihoods: Securing employment or engaging in rebusque 
Manuel was forced to move to Cartagena in 1996 because paramilitary groups 
were threatening to kill him for his organizing activities as the former director of a rural 
farming collective. He remembers the transition to city life as painful and frustrating: “It’s 
like being an animal kicked out onto the street. We don’t have the customs they have 
here; we don’t know how to navigate the city. In the beginning it was terrible being 
without work, unable to feed our children.” Over 15 years after arriving in Cartagena, 
Manuel still considers himself a temporary resident of the city, but he also knows it will 
be a long time before he can return to the life of a farmer. Manuel says that he, like most 
other IDPs, have had to adapt by living by rebusque [hustling or doing whatever you can 
to earn money] but it has been difficult without knowing anyone and without knowing 
the neighborhoods. “The migajas [crumbs or scraps] they give you for your work don’t 
add up to anything,” he says.  
Because most IDPs settle in historically poor neighborhoods with high 
unemployment and few economic opportunities, competition for what formal and 
informal work is available is intense. With few easily transferable skills, lower levels of 
education and literacy, fewer established job networks, and the added disadvantage of the 
stigma of their status, IDPs can rarely compete effectively against either the historic poor 
or the economic migrants living in Cartagena (Carrillo 2009; Vidal López, Atehortúa 
Arredondo, and Salcedo 2011).  
Broadly speaking, IDP women have an easier time leveraging informal networks 
for daily survival and finding new ways to earn an income (Moser 2001). Women are 
generally better suited than men to compete in urban labor markets because their labor 
experience (whether home-based or not) prior to displacement is usually more relevant 
with respect to certain low-skilled occupations like domestic service or food preparation 
(Calderón, Gáfaro, and Ibáñez 2011). As one IDP woman explains, IDP women are 
often more willing to accept work that pays poorly and that may be uncomfortable or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 One 2011 study found that 35% of IDP women between 15 and 19 had been pregnant at least once, 
compared to the national average of 20%. IDP women are also far more likely to experience physical, 
psychological and sexual abuse than non-IDP women (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011a). 
41 Lack of personal space and shared bedrooms also force many young people to have sexual experiences 
outside of the home. IDP youth generally cannot afford to pay for a room in a sex motel (a common option 
for young people in Colombia who mostly continue to live at home until marriage), says Eduardo, so they 
often find a semi-public space, often outdoors, which can expose youth to multiple health and personal 
safety risks. 
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degrading: “As women, we have to submit to the lowest and the most deplorable jobs in 
all of humanity just to feed our children.”  
IDP men, by contrast, generally have a harder time entering the labor market 
because their job skills (primarily as agriculturalists) are ill-adapted to urban conditions. 
As a result, they often experience a loss of status as breadwinners and undergo a rupture 
in their sense of masculinity, which can have serious impacts on family dynamics 
(Meertens 2001). This has been shown to lead to increased domestic violence,42 alcohol 
and drug abuse, and abandonment (Moser 2001; Human Rights Watch 2005; Carrillo 
2009; Calderón, Gáfaro, and Ibáñez 2011).  
Most IDPs end up working in the informal economy,43 selling cell phone minutes 
on street corners, vending frituras [fried foods], offering massages to beach tourists, etc. 
Most of the IDP women I met were officially unemployed but supported themselves with 
small informal ventures, like weaving traditional Colombian handbags or selling 
homemade pasteles de arroz [rice tamales]. Many women take on jobs in domestic 
service,44 cleaning high-class apartments or hotels in the colonial and beach resort areas of 
Cartagena. One of Maria’s daughters collects empty soda glass bottles, washes them and 
re-uses them to package and sell her own homemade juices. For every meeting with 
LIMPAL, one woman prepares the snacks and meals in exchange for a small sum offered 
by the organization. Among the community leaders, they take turns at each meeting, 
sharing in the opportunity to make a few extra pesos. 
However, the services that IDPs can provide based on previously acquired skillsets 
(food production, for example) have to compete with an overload of similar businesses 
with limited public trading spaces and an impoverished clientele. Some IDPs choose to 
travel to other neighborhoods to avoid confrontations with shopkeepers and other 
vendors, but this increases travel costs, which can be significant in terms of both time and 
money (Vidal López, Atehortúa Arredondo, and Salcedo 2011).  
Many municipal programs to develop skills or provide seed grants for IDPs are 
flawed in their design, relying upon assumed entrepreneurial predispositions and 
activities. These programs are expensive and often ineffective because they do not take 
into account the significant number of small-scale entrepreneurs already operating, 
formally or informally, in the neighborhoods where most IDPs live (Ferris 2008b). As 
one IDP man laments, “You grow up in the countryside and you know how to work the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 The intergenerational transmission of violence through child abuse becomes increasingly common in 
situations of displacement (Calderón, Gáfaro, and Ibáñez 2011). Though it is far less common, IDP 
women have also been known to commit acts of domestic violence. One woman I spoke with admitted to 
having abused her children after the initial period of displacement. She said her own parents used to hit her 
as a child, which she took to be a method of disciplining her own children. However, after participating in 
several human rights workshops and becoming an IDP and women’s rights activist, she realized one day 
that she was perpetuating the cycle of violence that she was working so hard to end. She decided to stop 
hitting her children and to actively intervene when she saw her neighbors, all of whom are IDPs, engaging 
in domestic abuse.   
43 Defined as all economic activities and enterprises that are not regulated by the state, and workers without 
social protections provided through their employment arrangement. 
44 One recent estimate found that 40% of all IDP women in the country are actively working, of which 20% 
works in domestic service, which tends to have low benefits and longer hours than other employment 
options (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011a). 
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land, but in the city, what do you do? Make a little business here when there are so many 
other little businesses? How can I compete with that, whatever pendejadita [stupid little 
trinkets] I can sell?” 
As a result, IDP wages are low, their hours are often longer than legally allowable, 
and there are no labor protections for accident insurance, sick leave, pregnancy or child 
rearing (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011a). In 2011, only 11% of all IDPs 
across Colombia with employment earned the monthly minimum wage set by the 
national government, and overall, almost 60% (68% among IDP women) received less 
than half that amount (Human Rights Watch 2012). Many IDPs report discrimination 
(based on race, regional accent, IDP status, etc.) and even physical and sexual abuse at the 
hands of their employers. One social worker in Cartagena told me about an IDP woman 
who was beaten and emotionally abused by her employer. She kept this abuse secret for 
fear of losing her job, which was her only source of income to feed her children.  
Unfortunately, IDPs often have little choice but to accept harsh working 
conditions because of the oversupply of cheap labor. This creates a precarious situation 
for IDPs who are teetering on the edge of starvation, homelessness and serious medical 
issues45 as a result of their displacement.  
The “poverty violence trap”  
Shouldering the burden of household income, many IDP women resort to 
begging or prostitution, which is particularly common in Cartagena, a city known for sex 
tourism, says Liliana, the coordinator of Mesa de Mujeres por los Derechos Económicos 
Sociales y Culturales (Mesa DESC), a human rights advocacy umbrella organization. 
“Displacement forces them to come to the city, where they have to take on a different 
life, and the only thing available to them is the street,” she explains. IDP girls are 
particularly vulnerable to recruitment into prostitution, some as young as 14 or 15.  
Meanwhile, IDP men, particularly young men, are often targeted and recruited 
into either armed groups or urban gangs, which—like gangs around the world—provide 
these struggling young men with an income, a recognized social identity and a sense of 
security (Cockburn 2004). For example, one 19-year-old IDP sicario [hired killer] was 
known to have killed 20 people in one year for just about $25 USD a head. For him, that 
criminal livelihood option was more lucrative than unemployment or living by rebusque. 
“We came to the city where we thought we’d be safer, but no,” says Maria’s 
daughter Eva. “Now they’re recruiting here in all the barrios. There’s just as much 
violence, there’s limpieza social,46 and young men are recruited with money and the 
promise of ‘security.’ But it’s a false security.”  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 It only takes one health emergency to push a family from barely surviving into destitution. When Isabel 
(who we met in the Introduction) arrived in Cartagena in 1992, her ten-month-old son at the time was 
very ill, and she had no choice but to beg on the streets to feed him. Her son was eventually hospitalized 
and then passed away. “With your own labor, with your street vending, with your micro-business, you can 
feed yourself, but when someone in your family gets sick and they go to the hospital, that can be fatal for 
the whole family,” Isabel says.  
46 Translated literally as “social cleansing,” this is the practice by which armed actors, usually paramilitary 
groups, carry out extrajudicial killings of “undesirables,” including the homeless, sympathizers of other 
armed groups, labor activists, prostitutes, etc. 
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This is not to say that some women aren’t also recruited into armed groups,47 but 
the vast majority of armed actors in Colombia are men (Schwitalla and Dietrich 2007). 
Anthropologist Kimberly Theidon’s work on demobilized ex-combatants (2009) 
addresses what she points to as a lack of attention paid to the cultural and political 
economy of  “militarized masculinity”48 so pervasive in Colombia. Soldiering, whether in 
the state military or in another armed group, is tied to social and economic mobility, as 
well as ideals of citizenship. Lacking other viable employment options, a man’s “bodily 
capital—and the high premium placed on physical force and prowess with a weapon—
may be all they have to trade on the labor market” (p. 23).  
Theidon found that a majority of those men who joined armed groups did so 
either via an acquaintance or because they lived in a zone already controlled by an armed 
group. This finding demonstrates the importance of social ties and the fact that “these 
young people grew up in contexts in which alternatives to war were almost invisible” (p. 
17).49 This harkens back to Lubkemann’s theory of war as a social condition. Youth, 
inequality and poverty have all been found to be key factors that facilitate recruitment 
into armed groups in Colombia (Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Curtin 2008). 
Davis (2012) calls this the “poverty violence trap”: in contexts in which 
employment is limited and poverty is rising, impressionable youth “are more willing to 
participate in violent activities where some income generation is possible” (p. 17). As 
violence increases, legitimate businesses move elsewhere, further limiting legal 
employment options – in a self-reinforcing cycle. 
For the IDPs who have settled in cities precisely to avoid the armed conflict from 
which they fled, the presence of gangs and ongoing urban violence is disillusioning, to say 
the least. Cities, which perhaps once represented a relative refuge from the violence that 
used to be concentrated in rural areas, no longer represent a secure escape from the 
influence of armed groups or urban gangs. As Pécaut (2000) wrote over a decade ago, 
"There are no spaces free of the intervention of the informal or illegal networks of power 
in Colombia" (p. 102). The impact of armed actors in urban areas will be examined in 
greater depth in Chapter 5.  
Managing changing family dynamics 
Many IDPs experience familial fragmentation – because of death, abandonment, 
dispersion or recruitment into armed groups – and/or reconfiguration – because of new 
romantic partners, new children, etc. (Bello 2001). Single motherhood becomes 
increasingly common, as do non-traditional forms of child-rearing, wherein members of 
extended family networks share homes and responsibilities.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 For example, it is estimated that of the 31,000 paramilitary members that demobilized in 2005 after 
official negotiations under the Justice and Peace Law, only 6% are female. Of the additional 10,000 
thought to have demobilized voluntarily, 14% are female. A quarter of all demobilized children are girls.    
48 Defined as “that fusion of certain practices and images of maleness with the use of weapons, the exercise 
of violence, and the performance of an aggressive and frequently misogynist masculinity” (p. 5). 
49 As Eduardo, a community organizer who works with IDP communities in Cartagena and Barranquilla, 
explained to me: “Men are being trained to be violent. They're made for the army, the police, the guerrilla, 
and the paramilitary. But it's not just us. We also have a violent state that solves everything through 
violence.” 
 	   42 
The struggles of economic coping can cause other ruptures in family dynamics as 
traditional gender roles at home and in the public sphere begin to shift, as mentioned in 
the section above (Meertens 2012). Sometimes, the new arrangement in household 
earnings can entail a shift in child-rearing responsibilities, with men learning to cook and 
care for children at home while women earn what they can outside of the home.50 “It’s a 
drastic change in roles,” says Carmen, a social worker in Cartagena, “particularly when 
you consider that the machista51 culture continues to teach that the man is the provider 
and the woman is the one who stays at home…These mitos culturales [cultural myths] hit 
up against the reality of living in displacement. It creates some serious cultural shocks for 
families.”  
Each IDP household handles these changing family dynamics differently. Some 
men can’t stand the pressure and abandon their families, while others continue to expect 
the women to clean, cook and care for their children, even after she has spent the whole 
day working in someone else’s home to earn an income, says Carmen.  
Other families rely on older children to assist in childcare and income generation 
(Bello 2001). Only 38 days after giving birth, Maria had to leave her infant child in the 
care of her other young children to go find work so that they wouldn’t die of hunger. 
Widespread unemployment and underemployment of adult IDPs often means that their 
children are less likely to finish schooling52 because of the need for extra income sources 
(Human Rights Watch 2005).  
For young people, growing up in a situation of displacement can be particularly 
difficult during the period of “discovering themselves,” says Carolina, Maria’s daughter. 
The urban context “doesn’t offer you anything but drugs, but alcohol, but things that 
degrade you as a human being,” she says, which she thinks is very distinct from 
adolescence in the countryside where young men prove their adulthood by beginning to 
cultivate their own plots of land under the guidance of their fathers. But in the city, says 
Carolina, “a young man isn’t going to say ‘I want to plant with you,’ but instead ‘I want to 
go do drugs with my friends, I want to go mess around.’ The context you grow up in has 
a big impact on a cultural level.” Young people who have spent the majority of their lives 
in cities are less likely to maintain the farming practices of their parents or the cultural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 One IDP woman I met says she felt like she was abandoning her own family to generate an income: “It 
was killing me, working for a family that wasn’t mine, giving them my work, and coming home to find my 
own son asleep, only to leave again in the morning without knowing how he woke up or if he has a 
stomachache.” 
51 Machismo is, roughly defined, a belief in the supremacy of men.  
52 Though I will not delve very deeply into education, it is worth noting that IDPs of all ages experience 
interrupted schooling whether as a result of displacement itself or as a result of the conditions and 
necessities of urban integration (Slim 2008). Even though public education is free in Colombia, the 
expenses associated with school – including matriculation fees (even when as little as $4 USD a year), travel 
costs, costs of mandatory uniforms, books and others supplies – can be prohibitive for families with 
multiple children and few income sources. Furthermore, many children experience discrimination based on 
their IDP status, race or regional distinctions (Human Rights Watch 2005). Carolina says her mother 
Maria had a hard time enrolling her many children in school because of this. For those who do enter 
school, IDP youth in Cartagena have a particularly high drop-out rate, especially in secondary education 
(ICRC-WFP 2007).  
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ties to their rural places of origin (Smit 2012). This can strain parent-child relationships 
and create intergenerational tensions in the family (Bello 2001). 
Dealing with trauma and navigating identity 
It is a Sunday afternoon, and Eduardo, a community organizer who works with 
IDPs along the Caribbean coast, is leading a workshop in a donated room in a local 
church in Líbano, a primarily IDP neighborhood in Cartagena. He has gathered a group 
of 22 IDPs (four men, eight adult women and eight teenage girls) together to participate 
in a theater-based exercise sponsored by LIMPAL and La Casa Úrsula, a national 
program for women’s rights established after the passage of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 in 2000.53 In the workshop, Eduardo asks the participants to act out a 
series of scenarios based on their experiences of displacement and settling in the city. One 
scene involves domestic abuse between a husband and a wife. In another, a teen mother 
leaves her young children at home alone so she can engage in prostitution. In yet another, 
a government official refuses to meet with an IDP woman, blaming the city’s rising crime 
on “invasores” [invaders] like her.  
Afterwards, as the participants have a chance to react to what they have just seen, 
Eduardo explains that in displacement “people were uprooted not just from their property 
but their culture, their identities.”  
 “Their freedom,” chimes in one of the participants.  
 “Their families,” adds another.  
 “Their work,” says a third.  
 “Displacement has changed the whole ambiente [feeling or environment] of our 
country,” concludes Eduardo.  
 
The emotional devastation of displacement can have multiple, and often 
overlapping, manifestations: anxiety, depression, aggression, nostalgia, fear, despair, and 
post-traumatic stress, to name a few (Cockburn 2001; ICRC-WFP 2007; Carrillo 2009). 
“I’ve been through so much,” says Diana. “When I don’t have even a small piece of panela 
[cane sugar] to give to my children, when I know that they don’t have clothes or shoes, 
those are my biggest concerns. The saddest part was my son’s birthday last week. My son 
asked for his father, who used to give him his birthday cake, and I didn’t know what to 
say except to cry and tell him he wasn’t going to have anything for his birthday.” 
Even though 67% of IDP households report mental health problems after 
displacement, requests for appropriate care are low, and provision is even lower (ICRC-
WFP 2007).54 The emotional and psychosocial trauma has been shown to impair the 
capacities to learn, become self-reliant and build new life projects (Carrillo 2009).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 UNSCR 1325 is an oft-cited rallying call among women’s rights organizations and peace activists across 
Colombia. The influence of international law and norms will be examined in greater depth in Chapter 6, 
but for now, it is worth noting that the theater workshop led by Eduardo is an example of how an 
international discourse has been concretized into on-the-ground action. 
54 Of those who self-identified as having psychosocial problems, only 24% sought professional help. 
Reasons given for the low demand for psychosocial aid include priority given to subsistence activities, 
embarrassment to admit to problems, and low level of knowledge of services available or their importance. 
Of those who did actively seek help, only 15% received it. This can be attributed to the fact that there are 
 	   44 
Most of my sources said they experienced culture shock and a loss of personal 
meaning when they were forced to make the transition from farming to other forms of 
economic activity. Carolina, who was five years old when they arrived in Cartagena, says 
the change was traumatic for the whole family: “Forced displacement breaks proyectos de 
vida [life projects] – we had to leave our land, we had to suffer el despojo [the 
dispossession] of leaving our homes, leaving our culture, leaving our way of life. The only 
thing my parents knew how to do was cultivar [farm], and we had to abandon everything, 
our documents, our belongings, to save our lives.” In the city, Maria’s family experienced 
hunger for the first time, and they had to confront new pressures55 and dangers, like the 
prevalence of drug addiction, which Carolina says was unknown to them before moving 
to Cartagena. “In that moment we were powerless having to face a city like that,” she 
explains. “We had to face those leones rugientes [roaring lions] but without the tools to do 
so. We didn’t have the tools to live in a city that was much more global, much bigger and 
very different from what we knew and how we lived.”  
As Slim (2008) writes, the loss of personal identity, stability, certainty, routine 
and order in the midst of armed conflict can become the loss of self. Both as individuals 
and as social beings, people have lost the markers that used to define who they were and 
who they are. This is what Pécaut (2000) refers to as the experience of “blowing apart of 
all personal points of reference” (p. 102). Family identities, professional identities, 
religious identities may all have been challenged or inexorably altered by war. Dignity and 
self-esteem suffer greatly, and many lose “the anchor of their sense of self [that] gave 
them the confidence with which to take their place in the world” (Slim 2008, p. 110). 
Carmen tells me about one young IDP woman named Violet, who worked in 
domestic service when they met a few years ago at one of Carmen’s human rights 
workshops. At the time, Violet’s employers paid her in leftover grains of rice and 2,000 
pesos (the equivalent of about $1.12 USD) for a full day of cleaning. With those 2,000 
pesos Violet only had enough to buy three eggs for her two children and to cover her 
transportation to and from her job. Carmen was dismayed at this story, and she began to 
work one-on-one with Violet to help her understand that she deserved more than that: “I 
reminded her of the africanos [the Africans] that came here. We cannot speak of them as 
slaves because they were kings in their lands in Africa. I asked Violet what she used to 
have back home. She said, ‘I had my house, I had chickens, I had pigs.’ I told her, ‘Then 
you are not a person who has to settle for leftover rice and 2,000 pesos. You have to tell 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
few services available and there are few standard assistance protocols in place across the country (ICRC-
WFP 2007).  
55 One of these pressures may seem innocuous but can have quite a big impact: Integrating into city life 
requires a new style of consumerism because everything comes with a price tag. Beyond paying for services 
and food for the first time, IDPs also must face the shift to the culture of conspicuous consumption. One 
IDP woman said that back on her farm the only thing she cared about was her harvest and the health of her 
animals, whereas in the city, many IDPs begin to acclimate to the “culture of going into debt to buy pretty 
things to have a pretty house.” Carmen, a social worker in Cartagena, similarly explains that, particularly 
for women who have never been inside a store before, the pervasive consumer culture in urban areas can be 
an emotional trigger. Carmen says that some IDP women think, “I’ve wasted my life caring for child after 
child after child and now I want, I want, I want.” It is this visible clash of rural and urban lifestyles that 
makes them “replantear su vida” [rethink their lives]. 
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your employer that you are here in the city because of displacement but that you still have 
your dignity and that your work is worth something.’” Carmen says that Violet has since 
graduated from the University of Cartagena with a degree in accounting.  
Carmen encourages IDP men and women to hold onto the past even as they 
navigate the unexpected present and uncertain future: “They can’t forget who they were 
and who they continue to be. It is from who they were that they need to demand their 
rights, that they can’t settle for a makeshift house, for low wages, for an ID card that says 
they are displaced.” 
 Here, it is interesting to note that Carmen makes the distinction between being 
displaced and being in a situation of displacement. She thinks that those who have been 
forcibly displaced should not let that single event come to define their entire identities 
and strip them of who they were or who they can be. “A woman is not displaced,” explains 
Carmen. “She is intelligent, she is hardworking, she is a fighter, she is a campesina 
[peasant], but she is not displaced. She is a woman in a situation of displacement.” 
Though I have chosen not to use this distinction throughout the course of this thesis, it is 
an important reminder of the power of language and naming. 
 Categories and labels – e.g. “IDP” versus “refugee” versus “economic migrant” – 
assigned by states and humanitarian agencies often obscure the complexity of overlapping 
identities in order to clarify the level of attention, protection and assistance that an 
individual or household receives based on the distinct prescribed rights of each group. 
These categories are ultimately artificial and administrative, but they can become 
inscribed into an individual's or group's identity, often as the basis for discrimination 
and/or empowerment (Koser and Martin 2011). Identity formation in displacement is a 
process of self-definition that is mediated by host communities, mediated by other IDPs, 
and mediated by the state, as the next several chapters will show. It is a constant 
negotiation of the personal and the collective.   
Summary  
 
“Bit by bit, you have to adapt, you have to live, because otherwise, you would be dead.”  
– Manuel, an IDP man in Cartagena 
 
  Carmen and Violet’s story is ultimately about the power of friendship, about 
having someone to lift you up and show you an alternative when you think you are only 
worth 2,000 pesos and a few grains of rice. Without Carmen’s support, Violet may have 
been able to feed her children for the time being, and she may have survived, but just 
barely. Like other IDPs in this chapter, Violet has faced overwhelming loss and confronts 
a radically new and challenging environment in the city. 
In the end, coping alone is simply not enough. As resilient as individuals or 
families may be on their own, they are constrained in scale and scope unless their 
response and survival strategies are interrelated to and bolstered by broader social 
networks. As Davis (2012) writes, the translation from individual to community 
resilience, from single agent or family survival to multi-stakeholder collaboration, is 
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“perhaps the most important process to understand of all” for policymakers who wish to 
address urban communities living in violent contexts (p. 66). 
What is it about the particular survival and response strategies of individuals and 
families that necessitate the formation of social networks? In other words, what needs are 
satisfied by social connections that cannot be satisfied by individuals and families alone? 
These questions will be addressed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
(Re)Building Social Networks 
 
It takes an hour by bus from the colonial tourist center of Cartagena to get to 
Tatiana’s neighborhood on the edge of the city. This is not the Cartagena of beaches and 
Spanish architecture, of tourists and neatly manicured palm trees. This is the Cartagena 
of flooded mud roads, of makeshift houses with tin roofs, of no running water, of 
intermittent electricity. This is the “other” Cartagena, the ciudad popular.  
Tatiana, a 53-year-old IDP woman, lives with four of her eight children in a one-
bedroom house. The walls are made of wooden planks nailed together, and the windows 
have no glass, but Tatiana feels lucky because she has cement floors. She knows many 
people whose floors are just the earth beneath them. 
Tatiana was displaced in 2000 from the department of Sucre, south of Bolívar, 
fleeing threats after she was raped by a paramilitary. Before her displacement, Tatiana 
was a small business owner and she often volunteered with the elderly. She says she was 
something of a community leader in her prior life, but Tatiana felt lost when she first 
arrived in Cartagena. That began to change when, in order to generate an income, she 
began working with an agricultural collective through a cabildo indígena [a council or 
community organization of indigenous peoples]. The cabildo often sent Tatiana as a 
representative to other community meetings, and with time, she became a go-to person 
for information.  
Many of the people I met during my time in Cartagena were through Tatiana, 
who has become a recognized figure among IDPs. She is something of a social 
entrepreneur,56 someone who goes out of her way to help others access aid, organize and 
learn about their rights. She estimates that she has personally brought over a thousand 
IDPs to the Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas (UARIV), the 
local government office responsible for IDP assistance. As we walk through the UARIV 
office one Monday morning, Tatiana greets every single person – she’s a minor celebrity 
here. 
Tatiana says that because of her own experiences, she thinks of it as her duty to 
help other IDPs get the help they need. “I was raped by a paramilitary, and behind me, 
there are many other women who have been raped too, but they can’t talk about it. I have 
had the courage to speak out and denounce it. There are women who don’t know what 
their rights are, who don’t know where they can go to demand them. As liderezas 
[women leaders] we have to bring this message to the neighborhoods,” she says. “People 
here now know me as a leader. Whatever concern they may have, whatever information 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 For those familiar with the work of journalist Malcolm Gladwell, Tatiana is a “Lois Weisberg” type – she 
seems to know everyone and everyone seems to know her. The takeaway from Gladwell’s 1999 The New 
Yorker article nominally about Lois Weisberg, but really about the power of social networks is: “Poverty is 
not deprivation. It is isolation” (Gladwell 1999, p. 62). In this way, Tatiana, a social entrepreneur who 
forges connections across otherwise unrelated or unknown groups or individuals, is playing an essential role 
in the economic and social survival of IDPs in Cartagena. This can also be analyzed as an example of 
“popularity” or “centrality” in a social network: Tatiana is effectively the person that serves as a connector 
between multiple actors or nodes in a network (Kadushin 2012).  
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they need, they come to me, and I tell them what to do and where to go.” 
 Tatiana’s story exemplifies many of the common characteristics of reception into 
and formation of new IDP social networks in Cartagena. When Tatiana first arrived in 
the city she was primarily concerned with her individual family’s survival (as described in 
Chapter 3), but she found that she could more effectively satisfy her need for income 
generation through a group (the cabildo). Building economic ties eventually led to her 
involvement in other social networks, and with time, Tatiana began recruiting others to 
join, as well.  
Obviously, not all IDPs experience this same trajectory, but Tatiana’s experience 
is a useful frame for this chapter, which will look at the development of, barriers to and 
functions of IDP social network formation in Cartagena.  
Social networks are can be understood as sets of voluntary direct and indirect 
relationships, communication and exchanges. These horizontal (though not necessarily 
equal) links are built on reciprocal trust. Social networks are adaptive: they evolve and 
transform over time to meet changing mutual interests or goals. Because of this flexibility, 
social networks can achieve results that otherwise would not be possible among 
individuals, more formal closed organizational systems, or abstracted market relations 
(Castagna and Jeyte 2011; Davis 2012; Kadushin 2012). 
  This chapter will examine the breakdown of social networks prior to 
displacement, the process of joining or establishing social networks in Cartagena and the 
multiple functions that social networks serve in the lives of IDPs.  
Corrosion of social networks prior to displacement 
Even before the act of flight, “geographical displacement has already been 
preceded by an emotional one: the withdrawal from social belonging" (Meertens 2001, p. 
137). In places of origin, death, abandonment and the climate of fear fostered by 
sustained violence have already eaten away at social cohesion and formal and informal 
support networks long before the displacement event itself.57 “Many of my friends and my 
compañeros [colleagues] at work and in our agricultural collective have been killed unjustly 
in a war that is not ours. The loss of so many friends, so many colleagues, so many 
relatives is incredibly hard,” says Manuel. Entire villages are ripped apart by social 
fragmentation through death or migration, sometimes leaving behind ghost towns of 
thousands of empty homes. 
What social networks do remain in communities of origin suffer from the 
corrosive impact of generalized warfare. The imposition of multiple and rotating regimes 
of power and domination, changing hands between armed groups over time, is an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 This is in fact one of the biggest critiques about the dominant policy discourse on “right to return” in 
most international and national internal displacement policies around the world, which tend to emphasize 
return to place of origin over sustainable integration or resettlement. What is a “return” to “home” when it 
has been ravaged by war, when livelihoods have been destroyed, when social communities are no longer 
cohesive? As Ballard (2012) writes of post-conflict property restitution, which has been critiqued for its 
idealization of return, “the very concept of “home” is altered by war…. Because the ideal of home is as 
much about the memory of customs, traditions or beliefs as it is about place, it may be impossible to return 
‘home’” (p. 491).  
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invasion not just of physical space but of social order, as well. It is also important to note 
that when new actors enter the scene, the pre-existing social orders do not get erased; 
rather, new and old orders superimpose upon each other, overlapping and creating deeply 
contested social identities.  
For example, many rural families are forced to pay bribes, house troops, and 
provision armed groups with food and water. Maria and her family lived in a big house 
on what Carolina, Maria’s daughter, calls a “strategic corner” in the town of El Carmen 
de Bolívar. Unfortunately, the asset of a well-located piece of land became a liability for 
Maria’s family. Because the whole town was visible from their house, armed groups 
would often commandeer Maria’s home. “They camped out there, they stored their arms 
there, they left all of their things there,” says Carolina. “They would stay for days or 
weeks, and my mother felt the brunt of it.” Against her will, Maria was forced to cook, 
serve and do laundry for the members of whichever armed group was currently occupying 
her land and her home.  
This, in turn, made Maria and her family a target for opposing groups who saw 
her involvement, whether by choice or not, as a sign of affiliation or support. “As soon as 
other groups found out, they called my mother an infiltrada [spy] and they accused her of 
being on the other side,” says Carmen. One morning, some strangers arrived in the area 
asking for Maria by name, but luckily, says Carmen, without knowing her face. They 
called Maria a guerrilla, and they said they had come to the house to kill her. By good 
fortune Maria had just stepped out to wash dishes in a nearby stream, and she was 
warned in time to escape.  
The successive conquest and re-conquest of rural territory, accompanied by the 
changing of hands of power over a civilian population, requires “continual adaptation to 
new requirements of loyalty and, simultaneously, fear of vengeance for alleged old 
loyalties to former occupiers” (Meertens 2001, p. 137). The result is the ley de silencia [law 
of silence]: keep quiet or risk accusation and retaliation (Pécaut 2000). Such silence has a 
dampening effect on the potential for collective action, whether social, economic or 
political, because it prevents the formation of relationships based on stable and reciprocal 
trust.  
Isabel, another IDP woman living in Cartagena, was initially displaced after one 
of her neighbors deliberately and falsely accused her of cooking for and colluding with 
guerrillas. The paramilitaries arrived at midnight, guns in hand, forcing Isabel and her 
family to flee with little notice. Her neighbor had been jealous of Isabel’s relatively more 
bountiful harvests and livestock, which was apparently reason enough to find a way to 
force Isabel out by associating her with the “enemy.”  
Isabel says the experience has made her guarded and suspicious: “You never know 
whom you can trust because sometimes even your friends betray you and take advantage 
of you. Back home, I thought I wasn’t messing with anyone, I thought nothing could 
happen to me, I thought that they could never betray me like that. But then jealousy is 
awakened, and they threaten you.”  
Maria and Isabel were both displaced because of their social identities, ones that 
they had not chosen but that had been forced upon them by the cruel machinations of 
internal armed conflict. Most of the time, armed groups in Colombia do not engage 
directly with each other but rather do so through civilians (Vidal-López 2012). The 
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distinction between “combatant” and “civilian” begins to lose meaning in a context in 
which identities and associations are forged on the basis of force, rumor and strategic 
advantage (Slim 2008). Social connection, real or perceived, can become a risk and a 
liability. As a result, some begin to avoid social connection altogether, creating a 
generalized withdrawal from social life prior to displacement. One IDP woman described 
the rupturing of social identity as the feeling of being completely adrift or “like a ship 
without a harbor" (Meertens 2001, p. 141). 
This makes it that much more difficult for IDPs to re-establish themselves upon 
arrival in host cities because they lack a prior social network to both help cushion the 
trauma of displacement and navigate the new urban environment in which they find 
themselves (Moser 2001; Frederico et al. 2007; Braun 2009). The individualization of the 
experience of displacement – the sense that “I am alone” and that it is unsafe to reach out 
to friends, neighbors, and sometimes even family members – undermines the possibility 
of constructing or reconstructing social networks in the site of reception even before IDPs 
arrive there. As Gloria of APRODIC explains, the fear that IDPs develop in their places 
of origin follows them to the city. They become dejected and politically demobilized, 
often too afraid to demand their rights and organize themselves, she says.  
(Re)establishing social networks and social capital  
in the site of reception 
To briefly reintroduce the concept, social capital can be understood as the capital 
generated by “social networks and the associated norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness” (Putnam 2007, p. 137). Social capital is analytically divided upon several 
axes (some of which were mentioned in Chapter 1), but for the purposes of this chapter, 
the most useful typology will be to distinguish between “bridging” and “bonding” social 
capital. Bridging social capital is generated through links across social cleavages (e.g. ties 
between people who are not alike), while bonding social capital is generated through in-
group links (e.g. ties between people who are alike) (Patulny and Haase Svendsen 2007; 
Putnam 2007). As IDPs move into the urban periphery, they can form two main types of 
social capital: bridging (between IDPs and other residents of Cartagena) and bonding 
(amongst IDPs). However, there are significant barriers to both kinds of social networks, 
which will be reviewed in more detail below. 
Bridging: Building links with the historic poor in Cartagena 
Host communities don’t exactly welcome IDPs with open arms. Whatever 
charitable good will or solidarity is expressed towards IDPs upon first arrival is usually 
short-lived because of contestation over space and identity, as well as discrimination 
based on race, ethnicity or displacement status. IDPs are often blamed for increasing 
crime rates, treated with fear, and persecuted and stigmatized for their cultural, regional 
or ethnic differences (Vidal López, Atehortúa Arredondo, and Salcedo 2011; Zea 2011). 
Reception into host communities is often hostile or defensive, as a result. 
Manuel says it was difficult to find work when he first arrived to Cartagena 15 
years ago because of the stigma associated with displacement. “Many times you have to 
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deny you are displaced just to be able to survive here in the city,” he says. In other words, 
it is not just the actual displacement that matters but also the perception of displacement 
and of displaced persons.  
For existing residents, IDPs represent economic competition, as mentioned in 
Chapter 3, as well as increased spatial density and overcrowding of homes and 
neighborhoods. As a result, urban host communities sometimes passively or actively resist 
the integration of IDPs into their settlements and neighborhoods (Morvaridi 2008). In 
this way, some of the individual or family survival strategies employed by IDPs (e.g. 
micro-businesses, squatting on vacant land, engaging in prostitution, etc.) may actually 
directly interfere with the possibility of fostering bridging social capital. 
A key difference between IDPs and economic migrants, who may experience 
some of the same resistance on the basis of the competition over limited resources and 
jobs, lies in the special treatment that IDPs are afforded by state policy. Competition over 
public services and government aid can prevent the formation of social networks between 
IDPs and host communities, who resent IDPs for pulling attention away from the needs 
of the historic poor of Cartagena. For example, Carmen says that some non-IDP women 
complain about waiting on long lines at public health clinics only to watch an IDP enter 
the room, skip the line and head right in to an appointment time reserved for IDPs. 
Schools are also a point of contention because new IDP students crowd classrooms.  
As the urban population grows and public services cannot keep apace for lack of 
human and financial capital, the public system cannot handle the extra burden. Because 
IDPs are given preferential treatment in accordance with national policies (which will be 
addressed in Chapter 6), the historic poor feel like they lose out on account of the 
invasores [invaders] occupying their neighborhoods. The influx of a new group of people 
competing for the same limited housing supply, job market and public services creates 
tensions that are only aggravated by government programs that seem to sacrifice the 
needs and priorities of native residents in favor of IDPs (Ibáñez and Velásquez 2008). 
The perception that IDPs already get more help than they deserve leads to 
hostilities and fewer social safety nets cast in their direction on the part of the host 
population (Vidal López, Atehortúa Arredondo, and Salcedo 2011). Ironically, then, the 
very state-based public assistance that is intended to help IDPs inadvertently exacerbates 
frictions rather than facilitates sustainable integration. This is also true of inconsistent 
housing subsidies, which can lead to the “hopscotch” effect that delays social connections 
and prevents residential stability, as explained in the previous chapter. 
Another obstacle to the formation of productive IDP-host relationships is the 
misconception that all displaced people are violent. “They call us guerrilleros or 
paramilitaries or part of some armed group,” says Carolina. “They don’t understand that 
we are campesinos [peasants], that we farm, that we have nothing to do with that illogical 
war that has been forced upon us.” The association with violence takes a toll on the whole 
family: in addition to limiting employment options, it also means that IDP children are 
often refused entry into or discriminated against in the public school system.  
This fear is contagious, explains Eva, Carolina’s sister. “Even if one person offers 
you help, someone else comes along and says, ‘Why are you helping her? She'll put a 
bomb in your house,’” she says.  
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The discrimination against IDPs extends beyond their immediate new neighbors. 
“We’ve been rejected and we’ve been discriminated against, not just by the communities 
around us but also by the very institutions that should be protecting us and supporting 
us,” says Katy, a member of the Comité de Seguimiento de Auto 092, an IDP women’s 
advocacy group. Natalia, the president of the Comité, adds that the police often blame 
the violence in Cartagena on IDPs.58  
Carmen says that through community organizations like FUNSAREP, which 
bring IDPs and non-IDPs together, host communities have begun to realize the need to 
redirect their anger and frustration away from IDPs themselves and towards the local 
government for failing to meet the needs of all of the city’s residents. Carmen (and 
several of my other sources) sees this as a slow-moving sea change in the attitudes of the 
host communities, which will be explored more in Chapter 5. 
That said, the competition over limited resources will only heighten as more and 
more IDPs move into Cartagena. The struggle to mobilize coalitions of IDPs and non-
IDPs together to make collective claims on the state is put at risk by the constant influx 
of newly-arrived and vulnerable populations in the urban periphery.  
Centripetal bonding: Social cohesion among IDPs 
Some would argue there is more hope for bonding social capital among IDPs who 
have suffered similar fates. Trauma and displacement can oddly enough become the basis 
for community when otherwise unconnected persons “develop a form of fellowship on 
the strength of that common tie” (Erikson 1995, p. 186).  
However, this “gathering of the wounded” has both “centripetal and centrifugal 
tendencies”: it can bring together or it can cast apart (p. 186). In the case of Colombia, 
the shared experience of migratory displacement is not enough alone to build a sufficient 
basis for social cohesion among IDPs, especially when those who have been displaced 
because of paramilitaries, those displaced by guerrillas and those displaced by the state 
military wind up as “neighbors” in host cities. Former social connections – whether real 
or perceived, chosen or applied by force – can prevent the formation of new ones in the 
reception city.  
Even the most mundane acts of daily life can become sites of confrontation or 
fear. One community organizer told me about an IDP woman who was waiting in line to 
pick up a package when she turned around and saw the man who had killed both her 
husband and her brother waiting in line right behind her. She fainted and that same man, 
her enemy and her neighbor, caught her as she fell. Despite the fact that IDPs have 
migrated explicitly to avoid such tensions, suspicion and uncertainty about who can be 
trusted and who is the “enemy” persist even in their new settlements.  
Although some IDPs may reassemble into a form of cooperation with people they 
know or on the basis of common place of origin, “the possibility of forming more 
extensive forms of social solidarity is undermined by the omnipresence of mistrust, 
distrust that is at the heart of a process of psychological individualization accompanied by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Chapter 6 will explore how the public discourse around displacement perpetuates these negative 
stereotypes, though some of my sources say that the general conditions have improved in the past few years 
because of increased awareness and IDP activism in the city. 
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the powerlessness of individuals to assume responsibility for their own lives” (Pécaut 
2000, p. 101). Even those who come from the “same place” negotiate and understand 
their displacement differently (Malkki 1996). It is not enough to rely on common 
experience to create social networks, nor is it enough to rely on shared location. 
“Community” is not built based on physical proximity alone, and “neighborhoods” are 
not simply collections of houses and streets. Rather, they are constructed and 
renegotiated through an “ongoing practical and discursive production/imagining of a 
people”— a task made that much more difficult when even the imagining of an individual 
or a family has already been contested by armed conflict, not to mention a collective 
“people” (Gieryn 2000, p. 472).  
The formation of social networks  
 Given these significant constraints on both bridging and bonding social capital, 
how exactly do IDPs form social networks? How do they engage in the “imagining of a 
people” in their site of reception? 
Though it is by no means revolutionary or even particularly unique, it is worth 
understanding the baseline process of social network formation for IDPs. This process 
shares many of the same characteristics or features of social network formation for any 
urban population: As new people arrive to a city, they first seek basic survival (shelter, 
food, livelihoods). As those needs are in the process of being met, new residents begin to 
bump into each other on the street or other public spaces, in places of work, in the 
marketplace, in church. The physical proximity to neighbors and strangers in the city can 
represent a drastic change for IDPs, most of whom migrate from low-density rural areas 
(Bello 2001). They begin acquaintance relationships based on visual familiarity (e.g. “Oh, 
I’ve seen you around before”), based on propinquity (e.g. “You’re my new neighbor”), 
based on private interests (e.g. “You have something I want”), or based on mutual 
interests (e.g. “We can share this information” or “We believe in the same things”).  
Charles Kadushin’s (2012) review of research on social networks finds that the 
two major determinants of social network formation are propinquity (“being in the same 
place at the same time”) and homophily (common norms, values or attributes). These 
features often create feedback loops with each other to reinforce social networks: “If 
people flock together, it appears there are four processes involved: (1) the same kinds of 
people come together; (2) people influence one another and in the process become alike; 
(3) people can end up in the same place; (4) and once they are in the same place, the very 
place influences them to become alike” (p. 20). 
Acquaintanceships sometimes develop into deeper friendships, romantic 
relationships, work relationships, or other tightly bonded networks like affinity or 
religious groups. Some social networks are codified or formalized into closed 
organizational structures while others remain more flexible and fluid. 
“We are all social beings by nature,”59 says Raquel, a member of the Red de Mujeres 
de Cartagena y Bolívar [Women’s Network of Cartagena and Bolívar]. “You can arrive to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 As Kadushin (2012) affirms, “Humans, from birth, desire to interact with others in order to feel secure 
and satisfy their needs” (p. 88). 
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a neighborhood alone, without knowing anyone, but with time between the inhabitants 
in a community, they get to know each other and they identify needs and take actions 
together. That’s the logic of a neighborhood, of a city: people arrive and they get to know 
each other and wave to their neighbors.” 
All of this probably sounds like a familiar story, but what makes it interesting is 
that for IDPs, the formation of any social network seems to fly in the face of so many 
barriers to social connection: fear and lack of trust, emotional trauma, ongoing 
competition for limited resources, the ley de silencia [the law of silence]. 
Not all social networks are formed organically or spontaneously through the sort 
of neighbor-to-neighbor engagement that Raquel describes. Many are facilitated through 
established community organizations, local or international NGOs or changes in the legal 
regime. For example, it was only with the passage of the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia ordinance Auto 092 in 2008 that the civil society organization Comité de 
Seguimiento de Auto 092 [Committee of Follow-up to the Auto 092] was formed to 
monitor the implementation of the ordinance. This group would never have come 
together were it not for the exogenous role played by Auto 092. Similarly, it was through 
a state-sponsored project that provided the funding and the land for 100 self-constructed 
houses for IDPs that the community organization Asociación Mis Esfuerzos (to which 
several of my sources belong) was first formed.  
This is not a new phenomenon: from youth groups formed by NGOs to satisfy 
donor requirements60 to participatory governing bodies established by state agencies to 
comply with the law, social networks are often created intentionally to supply the 
“community,” constituency or stakeholder group to which a certain program or policy is 
responding. We can think of this as the “top” reaching down to the “bottom” to build it 
up.  
The spontaneous mutual aid relationships previously described by Raquel often 
reinforce these intentionally-constructed social networks. Carolina explains the process in 
the following way: “First we began to build links with our friends, with our relatives, and 
then our neighbors. When we managed to build an organization [Asociación Mis 
Esfuerzos] that actually got heard in the community, people began to see the positive 
impact our work was having, and our reputation began to travel by word of mouth. More 
and more people came to us wanting to join and to work with us.” In this way, what 
could have been seen as an “artificial” social network/organization (because of the 
exogenous role of the local government in its formation) becomes legitimized by a wider 
public and embedded more soundly within the community.  
A note on the diversity of social networks 
Given this broad-based sketch of social network formation, it is worth 
considering some of the nuances and underlying dynamics. Not every IDP forms or joins 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 For a particularly telling example of this, see Ann Swidler and Susan Cotts Watkins’s study of donor-
funded AIDS programs in Malawi. Participants in these programs began speaking and behaving in the 
“language” of international donors, presenting and organizing themselves in such a way so as to benefit 
from the resources being funneled into Malawi. This re-formation of social networks made them legible to 
outsiders by conforming to their standards and expectations of what a “local community” looks like 
(Swidler and Watkins 2009). 
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social networks in the same way (if at all), and not all social networks are created equally. 
I also want to make the clear distinction that a social network is not inherently good or 
positive – gangs and armed groups are also social networks, for example.  
There appears to be a generational divide in participation in community life. Ana, 
a 65-year-old woman, fled central Bolívar with four young grandchildren after her son 
and son-in-law were killed under unclear circumstances. Ana escaped barefoot and left 
everything behind, including her identification papers, which became a significant 
obstacle when she began looking for work in the city. Unfortunately, the lack of 
employment opportunities in Cartagena is particularly acute for IDPs over the age of 50 
(Human Rights Watch 2005). Because government aid has been inadequate and 
inconsistent for Ana,61 and because of the difficulty of securing formal employment, Ana 
saved up to buy an old sewing machine to sew from home to earn a small income. “I’ve 
had to work hard to survive,” she says.  
Ana says the struggle to find work tired her out, and she disengaged from broader 
social networks, preferring instead to focus on her own family’s survival rather than on 
forming new friendships or social bonds outside of the family unit. “I am tired and old 
already, and what you lose you can never get back,” she says. Ana spends her day at home, 
and though she greets her neighbors as they pass by, she does not spend time with them 
unless she needs to ask a small favor. When asked if she feels a sense of belonging or 
community, Ana simply says no. 
The majority of the IDPs I met who were actively engaged in community 
associations were in their mid-50s or younger, perhaps reflecting a level of energy or hope 
to begin life anew that older IDPs may not demonstrate. Unfortunately, my data cannot 
provide a fuller account of the generational differences in social network formation, and 
this would be an interesting field for future research.  
The multipurpose functions of social networks 
Social networks of poor and disadvantaged groups (like IDPs) serve multiple 
functions, including limiting risk, enhancing economic opportunity and retaining – or 
redefining – identity (Woolcock 2010). Both instrumental and emotional functions of 
IDP social networks are reviewed in more depth below.  
Instrumental functions of social networks 
Sharing information, access and economic support 
When Diana first arrived in Cartagena a month before I met her, she says she was 
on her own, without friends, without family, and without support. One day, Yolanda, 
another IDP woman, found Diana crying and took it upon herself to invite Diana and 
her children to come live with her in their small rented home. “I arrived to a strange place 
where I don’t know anyone, and if it weren’t for Yolanda, I wouldn’t be able to ask for aid 
because I don’t know anything and I don’t know the city,” says Diana. On the day I met 
them, Yolanda was on her way to take Diana to declare her displacement status at the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Problems with state-provided aid will be examined in greater depth in Chapter 6. 
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UARIV, the local government office of orientation and attention for IDPs.  
Making an official declaration and entering the national IDP registry is the first 
step in the process to access state-provided aid, but it is a first step often not taken.62 To 
be able to take advantage of government aid programs, you first need to know about 
them. The lack of legal and rights literacy among IDPs can be a significant barrier to 
access: almost a third of IDPs in Cartagena said they did not know what humanitarian 
aid was provided by the state (Prada and Mieles 2007).  
For those that do know about aid and how to access it, there are other obstacles, 
like the difficulty of navigating complex bureaucratic procedures and the costs of travel 
and time spent at the UARIV and other government offices. In Cartagena it takes on 
average 113 calendar days from the moment of displacement to filing a declaration and to 
finally hearing the status of the declaration (ICRC-WFP 2007). With long wait times at 
local assistance offices (some report having to queue up at 4 AM), the risk of being 
identified by enemies, and the possibility of rejection from the national registry, many 
IDPs choose to avoid the process entirely (Albuja and Ceballos 2010; Zea 2011).  
This results in a serious underestimation of the IDP population in the official 
count (which is based upon registration numbers), as well as increased risks for 
unregistered IDPs. When research has been done to compare registered and unregistered 
IDPs, the evidence suggests that unregistered IDPs are by far the most vulnerable and 
isolated segment of the urban population. Unregistered IDPs fare worse than registered 
IDPs in terms of access to healthcare, education, and food security. Their anonymity and 
invisibility, whether chosen or not, puts them at even greater risk, and little to no effort 
has been made by local authorities to address their particular needs and vulnerabilities 
(Ibáñez and Velásquez 2008; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011b). 
Of those IDP households in Cartagena that did know about state-based aid 
programs, 40% said they learned about such programs through family members or friends 
and 13% said they did so with the help of a community organization that works with 
IDPs (Prada and Mieles 2007). The information sharing made possible through social 
networks makes arrival and reception into the city much more manageable for IDPs. One 
IDP man says that IDPs who frequent the same places begin to develop information 
sharing networks and friendships through these interactions. “If you ask me things you 
don’t know, and I ask you something I don’t know, we share that information. If one 
displaced person gets some information, all of the displaced people get it over time,” he 
explains. 
 Notably, only 4.5% of registered IDPs said they counted on local and national 
government agencies as important sources of information about state-based aid (Prada 
and Mieles 2007). Eva says that because the government has not proactively provided 
information to IDPs about their rights as victims, they have had to learn by their own 
means. “The necessity of bringing home food to our families means that we have to know 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 As mentioned in Chapter 2, a national survey taken in 2010 found almost a quarter of the national IDP 
population is not officially registered either because they did not declare their displacement or because their 
application was rejected. Of those who are not registered, 45% said they did not register because they did 
not know how and 30% said they did not register because of fear of discovery and retribution by those they 
wished to flee in the first place (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011b). 
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the decrees, the laws, the articles. We do the work the state should be doing, which is 
teaching ourselves about our rights, about where to demand them and how to ensure they 
are fulfilled. We have to teach the state, and we bring that to our communities, too,” says 
Eva.  
Community organizations in Cartagena play a significant role in information 
sharing, orientation and accompaniment during the arrival and reception stages of 
displacement (Prada and Mieles 2007). Those who are more experienced and 
knowledgeable about the aid systems reach out to newly displaced people arriving in the 
city. When anything is learned, it is taught to someone else. Information does not 
stagnate in social networks; it is transferred both through word of mouth and through 
more formal mediums like workshops and meetings. 
Economic support through social ties 
Like Tatiana, several of my sources joined or formed social networks or 
organizations for the purpose of enhancing their economic survival strategies. To apply 
sociologist Mark Granovetter’s concept of “the strength of weak ties” (1973), social ties 
create access to economic opportunity that can mean the difference between starvation 
and survival.  
Many of the IDP women I met are members of artisan collectives that make and 
sell traditional Colombian handicrafts like woven bags, beaded necklaces and jewelry 
made from caña flecha (the black and white tropical palm leaf for which Colombian hats 
are famous). Gangs are another example of a social network formed or joined on the basis 
of economic gain. Other IDPs, like Tatiana and Manuel, joined agricultural collectives, 
some of which have received government subsidies for proyectos productivos [productive 
projects]. Some community organizations also offer job skills training, and others (like 
LIMPAL) have a built-in opportunity for members to earn a small income by catering or 
hosting events.63 
One IDP member of an agricultural collective explains: “We got tired of waiting 
and pleading for government aid, so we decided to organize ourselves to do work 
together. What we know how to do is sembrar [to plant], what we know is the 
countryside. We’re suffering here in the city, and we don’t have anyone else to rely on, so 
we have to make it work together.” 
Emotional and expressive functions of social networks: 
Rewriting personal and collective narratives  
As I speak with Diana, she breaks down in tears and Yolanda encourages her to 
continue, patting her back and offering a voice when Diana feels without one. Yolanda is 
the only person with whom Diana has spent time since arriving in Cartagena. This 
friendship is one of the only reasons Diana has survived for the past month. “The support 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Another incentive is that most workshops or meetings hosted by these organizations advertise free 
refrigerios [snacks] or meals, and many will offer to cover the transportation costs of the participants to and 
from the meeting. Whether or not participants are actually interested in the content of the meeting, the 
availability of free food is a big draw. Sometimes this offering creates deeper buy-in, and participants who 
used to come for the extras begin attending regularly for the content, instead.   
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Yolanda has given me makes me feel calmer and gives me the strength to face what’s 
happening in my life. It makes me feel safer here,” she says.  
The emotional connectivity built through social networks – also known as “social 
support” – helps many IDPs articulate a sense of hope and an ability to move forward. 
Some studies have shown that social support ameliorates long-term effects of mental 
health disorders like Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (Kadushin 2012).  
As Manuel explains, he cannot simply dwell in the tragedy or suffering he has 
experienced. “In the midst of this violence, you have to keep your life going, you have to 
keep building friendships,” he says. “In spite of the things you live through, you have to 
try to keep smiling.” Even the small interactions with neighbors – playing cards, sharing a 
modest meal, laughing about sandals getting stuck in the mud on a dirt road – recreate a 
semblance of a “normal” life.  
On a broader level, social networks create the space for re-defining the life 
projects and personal identities that have been interrupted or contested by armed conflict. 
Above all else, civilians in the midst of war or armed conflict experience a loss of power: a 
loss of power to do, power to be, power over events, environments or other people, and 
power with other people in social groups. As Slim (2008) writes: 
 
 It is difficult to do things when you have no land and no resources. It is difficult to be 
respected, assertive or protective when you have lost rank or confidence and are being 
attacked by militarily superior threats like armed groups, or being told to clutch a ration 
card by humanitarian workers and wait in line for food deliveries. It can be difficult to 
have power over people or with other people when the politics around you have changed 
and you are caught in the middle of two more powerful and extreme groups at war with 
one another (p. 110, emphasis added). 
 
This analysis is important for recognizing both the individual losses of power (to 
do, to be, over) and the collective losses of power (with) for civilians in armed conflict. 
Reestablishing the ability to collaborate with others for mutual gain (whether emotional, 
political, economic, or security-driven) reaffirms all of these powers that have been 
diminished by conflict and displacement. Aside from reinforcing the obvious power with 
others, social networks that translate into community policing groups, IDP advocacy 
organizations, or agricultural collectives offer members something to do and someone to be, 
as well as the power over their environment.  
Social networks are ultimately about re-establishing a sense of self and a sense of 
belonging. In order for IDPs to set down roots and to integrate fully into an urban 
environment, Bello (2001) explains that two main processes are necessary:  
 
1. The emergence of a dynamic of hacer, or “doing,” that gives IDPs the feeling 
of being capable, independent and useful to form a new basis for individual 
identity.  
2. Self-recognition as a victim without falling into victimization. This implies 
demanding rights of the state (self-recognition as a citizen) as well as making 
use of all family, community and institutional resources available (self-
recognition as a member of a group). This is about recognizing agency to 
shape the future without forgetting about the tragedies of the past. 
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For Liliana, coordinator of Mesa DESC, social networks can satisfy a need for 
personal meaning when violence has fundamentally altered who you think you are and 
who think you can be. “Sometimes you can’t see the magnitude of what your words can 
mean to someone. You can’t see it, but other people can see it. Sometimes you can’t see 
the transformation that you’ve started with your actions, with your passing by, with your 
conversations, with your being with other people. That creates a deep personal satisfaction 
for me,” says Liliana. “It’s about looking for that feeling that you have something to give, 
that you have the expressive or affectionate ability that allows you to encontrarte con los 
demás [be with others]. In working with the community, in being part of a movement or 
of a family, you find yourself.”  
Ximena is from an older generation of IDPs: when she was eight, she fled the 
department of Sucre in the 1950s during La Violencia. Thirty-seven of her relatives have 
been killed during her lifetime. After her son was killed in 1997 because of his 
community work with youth, Ximena founded an organization in his name to help 
families who have lost relatives to urban violence. Ximena also works with FUNSAREP 
and Grupo Espejo, an organization that uses theater and art to teach people about non-
violence. On top of all of this, she is the president of the local Junta de Acción Comunal 
[Community Action Board], an independent community development and decision-
making body.64 Needless to say, Ximena is known widely across Cartagena as a 
community leader. 
“I didn’t come to this earth just to eat and to dance. I have a compromiso 
[commitment],” says Ximena. “Whether God exists or not, I have always learned that 
there is something that moves this world, and that moves me. I find God in that plant, in 
those birds that sing. So I will try to be a better person, and I will help my children be 
better people, and I will treat others with solidarity and with respect so that when they 
meet me they say, ‘I didn’t think it was possible. This woman whose mother was killed, 
whose brothers were killed, whose two sons were killed, how can this woman speak to me 
of hope? How can this woman speak to me of faith? How can this woman speak to me of 
compromiso? How can this woman tell me about solidarity and about respecting nature 
and life?’ This is a totally different way to build the things that give meaning to our life.” 
Beyond rewriting a personal narrative, Ximena says that becoming a part of a 
community is also about rewriting a communal narrative. It’s about redefining a people 
and a nation. “We have the capacity to transform and to build, which is what these 
organizations that unite us are doing,” says Ximena. “We are working on everything that 
has to do with the deconstrucción [de-construction] of imaginaries, because the violence 
has become a way of being, and we as thinkers, as professionals, as people, need to find a 
way to transform that which has done us harm. We need to turn it into a new construcción 
de vida [life project], a new social fabric, and a new language to say and do things... These 
families and organizations are working to find the serious and concrete tools that we can 
use to work on this transformation. Because if we don’t educate ourselves and try to make 
this change, we’ll always end up saying, ‘Well, it’s because Colombia is violent.’ But 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 For more information on the unique community governing bodies known as Juntas de Acción Comunal, 
see (United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services 2001). 
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Colombia is so much more than that.” 
Summary  
Before the event of displacement, social networks in communities of origin are 
torn apart or reconfigured because of death, fragmentation of family life, violence and the 
dissolution of trust in friends, neighbors and the institutions ostensibly responsible for 
protecting life. Upon urban settlement IDPs must grapple with hostile host communities 
competing for limited economic, spatial and political resources, as well as the everyday 
violence and fear of living in a new environment. The lack of residential stability and 
social cohesion among IDPs also stands in the way of developing deeper bonds of 
solidarity or trust.   
This chapter has explained how and why social networks form even in the face of 
such obstacles. Some networks form organically because of propinquity and homophily, 
while others are built as a response to exogenous factors like laws or government projects. 
Not all social networks are equal: they range from artisan collectives to urban gangs to 
childcare support groups. Some are more flexible or fluid, while others begin to take on 
more structure and formality.  
The common link between all social networks is the importance of the functions 
that they play for individuals and groups of IDPs. As one IDP woman explains, social 
networks are a necessity of both immediate survival and long-term urban integration: “El 
mismo proyecto de vida nos exige eso [Our life projects demand that we form social 
networks].” IDP social networks serve instrumental (e.g. access to information and 
economic support) as well as emotional functions (e.g. providing a sense of self) in the 
process of integrating into the city.  
The next two chapters will look at how IDP social networks coalesce into 
organizations, coalitions and broader social movements that make demands on the state. 
Chapter 5 will outline how IDP social movements operate given the physical, economic 
and security constraints placed upon them within the context of Cartagena. Chapter 6 
will focus on the interactions between these movements and the state.  
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Chapter 5 
Building Social Movements Against the Odds  
 
I meet up with Isabel one steamy 98-degree afternoon to pay a visit with Liliana, 
a well-known community leader in Cartagena as the coordinator of Mesa DESC and as 
an active madre comunitaria [Community Mother].65 Though Liliana only lives a few 
blocks away, it is too hot and Isabel’s knees are too tired to make the walk, so we catch a 
bumpy ride on a bicitaxi [a pedicab]. We sit in white plastic chairs on Liliana’s open 
patio, sipping sweet black coffee. The patio is well shaded by the tall trees surrounding us 
on all sides, but the heat is oppressive and not even a fresh guanabana fruit knocked out 
of a patio tree can keep us from sweating. While we talk, Liliana’s two dogs paw at the 
hard shells of the 12 turtles that amble freely in the yard. The dogs never seem to manage 
to produce the results they want – to tip the turtles, to startle them, whatever it may be – 
but that doesn’t stop them from trying.  
Liliana shows me her library of books about Cartagena, social movements, 
women’s rights and various UN and other NGO publications. We spend 30 minutes 
clicking through photos on her computer of past events with madres comunitarias, Mesa 
DESC and the Cumbre de los Pueblos [Summit of the People], a community-organized 
response to the Organization of American States Summit of the Americas, which took 
place in Cartagena in April 2012.66 Many of the faces in the photos keep cropping up in 
other photos and other events. It seems there is generous overlap in membership in 
different organizations. In fact, most of the IDPs I met who were actively engaged in 
some sort of community work were involved in more than one group or association. It 
makes for a tangled and interconnected web of members and leaders across multiple 
groups and identities. 
While not an IDP herself, Liliana works closely with many IDP women in both 
Mesa DESC and madres comunitarias. As she leans back in her plastic chair, she explains, 
“En este camino se ha ido tropezando pero se ha ido enredando con una cantidad de mujeres 
[Along this path, we have stumbled, but we have gathered up many women along the 
way].” 
“You always say we are tejiendo [weaving together],” says Isabel. 
Weaving together loose social networks into coalitions and organizations ensures 
that the key functions of information sharing, friendship and community engagement can 
build towards something bigger: a social movement, a political change, a chance to 
rewrite the narrative of war as a social condition, even a hope for peace.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Madres comunitarias are employed by the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar [Colombian 
Family Welfare Institute, known as ICBF] to run child-care programs known as hogares comunitarios 
[community nurseries] out of their own homes. The madres comunitarias have long struggled for better 
working conditions, better pay and more social protections from the ICBF (Vegas and Santibáñez 2010).  
66 The 2012 Summit of the Americas was infamously overshadowed by a scandal involving U.S. Secret 
Service Agents who brought prostitutes into their hotel. This controversy, which was covered more heavily 
in the media than the actual content of the Summit, highlighted the pervasiveness of Cartagena’s sex 
tourism industry. As mentioned at several points throughout this thesis, many IDP women resort to 
prostitution as an economic coping strategy, which is most likely bolstered by Cartagena’s reputation as a 
sex tourist destination. 
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To achieve those broader goals, the kinds of social networks described in Chapter 
4 have to coalesce into organizations67 and social movements against the odds in order to 
make claims on the state. The first two sections of this chapter charts the ways in which 
IDPs and non-IDPs overcome barriers to form coalitions in a city wracked by insecurity. 
The third section looks closely at the influence of armed actors on these social 
movements and organizations. The final section seeks to answer the question: Given the 
violence they have already suffered, why do IDPs engage in high-risk social movements?  
Building coalitions  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the past two decades have seen an upsurge in 
organized civil society groups protesting the armed conflict and promoting an agenda of 
peace. Beginning most visibly in the 1990s, peace rallies, public marches and even the 
formation of “peace communities” have become increasingly common in Colombia’s 
department capitals and other cities (Rice 2011). 
 What is it that mobilizes people to create organizations, form coalitions or join 
movements for collective action?68 As Fireman and Gamson (1979) summarize, some of 
the primary factors behind social movement mobilization include “interest in individual 
goods, interest in collective goods, and solidarity with others interested in collective 
goods” (p. 14). In other words, collective action groups can satisfy personal and 
communal needs while also providing the basis for emotional connection.  
Sociologists and political theorists have long established a link between the 
informal, grassroots mobilizing structures provided by social networks and the emergence 
of social movements. More flexible associational networks develop into more enduring 
formal movement structures in order to sustain collective action (McAdam, McCarthy, 
and Zald 1996). The following section will look at the dynamics of how IDP social 
networks crystallize into coalitions amongst IDPs and between IDPs and non-IDPs.  
Bonding IDP social networks 
The Comité de Seguimiento de Auto 092 (hereafter referred to as the Comité) meets 
in a small room packed with the ubiquitous plastic chairs that every Cartagena 
community organization seems to use because they are cheap, stackable and lightweight. 
The three filing cabinets in the room are crammed so tight with papers that the drawers 
don’t move and the rest of their would-be contents spill out onto the floor in high piles of 
disorganized pamphlets, reports and posters. Everyone is sweating from the midday heat. 
The light overhead is off and a broken fan hums loudly, blowing weak streams of warm 
air without ever managing to cool the room.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 As defined by Kadushin (2012), an organization is simply a “social structure designed to get things done 
through the cooperation of individuals.” Organizations require social networks to address the four 
challenges they face: 1) motivating people to do what the organization wants them to do; 2) deciding what 
should be done; 3) accomplishing what needs to be done; and 4) acquiring resources needed to get things 
done (p. 90). 
68 For a more complex and in-depth look at social movement mobilization, actors and trajectories on a 
theoretical, comparative level, see (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001).  
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The Comité has been offered this shared space in the building of Corvivienda, the 
local government office responsible for housing and community development projects in 
Cartagena. They are not officially affiliated – the Comité is an independent organization 
of IDP community leaders – but the offering of an office once a week is a big gesture, 
particularly when a lack of meeting spaces is an obstacle to community work (as will be 
detailed in a later section of this chapter). 
The Comité came together in 2008 after the passage of Auto 092, a compliance 
ordinance designed specifically to protect the rights of IDP women under the 2004 
Constitutional Court of Colombia ruling Sentencia T-025.69 Auto 092 required the 
government of Colombia to create and implement thirteen specific, tailored and gender 
differential70 programs to guarantee the rights of IDP women. These programs were to be 
piloted in Cartagena,71 and the Comité was voluntarily formed as a civil society group to 
monitor the progress of the Auto.  
“Why did we get together?” asks Natalia, president of the Comité. “Because of the 
need to work on Auto 092 and because we saw how the state was supposed to protect 
women’s rights but how we were and still are totally unprotected.”  
The Comité is comprised of 16 women who each stand as a representative for 
another community organization from a specific neighborhood in Cartagena. Eva is a 
member of the Comité as a representative for Asociación Mis Esfuerzos from Revivir San 
José de los Campanos. “We made this group up from many organizations,” says Eva. “In 
those organizations we were only working in our own communities with our own women. 
We would meet and talk and sometimes others would come give presentations to us, but 
the idea of forming this group [the Comité] was born when Auto 092 was passed and the 
Court realized that our rights as women were and continue to be violated. That’s when 
we said, ‘We have to get together, create a group and hacerle seguimiento [do the follow-up 
work] to see what happens with this program.’” 
The proliferation of IDP organizations and NGOs working with IDPs in 
Cartagena is reflective of national trends, as mentioned in Chapter 2. The Comité is a 
good model of how many smaller IDP social networks coalesce into a broader IDP 
coalition, of which there are several in Cartagena. The liderezas of LIMPAL are another 
example: each one works with their home community organization but they all come 
together through LIMPAL.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Sentencia T-025 blamed the Colombia government for an “unconstitutional state of affairs” in its failure 
to adequately address the impacts of internal displacement. It established the dominant normative  
framework for providing state-based aid to IDPs by requiring that national and local authorities adjust their 
budget priorities to reflect IDP needs and by allowing the participation of IDP groups in monitoring 
government progress in correcting the “unconstitutional state of affairs” (Zea 2011). 
70 “Differential” treatment based on gender requires that men and women be treated differently in 
accordance with their specific needs. An example of this is that women would be offered the option of 
working with a female social worker in recognition of the sensitive nature of the sexual violence they may 
have experienced. 
71 The results of the implementation (or lack thereof) in Cartagena will be discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter 6. 
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Bridging the divide between IDPs and non-IDPs 
Shared experiences of structural violence  
War as a social condition is not limited to those who suffer the fate of 
displacement – it is a generalized condition of both direct and indirect physical, 
emotional, economic, political and spatial violence that affects all members of a society. It 
was the mutual recognition of living in a violent system that allowed IDPs and non-IDPs 
to begin bridging the two communities together, explains Natalia. This sentiment refers 
back to Erickson’s idea of the “gathering of the wounded”: though the suffering of IDPs 
and non-IDPs may not be identical, they are both bound up in the same structures of 
violence, prolonged poverty and failed or nonexistent government interventions. 
“They [non-IDPs] didn’t live the same violence we lived,” says Natalia, “but they 
are also living a kind of violence here in Cartagena and a kind of abandonment. We’re 
not just concerned with the problem of displacement here in Cartagena but with a whole 
series of problems like extreme poverty and historic poverty. They first saw us as invasores 
[invaders] who came here to take away their places, and they felt envy or rage because the 
state was giving us attention, and they’ve been here for years without anything like that. 
There was a choque [clash], and we only saw the differences between us. But we’ve gotten 
to the point where las personas vayan acogiendo [people start joining together]. It hasn’t 
been easy, but now you begin to see it.” 
Building a common “memoria histórica [historical memory]” within coalitions of 
IDPs and non-IDPs is an important way to recognize the violence of displacement 
alongside the everyday violence in Cartagena, says Liliana. “There is an empathy between 
women who have been displaced and other women who have lived other kinds of 
‘displacement’ and violence, whether it’s domestic, gender-based, or economic,” she says. 
“That diversity has made us recognize that though everyone has their own problems, we 
can still juntar [join together] and tell our stories so that we feel less of that pain, less of 
that anguish, less of that anxiety. Every day you feel like you have less of a burden, less of 
that weight that hurts you.”  
Bringing people together builds capacity for action when it would otherwise easy 
for an individual to succumb to passivity, depression and inaction. The dialogue between 
IDPs and non-IDPs creates the conditions for personal growth, says Liliana. “It 
motivates them to no quedarse ahí [not just stay there], and to say ‘I am capable of doing 
this’,” she says. “There are women who came here not knowing how to read, but then 
they were motivated to study. There were women who came here without taking care of 
their personal appearance, but today you see them with their makeup and with the little 
they have. It is in those small revolutions that you see big transformations.”  
Working towards common goals 
Eva says that a big part of coalition-building has been the growing participation 
of IDPs in organizations or political structures, like the Junta de Acción Comunal, that 
used to be exclusively occupied by the historic poor. “We’re now sharing that work, 
because their pain is our pain, and ours is theirs,” says Eva. “That feeling is sharing.”  
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Katy, another member of the Comité, adds that participating in community 
organizations that are not limited to IDPs and collaborating on joint projects has allowed 
for the creation of “alianzas [alliances]” and “redes [networks].”  
Another IDP women in the Comité chimes in: “The idea is that in unity there is 
strength. One single organization is not el pueblo [the people]. So we have to draw on all 
of these organizations to build un pueblo together.”  
This sentiment reflects urban sociologist Georg Simmel’s recognition that “poor 
communities needed to generate social ties extending beyond their primordial groups if 
long-term developmental outcomes were to be achieved” (Woolcock 1998, p. 168). This 
is the power of bridging social capital: IDPs or any other marginalized community 
working alone will never be able to accomplish as much as they can by working with 
others.  
Carmen’s organization FUNSAREP made the deliberate decision of mixing IDP 
and non-IDP women in workshops and projects. “They are all women, and as women, 
we bring them together. One woman will say, ‘I come from this municipality and I come 
here through displacement and I have this or that problem,’ and all of a sudden another 
woman will say, ‘Look, I’m from Cartagena and I have the same problem.’ In that way, se 
unifican [they unite]. They give each other their phone numbers, and they become 
friends. That’s what we want – we don’t want to re-victimize these women in 
displacement, and we don’t want to widen the brecha de desigualdad [inequality gap] 
between mujeres receptoras [host women] and women in displacement even more.” 
The transition from outright rejection (which was described in Chapter 4) to 
building coalitions between IDPs and non-IDPs has strengthened overall capacity of 
what Liliana sees as a growing social movement working for women’s and victim’s rights. 
“I’ve seen a change and an acceptance,” says Liliana. “That’s what allows them to keep 
fighting.” 
For an example of a social movement that has been successfully bridging IDPs 
and non-IDPs in past few years through a common political goal, see Appendix C on the 
burgeoning women’s rights movement in Cartagena.   
Building afectividad [kinship] 
But building a red [network] of women is about more than just defining a 
common goal built around demanding rights, says Liliana. “It is the afectividad [kinship 
or affection] that fills you that allows these networks to endure,” she explains.72 “Even 
when there is no money to meet, we find a way. Each person brings some pedacito [small 
thing] and we share.”  
As Liliana sees it, building coalitions and communities of IDPs and non-IDPs 
together is about creating safe spaces for storytelling, mutual support, recognition, and 
friendship. There are so many stories to be told, and so few safe spaces for people to 
share, to stand up and speak. “You hear their stories and your throat closes up as if you 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 Kadushin (2012) cites research by sociologist George Homans that describes the power of sentiment in 
the formation and reinforcement or dissolution of social networks: “Interaction with others leads to 
feelings, sentiments, or evaluations about these others, and these sentiments, positive or negative, in turn 
have consequences for future interaction. Obviously, if sentiments are positive, a person engages in more 
activities (interactions) with the other; if the sentiments are negative interactions are reduced” (p. 88). 
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want to cry,” Liliana says. “But then you see them go through this process and you see 
how they can stand up and speak – that is significant.” The “process” of building 
networks can be something as small as sharing a cafecito [a small cup of coffee] in the 
home of a stranger.  
“I feel like I’m part of a family,” adds Isabel.  
“That afecto [fondness] goes beyond what you can accomplish with a law,” says 
Liliana. “At the end of the day, that is what lasts. The afecto you build with the person in 
front of you, that feeling that you are never alone. That when you go to someone’s house 
and there’s no chair, you say ‘Okay, we’ll sit on the floor.’ That when you want to make a 
sancocho [stew], each one contributes what they can to the pot.”  
Liliana thinks personal relationships that are built on a need to pool what 
resources are available are ultimately more dynamic and longer lasting. Friendships 
between members of a group create accountability, trust and familiarity, things that are 
sorely lacking in a society ravaged by violence. That afectividad also creates the conditions 
for a “pay-it-forward” chain of change. “They say, ‘I want to be there because I feel good, 
because I have learned, and because I can teach what I have learned to other women.’ The 
key is that they don’t just learn, but that they help other women – in their neighborhoods, 
on their blocks, wherever they may be – make that transformation too,” says Liliana.  
The nuts and bolts of IDP community organizing  
in Cartagena 
 With lofty goals and few resources, how do these organizations actually 
operationalize their efforts? In other words, how do they do what they do? 
 The Comité meeting described earlier in this chapter provides a snapshot into the 
difficulties of organizing: space is limited, the heat is often unbearable, resources are 
stretched thin, and very little of this work is remunerated. For the most part, time spent 
organizing is time not spent with the family or earning an income. Addressing these 
logistical concerns and keeping participants motivated is an ongoing struggle. What 
follows are several critical challenges for IDP organizations and social movements, as well 
as descriptions of some of their response strategies. 
Balancing the triple jornada: 
Home care, economic activity and community work  
 “I used to do home visits, and I would see the reality,” says Carmen. “This woman 
would show up all pretty to a meeting, but when I would go to her house, I would see the 
stove hadn’t been turned on for two or three days, and the children were crying. Ella 
sacaba pecho [She would try to be brave] to come a meeting, but I would say to her, ‘You 
can’t work on an empty stomach, let alone think, because you will say: I don’t believe 
things can change, because you’re talking to me here in this meeting, but I’m thinking 
about the five hungry children I left at home and how when I go home they’re going to 
ask me for food, and what am I going to tell them?’” 
In many parts of Latin America, it is often said that women are faced with a triple 
jornada (triple workday) because, particularly in displacement, they are tasked with the 
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three burdens of providing financial support, caring for the family and (re)building 
community life. Balancing these three prongs of the triple jornada takes its toll. Liliana, 
the coordinator of Mesa DESC, explains that being part of a social network (and in 
particular, being a leader) can eat up a lot of time and energy that would otherwise be 
spent earning income or taking care of the household. In addition to her work in the 
“mundo del hogar [the world of the household],” Liliana has taken on the “mundo del 
trabajo comunitario y trabajo social [the world of community and social work].” In Liliana’s 
case, none of this work is remunerated.73  
The time and monetary costs of attending meetings can be particularly prohibitive 
for women who have to arrange for childcare or pay the extra transport fare to bring their 
children with them. Furthermore, with the exception of a handful of paid staff members 
at a select few organizations, time spent in community meetings represents an economic 
opportunity cost for participants because less time is available for whatever income-
generating projects IDPs may rely upon to feed their families. Eva says that she has seen 
a “desmotivación [discouragement or lack of motivation]” among some women who began 
working with the various IDP or women’s rights organizations but who have since 
dropped out. Some older women simply get tired out, and some younger ones are held 
back by their husbands or partners, who say they aren’t spending enough time at home, 
explains Eva. 
Back in the Comité meeting, Natalia explains the frustration of putting in a lot of 
time without seeing an obvious economic benefit. “We’ve been working here since the 
early hours of the morning without eating breakfast, without eating lunch. And here we 
are working, without the support of anyone else,” says Natalia. “A lot of times trabajamos 
con las uñas [we work with the bare necessities], without the minimum that we need to 
this work, without transportation, without food, without income.” 
Given that the only reason many of the women in the Comité can spend so much 
time in meetings and workshops and marches is that they are officially unemployed, the 
“volunteer” nature of this work can be wearisome, to say the least. For some, it even feels 
like an affront: Tatiana explains that as community leaders who are educating the public 
about their rights, they are carrying out the responsibility of the government but without 
proper compensation. “As liderezas [women community leaders] we don’t earn a salary. 
The state doesn’t even recognize us. We don’t earn even one peso!” says Tatiana. “But 
here we are, with or without hunger, with or without money, looking after the needs of 
the displaced population.” 
Creative responses to the triple jornada 
Liliana says one solution to the triple jornada problem is to fuse these three 
seemingly separate spheres – income, family, community – together as much as possible. 
“You can’t separate what you do from your family,” says Liliana. “That is key. Even 
before I got married I was doing this community work, and when we got together, my 
partner got involved too. There are men who take away your dreams, who tell you that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Liliana’s personal reason for continuing her work in the community is the sense of satisfaction she gets 
out of her labor. “Everything I do is voluntary. None of it provides me a salary,” she says, “which means it’s 
been an entrega [an effort or a devotion] but an entrega that has been meaningful for me too.” 
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you can’t go, that you can’t leave the house. But my strategy has always been to talk about 
it with him, to share these processes. He shares in my work, my tears, my helplessness at 
times.”  
Many participants choose to bring their children along with them to meetings or 
workshops. At one LIMPAL workshop, for example, a fifth of the 30 participants were 
under the age of seven, most of them infants. The babies made a racket, and the acoustics 
of the room were so bad that it was difficult to follow the presentation or complete the 
workshop group activities. At one point, the workshop facilitator had to pause the process 
so one young mother could take her crying baby out of the room. But these disruptions, 
like the delays due to transportation (described below), are normalized within IDP 
organizations.  
Childcare is an issue not just for parents, but also for older siblings who are 
expected to watch their younger brothers and sisters while their parents are away. In one 
extreme situation, Eduardo, a community organizer, says he knew one 7-year-old girl 
who was responsible for caring for her 3-year-old sibling. Eduardo, who often runs 
workshops with IDP youth, came up with the simple solution of creating a special jardín 
[nursery] for the toddlers. Creating a safe space within the workshop for these tag-along 
siblings both provided much-needed childcare and freed up their older siblings for 
productive engagement with their peers.  
Being able to reach out to friends for support is often just as important as relying 
on romantic partners, children or other family members. Building the bonds of 
afectividad that Liliana mentions ultimately creates a deeper commitment to the 
organization or group that cannot be as easily shaken. Community work becomes not just 
about investing in some abstract concept of the general good but investing in friends, 
neighbors and collaborators.   
 “Sometimes when you find an emptiness or you wish things were easier or faster, 
then we fall in the trap of wanting to give up. It is in those same situations that everyone 
else comes around to push you, to encourage you, to say ‘How are you going to leave us 
alone?’ They help you regain your strength and continue going through this process,” says 
Liliana. 
“It’s work, this community work, but it’s important work,” says Carolina. Though 
it takes a lot of time and energy, she ultimately finds it fulfilling. Maria says that there are 
times when Carolina arrives home at 8:30 PM only to find four or five IDPs waiting for 
her help. “They come, they tell her their stories and she says, ‘Look, I’ll leave you a 
photocopy of my ID so you can call me, so you can find me,’ and she helps them. 
Sometimes it’s midnight and Carolina is still working!” says Maria. 
 Carolina laughs and explains, “I like working. I like hearing people call out 
‘Carolina!’ I feel conocida [known]. It’s like my ‘family’ has grown, and now I have a much 
bigger family.” 
In addition to Carolina’s sense of personal fulfillment and pride for being conocida 
[known] as a lidereza, she continues doing this work because she knows she is not alone 
in it. “This non-profit work, this community work requires a lot of your time, a lot of 
your energy – so you have to enjoy what you do. You have to feel for the community. You 
have to feel the pain and the needs of the people that live in the community,” says 
Carolina. “When you become a leader, when you become a facilitator, you feel what 
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happens in the community and what happens to the people. We know that this is not 
work that you do alone. This is work that you do with a team. All of us put in one grain 
of sand, and we are building towards progress. We have seen results and we have seen a 
response from the state, but this is only because we’ve done this as a team.” 
Finding safe meeting spaces 
 In Chapter 3, we met Eduardo, who was leading a theater-based workshop with 
IDPs in a church room in the Líbano neighborhood. The decision to hold the workshop 
in the church was a last-minute choice; it was originally supposed to be held in a different 
neighborhood, Revivir de San José de los Campanos, but the night before, four men were 
shot there. The circumstances around the shootings were still unclear, and the liderezas of 
LIMPAL who were co-hosting the event were shaken.  
“We don’t feel safe anywhere,” says Eva.  
“We can’t even walk on the street or talk to someone openly,” says a LIMPAL 
staff member.  
“We have to talk behind closed doors,” says another LIMPAL lidereza.  
The decision was made to move the workshop to Líbano, even if it meant that 
many of the original intended participants would now not be able to attend. It was a 
sacrifice that Eduardo was flexible enough to make because security comes first and 
foremost, particularly when his workshops touch on sensitive or personal matters.  
"Getting to peace is difficult, but it's not impossible," says Eduardo. “There just 
aren't spaces for people to congregate, converse and work together safely.”  
Finding those safe spaces is a challenge not just for one-time events like 
Eduardo’s workshop but also for established organizations like LIMPAL, too. Right 
before I began my fieldwork in Cartagena, LIMPAL had moved out of their old office 
because their laptops had been stolen there, both a financial loss and a scare in terms in 
protecting the private information of their IDP participants. Since vacating that space, 
LIMPAL’s staff members began working from home and carting their materials back 
and forth as necessary. It was a temporary solution that needed a quick fix because 
LIMPAL’s office had been a meeting space for the liderezas, a need that could no longer 
be met in the private homes of staff members.   
It was difficult for LIMPAL to find a new office that was both safe and not too 
expensive since the real estate market in downtown Cartagena (by most accounts the 
safest part of the city) is tight and prices are high. It took LIMPAL a few months to find 
a new space, which they were just moving into at the end of my fieldwork in late July. It 
is a small, stuffy office on the side of a main throughway. It has no windows, and the rent 
is more than LIMPAL had been hoping to pay, but at least it is safe and close enough to 
the outerlying IDP neighborhoods for the liderezas to come to meetings.  
These trade-offs are common among community groups or organizations looking 
for safe, affordable and comfortable spaces. As mentioned earlier, the Comité meets once 
weekly in the Corvivienda building, sharing a small, hot office space with several other 
organizations. It is not theirs, but it is better than nothing.  
Some groups strike up deals to co-sponsor events or meetings to gain access to 
private spaces. For example, because one LIMPAL staff member also worked part-time 
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at a local technical university, LIMPAL was allowed to schedule meetings there.  
“It’s complicated when we need to find a space where we can bring people 
together to talk,” says Humberto of APRODIC. “We have to find the institutional 
spaces that can act as a sort of protection, both for the people who work for our 
organization and for the people of the barrio. For example, we use a strategy of linking up 
with schools or with other community organizations in the neighborhood, but we still 
have to be very careful.” 
Others make deals with local churches, which are generally respected as safe 
spaces in neighborhoods. However, churches often place limitations on the activities or 
discussions they will allow under their roofs. Eduardo has had trouble in the past when 
hosting workshops with young people about safe sex, AIDS or sexual violence. In these 
cases, the church said no and despite the blaring sun and the lack of privacy, Eduardo had 
no choice but to take the participants out on the street, one of the only public meeting 
spaces available. 
The challenge of urban mobility 
 In Eduardo’s workshop, we wait about two hours for all of the participants to 
arrive, even though the 9AM start time was clearly and repeatedly communicated to 
everyone well in advance. As one LIMPAL staff member explains, “siempre llegan tarde 
[they always arrive late]” because of transportation. The delay in the workshop is 
expected. Those participants who actually did arrive on time because they live close to the 
Líbano church don’t seem surprised or bothered by the wait.  
Physically bringing IDP men and women together from all over Cartagena is a 
logistical challenge, particularly when they may not have the 1,500 pesos [$0.83 USD] to 
pay for a bus or a mototaxi [motorcycle taxi] upfront. How can someone like Violet, the 
IDP woman we met briefly in Chapter 3, afford to attend community meetings when the 
cost of a public bus, little as it is, would mean not being able to feed her children every 
day?  
Cartagena is a low-density city and some neighborhoods can be as far as an hour 
apart by bus, so transport costs have to be considered both in terms of time and money. 
Some neighborhoods (often the ones where IDPs are most likely to live) are so dangerous 
that buses and taxis won’t drive into them or will restrict their operating hours to avoid 
nighttime travel. Certain holiday seasons make public transport almost impossible 
because the city practically shuts down with celebrations and parades. The entire month 
of November, for example, is written off as a no-go for community organizing work 
because Cartagena is overtaken by Independence Day festivities and the annual crowning 
of Miss Colombia.  
 All in all, a bus trip to a meeting is not as simple as it may sound. For example, it 
takes two bus trips to arrive at a meeting in the center of Cartagena departing from 
Pasacaballos, a poor and IDP-heavy neighborhood that is physically close but lacks easy 
access to transportation to the center. Back and forth, “that’s 10,000 pesos [about $5.50 
USD],” says Carmen. “Where is a woman going to get 10,000 pesos just to come to a 
workshop?” 
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Pooling resources  
In the face of these logistical barriers to organizing, Carmen says there is a bright 
spot in seeing how the participants give what little they can to share with the group. 
“Sometimes a woman will say to me, ‘Today, don’t give me money because I can pay for 
my transport,’ and sometimes they’ll bring a big watermelon to a meeting to share. They 
say to me, ‘You always give to us, so today I’m bringing in these cookies.’” 
The women of the Comité similarly pool their few resources to help one another. 
“We all help each other when we don’t have money for transportation,” says Natalia. 
“One of us will give something. Even if she’s just a little better off, le colabora a la otra 
[she’ll help the other].” 
These small collaborations are certainly important, but there is a question of scale. 
Eva thinks logistical constraints, which can perhaps be overcome within the closed loop 
of a given organization, are actually preventing the formation of broader networks and 
coalitions. She gives the example of wanting to take a LIMPAL workshop to train 
community leaders in some of the most dangerous neighborhoods of Cartagena, those 
that are least serviced by the state or NGOs. But Eva says it is just logistically impossible 
because of insecurity, lack of funds for transport and no money to pay for refreshments or 
lunch. In other words, the information, access and support to be gained from linking into 
a broad-based social movement are limited by the safety and financial barriers to bringing 
people together in the city.  
 
There is one big omission in this list of challenges to IDP organizations, to which the 
entire next section of this chapter will be dedicated: the presence of armed actors in 
Cartagena. 
Living in fear: The presence of armed actors in Cartagena74 
The battle over space 
Humberto, co-founder of APRODIC, counts at least eight armed groups 
operating in Cartagena, three of which (Los Paisas, Los Urabeños and Los Rastrojos) he 
says control half of all municipalities in Bolívar. After the 2005 national demobilization 
of paramilitaries under the Justice and Peace Law, 400 of the 700 demobilized 
paramilitaries from the nearby Montes de María moved to Cartagena, where they set up 
in “strategic neighborhoods,” says Humberto. Many of those neighborhoods are also 
heavily populated with IDPs, as is visualized in the map below, which was originally 
compiled from information reported to the Defensoría del Pueblo in Cartagena in 2011.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 For a longer study on the presence of armed actors in Cartagena, see (Defensoría del Pueblo 2011) or 
(Corporación Humanas 2011).  
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The demobilized paramilitaries began offering “security” services, requiring that 
local businesses (including private buses) pay a daily fee or risk attack. They have 
established an elaborate system of blackmail and control. Paying the vacunas [bribes]75 
eats up the hard-earned money upon which so many IDPs and the historic poor depend.  
To solidify their power, armed groups began drawing up lists of community 
leaders, demanding that those named leave or be killed. They also began limiting 
mobility, declaring “curfews”76 during which no one would be allowed out on the street, 
thereby preventing any non-sanctioned collective action. Ultimately, this tactic is about 
claiming and marking territory, says Humberto. 
There is a pervasive and persistent sense of fear, particularly among women living 
in the city. “There is no security,” says Liliana. “There are all kinds of genocide and death 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 The literal translation of vacuna is vaccination, as if this bribe were a preventative measure against the 
“disease” of attack or threat by armed actors. 
76 “There’s a town in Sucre where the paramilitaries set a curfew at 7 PM, so from 7 PM to 6 AM no one 
can go out,” says Humberto. “About two weeks ago they killed a 15-year-old boy because he was going to 
an appointment in the next town. He was biking on the road but it wasn’t yet 6 AM, and they killed him 
right there, a pelado [young boy] of 15. That’s the same kind of situation we’re living here with the 
paramilitaries controlling Cartagena.” 
 
The presence of illegal armed actors and threats reported in Cartagena in 2011 
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and femicide and violence against women. There are so many of these situations that 
sometimes you are scared of just going out. You don’t feel safe. It prevents us from being 
independent, from having autonomía del espacio [autonomy of space], on the street, in the 
parks, in the movie theater.”  
It is interesting to note that Liliana describes feeling fearful in both public and 
private spaces. In public policies designed to address fear and safety in urban spaces, the 
consistent separation of the public and private spheres as if there were no overlap or no 
public responsibility for the latter has stifled effective responses to violence, particularly 
gender-based violence (Sweet and Escalante 2010).  
The functioning of social networks and community organizations is limited and 
interrupted by the constant concern for safety. “If I don’t trust the people who live next 
door to me because they could be associated to the fuerzas y armas [forces and weapons], 
then it’s that much harder to build organizations in those areas,” Humberto says. 
“Sometimes we get discouraged if we host a meeting and only five people show up, but 
you know it’s because of something.” Humberto says the appearance of pasquines [posters] 
or pamphlets that list community leaders or other enemies of the paramilitaries in a 
community can cause widespread terror, so much so that only five people at a time can 
meet in one place. It’s not that people aren’t interested in Humberto’s meeting, but that 
they can’t attend for fear of retribution.  
The battle over identity 
David was displaced from a rural area outside of Cartagena after his father-in-law, 
who was running for public office, was threatened by armed men who gave him 24 hours 
to vacate his property. David’s family first escaped to Bogotá, where they spent six years, 
moving various times within the capital city to find work and avoid trouble, before they 
decided it was safe enough to return to Cartagena in 2012. In both Bogotá and 
Cartagena, David joined IDP organizations as a way of gaining access to important 
information-sharing networks and to express his solidarity with others in a similar 
situation. 
 But even within these organizations, David says it is difficult to navigate old and 
new loyalties that may or may not be public knowledge. He has to tread carefully so as 
not to stir up conflicting sympathies since some IDPs in these organizations are former or 
current guerrillas or paramilitaries, while other members of the same organizations have 
been displaced by those very groups. This is a clear example of the concept of 
“multiplexity,” or having stacked and multiple overlapping identities or social associations 
(Kadushin 2012).  
 “You have to be prudent to not create conflicts in the organizations between 
people’s different feelings of belonging,” David explains. “But we also cannot deny that 
there are many armed groups in the city. We cannot cover that up. The war in Colombia 
is not over. They want us to think the war is over,77 but it’s not.”  
Even in IDP community solidarity networks, the armed conflict continues as a 
persistent undertone to all social interactions. Just as in places of origin, the rotating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 David is referring to the Colombian government, which did not officially acknowledge the internal 
armed conflict until the passage of the Victims’ Law in 2011. 
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domination of space between multiple armed groups and the continual contestation over 
territory puts IDPs (as well as native residents of Cartagena) not only in the crossfire of a 
seemingly never-ending gunfight but also in the crossfire of a battle over identity.  
Young people, primarily young men, are “recruited” to join armed actors and 
gangs through force: they are told that if they do not join, they will be killed. Other 
young men join because of a lack of economic opportunity, as mentioned in Chapter 3, 
and because of the desire to affiliate with a social group that can provide support and a 
sense of belonging. Without educational opportunities and with nothing else to do, some 
young men get caught up in what Humberto calls “schools of sicariato,” where they are 
trained to become sicarios, hired assassins.  
IDP families with teenage children often fear the voluntary or forced recruitment 
of their sons and daughters into gangs or prostitution, particularly because the association 
with either activity can put the entire family at risk, says Carmen. Similarly, young girls 
who become romantically involved with members of armed groups enter not just into a 
relationship but also into all the trappings of that group’s label. Some families even elect 
to uproot themselves again within a city in order to avoid this.   
Teenagers are not the only ones at risk. Knowing or assuming that IDP families 
receive state-based aid payments, some armed actors strike up relationships with older 
IDP women, many of whom arrive as or become single mothers in displacement. “These 
are women whose husbands were killed, whose sons were killed,” says Carmen, and now 
they are taking up with men who may have some affiliation with the very groups that 
perpetrated the crimes against their families. Carmen explains that many women see 
these relationships as a form of “protection” in the city, though she says it is a false 
protection that could actually put them at more risk.  
Sometimes women who maintain relationships with armed actors are used as 
informants. They attend meetings of community groups or organizations as if they were 
members and then share whatever information they gather with their lovers, boyfriends 
or husbands. The risk of one social identity (built on a relationship with an armed actor) 
precluding and ultimately unraveling another (built on a relationship with a community 
group or organization) is ever-present. This is another clear example of how IDPs must 
navigate multiplexity in their social relationships.  
Liliana says there are also known cases in which the men of the household (both 
romantic partners and sons) disappear mysteriously to “work” (presumably for an armed 
group) for long stretches of time. Neighbors, friends, and sometimes even family 
members may not know their whereabouts or alliances. In their absence, many of the 
women left behind become more active players in community organizations. However, 
when their sons and husbands return from what was most likely paramilitary or guerrilla 
action after some time, the home dynamic shifts. Some women have to tone down their 
involvement in organizations while others drop out completely for fear of the negative 
affiliation that has been imposed upon them by their family members. Others may 
become informants. 
Suddenly, says Liliana, the home of that family is no longer a safe space for 
gathering, and friends and neighbors can no longer talk as openly as they once did there. 
The space has been tainted, but so has the reputation of the family in question. Trust is 
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dynamic and often has less to do with an individual than with what that individual 
represents, whether willingly or not. 
Infiltrating community organizations and fomenting distrust 
The threat of infiltration or betrayal from within makes some IDP activists wary 
of their fellow group members. When interpersonal trust is already so tenuous, the 
inability to trust even the members of one's own organization can be paralyzing. 
Conversations never feel fully private, and words must be carefully couched and guarded 
at all times.  
 This suspicion is intentionally fomented to prevent any collective action that 
might threaten the dominance of the armed actors. Carolina says that because 
community organizations gather people together and empower them to demand their 
rights or to change their lifestyles, these social organizations represent a cap on the power 
of armed actors. “As people build capacity, and many of them stop doing drugs or being 
delinquents or prostitutes, then we [as an organization] become a threat to the armed 
actors,” Carolina explains. “As consumption goes down, spending on drugs in the 
neighborhood goes down, and their profits aren’t as big because people are starting to see 
the world from a different perspective. They think maybe before buying drugs, before 
getting involved in crime, I will join this organization that is working in the community.” 
Unfortunately, the more power wielded by a community organization in helping people 
get off of the streets, the more of a threat they appear to be to the armed actors or drug 
traffickers who profit from others’ misfortune.  
As organizations grow in size and impact, newer members are increasingly less 
well known to the core of the group. “That’s where we feel the fear that our information 
is being filtered or that those armed groups are there, listening to all of the things we are 
doing,” explains Carolina. “At the moment of adding more people, the bonds of trust in 
community work get weaker. Many of the women who work with the organization have 
received threats in pamphlets or email, and we don’t know if those threats are coming 
from the people we work with or from the state that we’re challenging. That’s where 
building trust to keep adding more and more people hits a wall.” 
Back on Liliana’s patio, both Liliana and Isabel say that they always have to know 
who they are talking to and who might be listening. Most people who are invited to 
meetings have to have some sort of reference, association with a known organization or 
mutual friend in order to be trusted. “Nunca se sabe dónde está el enemigo [You never know 
where the enemy is],” says Liliana. Had we not been sitting in a relatively isolated garden 
area on Liliana’s patio, far from prying ears and eyes, we could not speak as openly as we 
are now, she explains.  
Sometimes armed actors intentionally make organizations believe they have been 
infiltrated, whether or not it is true. Eva says that Asociación Mis Esfuerzos received one 
pamphlet that threatened: “We know where you meet, with whom, and what you talk 
about. We have someone embedded in your group.” This is a clear attempt to generate 
distrust within the group to break down basic bonds between the members. As Carolina 
explains, "When they tell us there's a spy among us, that makes creating trust even within 
our own group very difficult to build. How can we move ahead if we're constantly 
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worrying there's a spy among us? How can we create safe spaces and feel comfortable 
when any one of us could be the one spying? They know that kind of message breaks us 
up. It could be true or it could be a lie, but we don't know."  
This constant uneasiness means that community work gets stalled, put on pause 
or even undone, and community groups can never let their guard down, not even when 
among friends or family. Trust is hard to come by when “rumors constantly circulate, 
there is the daily possibility of the intrusion of one or another threatening group, and the 
sensation of being spied upon by the agents of any or all of the armed organizations is 
unremitting” (Pécaut 2000, p. 103). 
Direct threats to community organizations 
2012 marked the highest registered number of threats78 against human rights 
defenders since 2002: 357 individual human rights defenders (of which 69 were 
assassinated) and 120 human rights organizations reported threats against them.79 In 
addition to threats against physical integrity or life, illegal surveillance of phone calls, 
emails and personal correspondence of human rights defenders has been widely reported 
(Human Rights Watch 2012; United Nations Human Rights Council 2012).  
IDP activists and community leaders are systematically targeted for attack, not 
only when their activities interfere with the relatively small-scale daily dealings of 
neighborhood drug traffickers, but also when their work is explicitly or implicitly 
connected to the large-scale questions of land and property restitution or political rights 
(Vidal-López 2012). Community groups represent a challenge to the economic and 
political power of armed actors, so armed actors threaten community leaders to keep 
them quiet to prevent IDPs from accessing aid or demanding their rights from the 
government. In Cartagena, most threats reported to the Defensoría del Pueblo have a 
relationship to the community organizing work of those who have been threatened 
(LIMPAL 2011). 
In this way, the information sharing function of social networks is both an asset 
and a liability because educating others on rights is reason enough to warrant being 
threatened by an armed group. “That’s part of being a lidereza,” says Eva. “That’s our risk 
to take because liderezas never keep information to ourselves. We share it so that the 
whole world will know, so that it’s not a secret.” 
Between 2005 and 2011, 50 IDP leaders were assassinated because of their 
association with movements to recover land lost during displacement (CODHES 2012; 
Vidal-López 2012). As Natalia understands it, “we are the pebble in the shoe of the 
[land] projects that are happening in Cartagena and outside of the city. We are being 
threatened because we are fighting for our right to land and we are fighting to prevent the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 These figures include threats, assassinations, attempted assassinations, disappearances and arbitrary 
detentions. 
79 Only two-thirds of those threatened could identify their attackers, among which were paramilitaries 
(41%), the Colombian army (13%) and guerrillas (9%). This information was collected from the 2012 
report of the Sistema de Información sobre Agresiones a Defensoras y Defensores (SIADDHH) and 
compiled by Semana, a Colombian newspaper (Arango 2013). 
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megaprojects80 that are destroying our culture, above all the culture of the afrodescendientes 
[Afro-Colombians] and indigenous peoples. So what do we do? We judge, we 
investigate, we denounce, and for that, nos ganamos las amenazas [we win threats].”   
Tatiana says that being known as a lidereza is both a source of pride for her as 
someone who only made it to third grade and a source of danger as someone who has 
assumed a position of relative power within her community. Tatiana has been directly 
threatened twice as a result of her activism. The first threat arrived as a panfleto [a 
pamphlet or flyer] warning Tatiana to stop being a human rights defender or risk violent 
action. Tatiana went to the Fiscalia [the Attorney General’s office] to file an official 
complaint. Soon after, she received the second threat directly to her cell phone.  
As a measure of protection, Tatiana was provided with a daily police patrol to 
provide surveillance for her home, and every day four or five officers pass by to check in 
on her. Two policemen stop by while I am visiting Tatiana’s home and they pull up two 
plastic chairs to join our conversation. One of them is engaged to one of Tatiana’s 
daughters, and they flirt in the corner. The officers stay for twenty minutes and then take 
their leave: all is clear, for today at least. 
The security provided by the patrol is not unmitigated. This form of protection 
has ironically placed Tatiana in a precarious situation, generating suspicion and rumors 
within her neighborhood about why the police linger by her home and what her 
involvement with them might be. The association with the police provides Tatiana some 
protection, some emotional support and even political access to a certain degree, but it 
also places her at risk. In other words, this security measure can also have the perverse 
effect of heightening Tatiana’s insecurity. 
This social connection is an asset and a liability not just for Tatiana, but also for 
her family, friends and colleagues, as well. Her daughter’s impending marriage to a 
policeman may also bring further complications. Social identity is “contagious” in this 
sense—perception or assumption of association is often as meaningful as real association 
itself.  
State collusion with armed actors 
Humberto explains that in over two thirds of the 45 municipalities in the 
department of Bolívar there have been reports of the continued presence of paramilitary 
groups, many of whom maintain control over the municipal administrations. Some 
scholars argue that the 1991 Constitution, which led to the decentralization of power 
from the central government to subnational and local governments, created the 
conditions for the takeover of municipal governments. Across the country, the number of 
municipalities either partially or completely under the control of violent actors rose from 
173 in 1985 to 622 (more than half of all municipalities) in 1995 (Rice 2011).  
“The groups that caused displacement in the first place are still in power,” 
Humberto says. “They control the governments that are supposed to apply the law. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Natalia is referring to agroindustrial megaprojects that agglomerate vast amounts of land, much of which 
has been vacated because of displacement. More information on these projects is available in (Alviar García 
2012). 
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concern is that when someone goes to submit a land restitution claim, the next day that 
person will be threatened.” 
Tatiana even wonders aloud if it was the very institutions to which she appealed 
for help after her first threat that gave away her cell phone number to the people who 
threatened her the second time.  
“When I arrived in Cartagena I thought it was one of the most peaceful cities,” 
says Manuel. “But I realized that the paramilitarismo [paramilitarism in politics] has 
shifted to cities and is in all of the neighborhoods in Cartagena. They continue 
massacring people; they continue killing young people, community leaders, union leaders; 
they continue attacking organizations of displaced people, especially those that want to 
reclaim our lands. We’ve been re-victimized by ongoing threats, threats that we’ve 
denounced to the Fiscalia, to the security forces of the state, but we’ve never gotten 
concrete responses.”  
The government response to threats against community leaders and human rights 
defenders has been lackluster (some say because of collusion with those issuing the 
threats). This makes many IDPs feel unsupported, unprotected, and frustrated with the 
continued lack of help from public agencies, explains Katy. “We struggle and struggle and 
struggle, and when we finally achieve even something small, then comes the threat: 
‘These women are putting their nose where it doesn’t belong. We’ll send them a papelito 
[little paper] so that they stay quiet.’ And that’s when we are afraid and some women 
want to stay at home. It’s hard for us to take on that role, that great responsibility of 
wanting to salir adelante [make progress] for our families and our community. We want 
to make our lives better, but it’s not easy because the institutions no se prestan [don’t care], 
the government no se presta, nobody does. It’s total chaos, and we are losing trust and 
credibility in the state institutions. Imagine, from that point, we can’t do anything!” 
Manuel blames the silence on the well-documented complicity of government 
actors with paramilitary groups (reaching all the way up to former President Álvaro 
Uribe). This, not surprisingly, makes many IDPs very hesitant to hope for a real chance 
for peace or reconciliation. Chapter 6 will go into greater depth about trust in the state 
and concerns over collusion with armed actors, but it is worth noting here that IDPs feel 
unprotected by the state because of these misaligned interests (or perceptions thereof).  
Even though the Colombian government invested $100 million USD in 2012 in 
protecting human rights defenders through the Unidad Nacional de Protección [National 
Unit of Protection], many IDPs continue to feel the response has been inadequate, 
particularly given evidence of state collusion with armed actors (Arango 2013). For 
example, the women of the Comité, which has been threatened on multiple occasions, 
feel they have not been protected appropriately. “The only thing we get from the 
government, from the state, is a radio telephone that doesn’t even work. That’s been the 
only form of protection they’ve offered us, so we have to take our own measures of self-
protection,” explains Natalia, president of the Comité.  
Community responses to violence and insecurity 
Across Colombia, the prevalence of violent urban social networks (e.g. 
demobilized paramilitaries, bacrim, urban gangs, etc.), paired with frustration over failed 
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or inadequate state responses, has led to the formation of some proactive citizen-
organized security networks (Davis 2012). Some Cartagena neighborhoods organize 
brigadas cívicas [civic brigades] to patrol the streets, a sort of community policing but 
without engagement from the official police force. Citizens volunteer to guard the 
neighborhood at night to prevent robbery and violence. However, some of the brigadas 
wind up in the control of paramilitaries, says Humberto, and they are converted from a 
source of security to a source of danger. In these situations, those who refuse to submit to 
the will of the brigadas are threatened or killed.   
There are several other survival mechanisms that IDP organizations and 
community leaders use to handle threats. As mentioned earlier, Tatiana has pursued 
public complaint through the official state channels. Many of my sources reported filing 
complaints with various state and local government agencies, though they rarely saw the 
same level of protection that Tatiana is receiving from her police patrol.  
Others choose to shrink away from IDP networks, dropping out of community 
organizations and shutting themselves and their families up at home. As Carmen says, 
“There are times when we lower our profile as much as possible.” There are benefits to 
being a recognized community organization in terms of reaching a wider IDP population 
and gaining political voice, but it also can place the leaders and members at risk, for 
which they must compensate by quieting down in response to threats. This can create a 
sort of rollercoaster of public action. The bigger a social movement gets, the more it must 
be concerned about security, particularly if the threats may be coming from within. 
 In contrast to that approach, some choose to heighten the visibility of the 
movement even more. In 2011 after a threat against a group of IDP women, those 
threatened (including Tatiana) decided to organize a public march into the center of 
Cartagena to the historic Torre del Reloj at the gates of the old walled city. Marches and 
public demonstrations in protest of violence and threats against IDP groups are 
increasingly common in Cartagena.  
In a LIMPAL workshop that I ran in July 2012, I asked 30 IDP women to 
participate in an activity to identify the risks and threats they had faced as human rights 
defenders, as well as their personal and collective strategies for addressing such threats. 
Some of the security strategies they identified in this workshop that have not mentioned 
above include forging alliances with local and international NGOs, launching public 
awareness campaigns and calling on neighbors to get involved in preventing or 
responding to threats.  
Why do IDPs engage in high-risk activism? 
 Given that IDPs have fled highly insecure and risky situations in their places of 
origin, a paradox arises in the fact that so many seek out highly insecure and risky 
situations in their sites of reception through activism and community organizing. Why 
would someone escaping violence put her- or himself directly in the line of fire again?  
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Considering alternatives to engagement 
 Some IDPs see the risk of not engaging in social movements as greater than the 
risk of doing so. As Loveman (1998) points out, the motivation to join a high-risk social 
movement is often driven by the lack of other viable options. When lifestyles and values 
are threatened by war as a social condition, joining a social movement (no matter how 
high-risk) to restore what has been lost may even be seen as a move for self-preservation.  
Because of threats and fear, the Comité has experienced some “bajones [slumps]” 
during which the members stayed at home for extra security, says Eva. But eventually, the 
Comité ramped their activities again because they knew if they didn’t, nobody else would 
either. “We are doing political advocacy,” says Eva. “We can’t stay in our houses. Because 
that’s when we give our enemies points, the ones who want to take us out of the game 
with fear.”  
“We are terrified, but we cannot show that fear,” says Ximena. “We are terrified, 
but not paralyzed. We cannot paralyze ourselves because that would be even worse.” In 
other words, for Ximena, Eva, and many other community leaders, not engaging actually 
represents a bigger threat to their lives, families and futures.  
Learning to trust again 
 Afectividad [kinship] and emotional bonding are key to building the solidarity 
networks that allow IDPs to continue their participation in social movements even in the 
face of direct threats. As Tate (2007) writes, “the emotional rewards of activism are 
central precisely because the material benefits of human rights activism in Colombia are 
few and the dramatic drawbacks – threats and harassment, even death – loom so large” 
(p. 148).  
Face-to-face interactions between friends and colleagues serve as a form of 
insulation for activists and build the trust that counteracts disincentives to participation 
(Loveman 1998). For members of these groups, there is a stake in both individual gains 
and/or losses through collective action but also in collective gains and/or losses, creating 
ongoing solidarity that becomes an important basis for mobilization despite risks 
(Fireman and Gamson 1979).  
The everyday violence that IDPs experience in Cartagena neighborhoods can be a 
barrier to participation, but Humberto says this barrier can be lowered, if not overcome 
entirely, by establishing real relationships between participants. “You have to 
communicate and build up trust slowly so that people invest in the organization,” says 
Humberto. “You have to create the climate of trust in the barrio [neighborhood] so that 
when there is danger, you warn each other and you learn the strategies for how to meet.” 
This process can be discouraging because of slow progress, he explains, but it is essential 
to sustaining a movement that would otherwise scare people away entirely.  
Das et al. (2001) argue that trust can only be re-established when understandings 
of what is “normal” shift: “No glib appeal to ‘our common humanity’ can restore the 
confidence to inhabit each other’s lives again. Instead, it is by first formulating their 
notions of ‘normality’ as a changing norm, much as the experience of a disease changes 
our expectations of health, that communities can respond to the destruction of trust in 
their everyday lives” (p 23). This shifting normality reflects the same concept underlying 
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war as a social condition. IDPs learn to operate within the new “normal” of the city, the 
new “normal” of threats against their lives and organizations, and the new “normal” of 
their shifting identities as individuals and members of a group. 
Within this new normal, IDPs find ways to build trust even in a society deeply 
embattled by extreme and everyday violence. This speaks directly to the necessity of 
rethinking conflict and post-conflict situations not as vacuums or as entirely destructive 
to the social fabric of a place but rather as creating the conditions for a re-weaving of that 
social fabric. Conflict upsets and transforms, making way for reconfigurations of social 
connection. It is, in fact, the very tangible and ever-present threat of violence that “might 
explain how hard the survivors had to work to generate new contexts in which enough 
trust could be created to carry on, once again, the work of everyday life” (Das et al. 2001, 
p. 18) 
Framing identity through participation in social movements 
 IDPs are willing to suffer a certain amount of risk for the sake of a social 
movement or organization because of how their involvement in those activities has come 
to define a new life project for them in the city. The personal meaning and identity that 
has been forged through this process would be violated were the individual to pull back 
because of threats. In other words, their commitment to the movement relies on how it 
fundamentally factors into their sense of self (Tate 2007).  
 Carmen says that building trust is a process that emerges from individual self-
recognition and self-respect. She believes that one of the most important and most often 
overlooked impacts of the armed conflict has been the violation of the human body, 
particularly the bodies of women.81 Based on this principle, Carmen works with IDP 
women to help them rebuild self-confidence and to relearn how to carry themselves 
physically in their own bodies. “We begin to work from the territory that is hers,” 
Carmen explains. “Nobody should invade the territory that is her body. She begins to 
discover that territory, to understand how her territory has been violated, that she is the 
only one who can defend it and that the state should guarantee her rights. She begins to 
trust herself and from there she can begin to trust others, and others, and others. That’s 
what can build a society, a society that trusts, a society that is trustworthy, a society that is 
also happy and can aspire to a better life.” 
Scaling up from the individual, as Carmen describes it, follows a certain logic of 
change. As one person joins a social movement, she or he then recruits friends and family 
through tight-knit kinship networks, and both personal and collective identity become 
embedded in the social movement through the experience of ongoing participation. 
Individuals subsume their personal level of risk to what they understand to be a 
movement greater than themselves. The individual motivations for participation are 
complemented by and embedded into personal and institutional social networks 
operating at multiple scales – body, neighborhood, city, state, even globe (Loveman 
1998).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Some feminist scholars have called for a re-scaling of social and policy analysis down to the scale of the 
individual body, paying particular attention to the gender dynamics of the brutalization of body in times of 
conflict (Cockburn 2004). 
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Summary  
 This chapter has examined how some IDP social networks form the basis for 
coalitions between IDPs and non-IDPs (both bridging and bonding) despite the many 
obstacles to community organizing, including the triple jornada, the lack of safe spaces 
and the problems of urban mobility and resource mobilization. This chapter also took a 
close look at the impact of armed actors on IDP social networks and organizations, 
generating fear, distrust, and violence in public and private spaces.  
 Given these limitations and threats, this chapter also explored a few reasons for 
why IDPs continue to engage in high-risk activism, including the lack of alternatives to 
engagement, the emotional bonds that tie IDPs to each other, and the power of personal 
identification with a movement.   
 The next chapter will offer a brief review of the main international, national and 
local policies on internal displacement in Colombia before delving into how IDP 
networks, organizations and movements engage with the state. 
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Chapter 6  
IDPs Engaging with the State  
 
How do IDP social movements interact with and make claims on the state, going 
beyond passive resistance or violent confrontation? This chapter will delve into the ways 
in which IDPs have engaged with the municipal authorities in Cartagena as recipients of 
aid, as citizens and as change-makers. 
The first section of this chapter lays out the current international and national 
legal and policy frameworks that address internal displacement in Colombia. The second 
section looks at the dissolution of trust in the Colombian state, which is only exacerbated 
by poorly designed and poorly administered IDP assistance programs. The third section 
describes social networks as the loci of rights-based claims. The fourth section looks at 
building vertical social capital between IDP organizations and the government as a 
future-looking project of combining political engagement with community 
transformation.  
The legal and policy framework for internal displacement 
Internal displacement was first addressed by the Colombian government in 1995, 
when it set up the first emergency aid system for IDPs.82 This policy was further 
institutionalized by the passage of Law 387 in 1997, which established a statewide system 
for the prevention of displacement and the protection of those already displaced. The 
national IDP registry system was set up three years later in 2000 (Taylor 2010).  
However, the early progress made on a national policy level was not fast enough 
to address the growing crisis of displacement at the turn of the millennium. In 2004, 
under Sentencia T-025 the Constitutional Court of Colombia found the lack of an 
adequate government response to displacement to be an "unconstitutional state of affairs” 
so pervasive it could be only be ascribed to “a widespread, structural failure of the 
government’s response” (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011b, p. 47). In a 
series of follow-up court orders (the most recent in 2010), the Constitutional Court 
continued to apply pressure to the executive and legislative branches of the national 
government to recognize, investigate and attempt to remedy the situation. In June 2011, 
President Juan Manuel Santos signed Ley 1448, known as the Victims’ Law, the largest 
victims’ rights and reparations law in Colombia’s history, with sweeping provisions for 
land restitution, compensation and a wide range of guarantees of services like preferential 
housing subsidies for victims of the conflict. 
This section will briefly summarize the various international and national legal 
and policy frameworks that address internal displacement in Colombia. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Note that internal displacement has been documented in Colombia since La Violencia in the 1950s, but 
the Colombian government did not begin to officially respond until the mid-1990s.  
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International law and policy 
Though the Colombian government has only begun to officially address internal 
displacement through law and policy in the past few decades, the international precedent 
for the protection of civilians in armed conflict had been set since the end of World War 
II. The 1991 Constitution of Colombia affirms the incorporation of all international 
treaties signed and ratified by Colombia directly into the national legal framework in at 
least five constitutional Articles.83 The Constitutional Court of Colombia ruled in 1995 
that international law prevails over national law. Thus, the following human rights 
treaties are all considered part of the national legal framework in Colombia (Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011a). 
Article 3 in the Geneva Conventions of 194984 
Under the Geneva Conventions, civilians (those who do not take direct part in hostilities) 
may not be subject to attack in either international armed conflict or internal armed 
conflict. According to Article 3, which specifically addresses internal armed conflict, 
those taking no active part in hostilities cannot be subject to violence, taking of hostages, 
outrages upon personal dignity, or extrajudicial executions. The Geneva Conventions 
achieved universal ratification among UN signatories in 2006 (United Nations 2007).  
Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions 
This additional protocol, which passed in 1977 to address the victims of non-
international armed conflict, reinforces Article 3 and additionally prohibits collective 
punishments, acts of terrorism, slavery, pillage, forced displacement and threats to 
commit any of these prohibited acts. Colombia ratified Additional Protocol II in 1994 
(Andreu-Guzmán 2012). 
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement 
In 1998, the United Nations Economic and Social Council passed the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement, an overview of the rights of IDPs in accordance with existing 
standards of international law. The Guiding Principles place primary responsibility upon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 These Articles are as follows, quoted in the original Spanish (LIMPAL 2011): 
Artículo 9: Las relaciones exteriores del Estado se fundamentan en la soberanía nacional, en el respeto por la 
autodeterminación de los pueblos y en el reconocimiento de los principios del Derecho Internacional 
aceptados por Colombia. 
Artículo 93: Los tratados y convenios internacionales ratificados por el Congreso, que reconocen los 
derechos humanos y que prohíben su limitación en los estados de excepción, prevalecen en el orden interno. 
Los derechos y deberes consagrados en esta Carta, se interpretarán de conformidad con los tratados 
internacionales sobre derechos humanos ratificados por Colombia. 
Artículo 94: La enunciación de los derechos y garantías contenidos en la Constitución y en los convenios 
internacionales vigentes, no debe entenderse como negación de otros que, siendo inherentes a la persona 
humana, no figuren expresamente en ellos. 
Artículo 214, numeral II: No podrán suspenderse los derechos humanos ni las libertades fundamentales. En 
todo caso se respetarán las reglas del derecho internacional humanitario. 
Artículo 53: Los convenios internacionales del trabajo debidamente ratificados hacen parte de la legislación 
interna. 
84 For the full text of the Geneva Conventions, including both Article 3 and Additional Protocol II, visit 
www.icrc.org 
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national governments (not local governments) for designing and implementing 
appropriate policies to address internal displacement. Though the Guiding Principles are 
not open for ratification because they are non-binding, the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia has made repeated reference to the Principles in their rulings and decisions, as 
well as in statutory law, case law and administrative law (Human Rights Watch 2005; 
Ferris 2008b; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011a). 
The Pinheiro Principles 
In 2005, a sub-commission of the United Nations Human Rights Council endorsed a 
series of guidelines on post-conflict property restitution called the United 
Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees and Displaced 
Persons, more commonly known as the “Pinheiro Principles.” Borrowing heavily from 
the experience of property restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the early 1990s 
war in former Yugoslavia, the Pinheiro Principles propose a legal, administrative and 
enforcement framework for the design and implementation of property restitution 
processes in the wake of conflict. The Pinheiro Principles are guidance or best practices, 
not binding law (Mohan 2011; Ballard 2012). The Victims’ Law in Colombia, which will 
be discussed below, draws heavily on the Pinheiro Principles. 
Other treaties and agreements  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified in Colombia in 1969) 
and the American Convention on Human Rights (ratified in Colombia in 1973) both 
include protections for freedom of movement and freedom to choose one’s residence 
(Human Rights Watch 2005). Many IDP organizations in Cartagena, including 
LIMPAL, APRODIC and Mesa DESC, also make heavy reference to UN Security 
Council Resolution 1325, which was adopted unanimously in 2000. UNSCR 1325 
address the role of women in peace, security, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration 
in situations of conflict. The implementation of UNSCR 1325 in Colombia has been 
spotty and inconsistent.85 
 
National law and policy 
In addition to the international treaties mentioned above, Colombia’s national legal and 
policy framework has expanded significantly since 1995. After the “unconstitutional state 
of affairs” declared in 2004, over 100 national policies to address internal displacement 
were passed (Taylor 2010). The following is a sampling of the key policies on the books.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 In a veeduría [a legal tool that allows civil society organizations to monitor and produce independent 
reports on government agencies] completed in 2011, LIMPAL found that public officials in Cartagena had 
very little knowledge of UNSCR 1325. Among those who knew of the resolution, there was little attempt 
to implement it, little support for the participation of women in peace processes, and a lack of the guarantee 
of access to justice, all of which are important components of UNSCR 1325. LIMPAL found that women 
are often re-victimized when they seek help for gender-based violence. Another major obstacle to the 
implementation of UNSCR 1325 is the short office terms of public officials and the lack of continuity for 
support and implementation (LIMPAL 2011).  
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1991 Constitution of Colombia 
In addition to direct incorporation of international human rights and humanitarian law, 
the 1991 Constitution established several institutions for the protection of human rights. 
The Fiscalía (Attorney General) and Procuraduría (Inspector General) were given 
separate judicial functions and the latter was made responsible for investigating official 
state misconduct. The Defensoría del Pueblo (Ombudsman) was charged with assisting 
victims of human rights abuses (Tate 2007).  
 
The Constitution also played a major role in the fiscal and political decentralization of 
Colombia’s government system, which has created significant challenges for local 
authorities that have been assigned new administrative tasks and functions without the 
necessary funds to carry them out. The impact of this “incomplete decentralization” on 
IDP assistance will be examined below (Ferris 2008b; Ibáñez and Velásquez 2008). 
Law 387 of 1997 
In 1997, the Congress of Colombia enacted Law 387 to create a state system to address 
internal displacement. This law officially acknowledged the state’s responsibility to 
protect the constitutional rights of IDPs. Law 387 created 18 government agencies at 
different levels under the National System for the Integral Attention to the Displaced 
Population (SNAIPD by its Spanish acronym), as well as a National Plan for Attention 
to the Displaced Population. SNAIPD and the National Plan are now coordinated by a 
government agency called Prosperidad para Todos under the Office of the President 
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011a; Vidal-López 2012). 
Sentencia T-025 of 2004 
This ruling declared the “unconstitutional state of affairs” that created a mechanism for 
the Constitutional Court of Colombia to produce a series of orders (including Auto 092) 
for the government to enforce the protection of all IDPs. Sentencia T-025 also created a 
permanent monitoring system, including public hearings with IDP and other civil society 
organizations (Vidal-López 2012). 
Justice and Peace Law (Law 975 of 2005) 
In 2005, Congress passed the Justice and Peace Law to demobilize paramilitary groups 
under the law. Perpetrators of crimes were responsible for providing reparations to 
victims and were offered reduced penalties in exchange for their cooperation. However, 
the legal process for reporting, prosecuting and securing damages or restitution for each 
crime was complex, and institutional support structures were weak. The Constitutional 
Court has since issued several mandates to strengthen these processes, which were further 
bolstered with the passage of the Victims’ Law (Summers 2012).  
Auto 092 of 2008 
As a follow-up to Sentencia T-025, the Constitutional Court of Colombia recognized 18 
specific ways in which displacement disproportionately affects women, including 
increased risks of sexual violence, loss of property and labor exploitation. In Auto 092, the 
Court ordered the adoption of thirteen differential programs to address these risks 
through protection, assistance and rights restitution. Unfortunately, these rights were 
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broadly defined, and the government response has been limited (Internal Displacement 
Monitoring Centre 2011a; LIMPAL 2011; Meertens 2012).  
 
The women of the Comité de Seguimiento del Auto 092 say that only three of the 13 
proposed programs have been implemented in Cartagena, and of those that do exist, the 
results are less than spectacular. The three programs in Cartagena include a high school 
program for IDP women whose education was interrupted, an income generation project 
to help under- or unemployed IDP women and a security program for women 
community leaders to facilitate their political participation. But these programs are 
underfunded and underdeveloped, says Eva, a member of the Comité. Only 152 women, 
by Eva’s count, have benefitted from the programs so far, and of those 40 who 
participated in the high school program, only 20 or 30 actually graduated. “Se compromete, 
pero incumple [The government makes commitments but doesn’t implement them],” Eva 
explains.  
Victims’ and Land Restitution Law (Law 1448 of 2011) 
The most recent IDP law to be passed is the Victims’ Law, which sets out to “seek truth, 
justice and integral reparations for victims, with a ‘guarantee of no repetition,’” essentially 
promising to prevent future violence and displacement. In theory, the Victim’s Law 
creates a robust institutional structure to manage, administer and adjudicate claims of 
victim’s rights, but it has been criticized for simply shuffling assignments of authority and 
responsibility between an already overly complex network of actors that may or not be 
accountable to each other or to the public. Some observers expect the Victims’ Law to be 
a paper law—once passed, filed away and never implemented on the ground. The impact 
of the Victims’ Law is yet to be fully realized. Most reports on early implementation have 
indicated little to no systematic progress in IDP assistance (Summers 2012). However, it 
is too soon to tell. For an extended look at the Victims’ Law, see Appendix B.   
Municipal implementation of national policy 
IDP assistance policy and programs are designed at the national level with little to 
no consultation of the local authorities that are assigned to execute these programs. The 
resulting lack of coordination and assignment of responsibility and authority is 
problematic for developing efficient and accountable programs of IDP assistance. 
The roots of this problem run deep. The “incomplete” decentralization under the 
1991 Constitution was based on a delegation of administrative tasks and functions 
previously carried out by the national government without consideration of local capacity 
or political will. This system has created a complex web of city agencies. Municipal 
authorities are responsible for running local UARIV offices, which house IDP 
registration, emergency aid and other assistance programs. The Defensoría, Procuraduría 
and Fiscalía also have municipal offices responsible for handling IDP claims regarding 
human rights abuses and other government misconduct. These offices coordinate with 
other city agencies, like Corvivienda. These institutions are often overburdened, and 
IDPs have to wait hours in line to submit claims that sometimes take years to process.  
While city governments are responsible for carrying out IDP assistance programs, 
financial prioritization and allocation still remains at the national level. This leaves 
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municipal institutions with too many assignments, too few public monies to carry them 
out and practically no room or discretion to rearrange their own local investment 
priorities.86 As more and more IDPs arrive to cities every day, the same limited revenue 
and government capacity has to stretch to assist more and more people with mixed results 
(Ibáñez and Velásquez 2008; Carrillo 2009). 
The loss of trust in the Colombian state 
The capacity for trust in government institutions and in the state as a broader 
concept is just as important as the capacity for hope when it comes to building new life 
projects in situations of ongoing conflict and violence (Davis 2012).  
In Colombia, loss of confidence in government and citizenship may begin long 
prior to the actual act of forced migration. According to Erikson (1995), the experience 
of trauma signifies “not only a loss of confidence in the self, but a loss of confidence in 
the surrounding tissue of family and community, in the structures of human government, 
in the larger logics by which humankind lives" (p. 198). The trauma of sustained violence 
paired with the (real or perceived) absence of rule of law and government presence in 
both rural places of origin and urban settlements make formal institutions seem distant, 
removed, abstract even. Perceptions of state absence are exacerbated for IDPs living in 
peripheral neighborhoods with the least access to public services and the least proximity 
to the buildings of the municipal government, almost all of which are concentrated in the 
colonial center of Cartagena (Pécaut 2000; Holmes, Gutiérrez de Piñeres, and Curtin 
2008). When government institutions are present they are often associated with the 
military, not necessarily an institution that inspires great confidence or trust in 
populations that have been violently victimized for so long (Pécaut 2000). Or, the state is 
only visible as a self-serving strategy, like around election time.87 
 Furthermore, “wheeling and dealing” negotiation with protagonists of violence 
tarnish public institutions because of close ties with the enemy (which, as mentioned 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Local authorities can draw on three main source of income to finance their public services: 
intergovernmental transfers, self-generated revenues and borrowing. Central government transfers are 
distributed annually among all of the municipalities in Colombia in accordance with their category, which 
is determined by population size and un-earmarked current income. Because population size is updated 
infrequently with the national census (the most recent was in 2005) and often based on projections rather 
than hard numbers, there is a gap between the “official” population and the real population. This gap is 
particularly pressing when the real population is inflated day after day with the arrival of more and more 
IDPs, many of whom are never counted by official estimates because they do not formally register with the 
government (Ferris 2008b; Carrillo 2009). 
87 “When the politicians need us, then you see trucks of all different colors, of fancy brands, luxury trucks 
with four doors and big sound systems,” says Ximena. “They come to the barrios [neighborhoods] making 
all sorts of noise…In election time when they are running, you see the politicians every day there, even 
eating on the floor with you, eating on a staircase with you, but when they get power, what a mess to set up 
a meeting with them! What a mess to get attended by them!” As president of her local Junta de Acción 
Comunal, Ximena has been to the Mayor’s office five times to set up a meeting to no avail. She says it took 
ten years just to get the main road paved in her neighborhood. “Is that the way the state guarantees the 
rights of their citizens? They treat us like fourth-class or fifth-class citizens. It’s embarrassing to talk about 
it, to say that our public functionaries are Colombians, are our compatriots, are our brothers and sisters in 
politics.”  
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earlier, is even more complicated when the “enemy” can mean different things to different 
people). Corruption and collusion88 with armed actors has been reported in all branches 
of government, including Congress, the judiciary and the executive branch (Pécaut 2000; 
Alviar García 2012; Summers 2012).  
A high level of “amarre burocrático [bureaucratic incest]” in public agencies 
complicates the assistance process and makes IDPs wary of government actors, explains 
Carmen. “You go to file a denuncia [complaint] in the labor office, and the women who 
hired me to work in her home is the sister-in-law of the doctor of who knows who in that 
labor office. So, there are deals and debts: each person owes a favor to another so they 
agarran todo, atan todo [they hold up everything, they tie everything up]. It’s difficult to 
get your complaints heard,” she says. The collusion between public administrators and 
the subjects of denuncias frustrates even the most diligent efforts to present claims.  
One government official from the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar 
(ICBF), the national agency responsible for family welfare, told me that laws like the 
Victims’ Law are more likely political bargaining chips than real policy change. The 
vested interests in sustaining armed conflict and the ongoing dispossession of fertile land 
for highly profitable agroindustrial projects are just too entrenched. “War is a big 
business,” he explains, and corruption is an obvious consequence, from his point of view. 
So, why should IDPs trust the system when it is so clearly corrupt, when the 
scales are already tipped against their favor? In this context, rights and citizenship may 
become abstracted because IDPs feel they do not possess the means to exercise them or to 
demand justice from a system that is seen as inherently unjust (Pécaut 2000). When the 
government has failed to protect against (and has sometimes even directly perpetrated) 
violence, and when displacement is not just dispossession of material belongings and land 
but of rights as well, the degree to which trust (and hope) can be built is severely 
compromised.  
What follows are a few of the major obstacles to building trust between IDPs and 
the state: 
1. Resistance to IDP assistance 
Back in Eduardo’s workshop in the church room in Líbano, the IDP participants 
act out scenes from their own experiences dealing with public agencies in Cartagena. In 
one scene, two women from an IDP organization go to the mayor’s office to set up a 
meeting to share a project proposal for IDP aid. The secretary says the mayor is too busy 
and offers them a meeting in two months time. They return in two months, but the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 “There are many senators who have taken advantage of these circumstances to take our land – the land 
that was taken away because it was illegally purchased with drug trafficking money, that land is now in the 
hands of senators, families of senators. Those are the people who exploit the land, and in the meantime, the 
campesino, the displaced people, the indigenous, the Afro-Colombians, we are brazos caídos [crestfallen] in 
the cities, lamenting the loss of our land,” says Manuel. Later in the same conversation, Manuel adds: “We 
see that there is no justice. We have seen the alliance between the paramilitaries and the state. Whenever 
the paramilitaries were going to carry out a massacre, the state cleared the area of the army so that they had 
all the space to do whatever they wanted.” 
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mayor barely pays attention during the meeting, talking on his phone distractedly and 
calling them invasores [invaders] responsible for increased crime in the city. After the 
meeting, the mayor hands the proposal to the secretary, who promptly throws it in the 
trash.  
“Is this real life?” asks Eduardo when the scene is over.  
“Yes!” cry the workshop participants in unison. Isabel adds that when she went to 
go see the Mayor, he told her IDPs are to blame for the problems and delinquency in 
Cartagena. Another woman nods in agreement, saying that the municipal authorities 
often blame poverty and violence on IDPs.  
Because of concerns over limited budgets and administrative capacity, some 
municipal authorities are either subtly or blatantly anti-IDP (Ferris 2008b; Zea 2011).89 
In a LIMPAL workshop, an IDP woman explains that many people feel re-victimized 
when they seek aid. “They are told, ‘But you’re from that little town where not even 
donkeys would go,’” she says. The lack of sensitivity and training of public functionaries is 
a recurring theme in almost all of my conversations with IDPs. Public officials often 
make slight of the claims presented, blame the victim, or make them feel uncomfortable. 
Katy, a member of the Comité, says that the use of language against IDP 
organizations from on high has been a significant obstacle and a determinant of broader 
public opinion against IDPs. “These institutions have come hard against us – the police, 
the senators who were candidates for mayor, the Mayor himself has said on occasions 
that we are delinquents and that we are violent.” 
In the past there have been rocky relationships between the state and IDP and 
victims’ rights organizations, which have largely been excluded from peace negotiations 
and transitional justice processes (García-Godos and O. Lid 2010). Not being invited to 
the table and sometimes being treated as “enemies of the state” has created a situation of 
mutual mistrust or even hostility.  
Because of this, Ximena expresses a deep cynicism towards those she calls “the 
macabre elite”: “The problem of displacement becomes even graver because this is a 
country of discrimination and injustice, a country in which power is in the hands of a few, 
in which families with certain last names think they are the dueños [owners] of Cartagena, 
the dueños of all of Bolívar,” Ximena says. “This macabre elite, you see them calmly with 
their white ties stand up at podiums to give speeches and all the while in the background 
they are sending people out to kill. Sometimes they even say that we are their enemies – 
those of us that work in the Juntas de Acción Communal, in the neighborhood associations, 
in the civil society organizations. The State has la gran cara [a bold face] to say that we 
are enemies of the state, that we are attacking the state, because really, when we claim our 
rights we become human rights defenders. That is not attacking the state. Because the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 It is worth quoting Jean-Noel Wetterwald, former representative of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees in Colombia, at length here to display the aggressiveness with which some municipal officials 
have resisted providing IDP assistance: “Their speeches "highlight the risks of offering housing alternatives 
to the [displaced] population because this could generate a mass population influx, or they identify the 
displaced with safety problems in the municipalities, or make offensive statements such as ‘we should assist 
the displaced with torn plastic tarps so that when it rains they go back, and we should give them rocks for 
pillows,’ as the mayor of one of the largest cities in the country said over a year ago” (Ferris 2008b, p. 57). 
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state is all of us. We are the state, the people, the sovereign of this country, and we elect 
the government to defend our interests, but we see that that apparently matters less than 
the defense of those who take away our right to life, our right to health, our right to a 
home, our rights that we all have as Colombians.”  
2. Complexity of the aid process  
Tatiana waited a long time before declaring her status as an IDP with the UARIV 
because she did not understand the process. It was only through her association with a 
cabildo indígena that she learned how to declare. Finally, in 2008, eight years after she 
arrived in Cartagena, Tatiana got her first aid payments.  
Since few IDPs know the ruta de atención [the pathway the access aid] when they 
arrive in Cartagena, they often embark on complicated goose-chases between the various 
institutions. Ana, the older IDP woman we met briefly in Chapter 4, made four attempts 
to declare with several different offices. “First I went to the Personería where they took 
my declaration, but they didn’t give me anything, anything, anything. Six years ago I 
went back. I had to declare with a lawyer, then again in the Personería, and then again in 
the UARIV because I still didn’t show up in the registry,” she says. She was finally 
accepted into the system, but the aid she has received has hardly been enough to get by.90  
Humanitarian aid payments rarely arrive on time, forcing IDPs to scramble to fill 
the gaps. Even after Tatiana finally got into the IDP registry, she found that the aid 
payments, which should come monthly, are intermittent. “You wait 20 days and nothing 
comes, you wait another 15 days and nothing comes, and a whole year goes by and 
nothing comes,” Tatiana says. 
In addition to the time costs of accessing government aid, transportation and 
childcare costs make trips to multiple public agencies a very expensive endeavor, 
especially when IDPs only come away with half-fulfilled promises of aid (Human Rights 
Watch 2012). Sometimes there are additional financial costs, as well: there is an entire 
industry built around taking advantage of IDPs with government checks. Eva says she 
knows at least three or four IDPs who have had to pay bribes to public officials for their 
claims to be processed. Similarly, a lawyer who works with LIMPAL told me about aid 
chasers91 who charge 30 to 40 percent of aid received to help IDPs with their paperwork. 
“There’s a whole business in it,” says Eduardo. “They bleed them from all sides.” 
When depending on government aid is precarious and sometimes even costly, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 After declaration, Ana received 200,000 pesos (around $110 USD) a month for food for three months. 
Two years later, she was also offered some additional income generation subsidies, and for two years she 
was given a lump sum of 915,000 pesos (around $507 USD) as ayuda humanitaria [humanitarian assistance]. 
But since that last installment, Ana says, “after that, they have given me nothing, nothing, nothing.”   
91 “In Cartagena there are all of these professional lawyers who have built a block together so that when 
people arrive in a situation of displacement and they don’t know where to find anything, then the lawyers 
appear,” explains Carmen. She says that even though IDPs can (and often do) declare or file claims on their 
own without the help of a lawyer, aid is often mysteriously only made available once a lawyer steps in. 
“They [the IDPs] do all of the required procedures to get their money, but it doesn’t come. But as soon as 
one of these lawyers comes, the money gets released immediately. So you can suspect there is some sort of 
alliance between the lawyers and these institutions,” Carmen says. She has no official proof of this supposed 
kickback scheme, but her suspicions are not hers alone. 
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lack of reliability in even the most basic services does not bode well for building trust 
between IDPs and public agencies. “What they give me is 500,000 pesos [around $277 
USD] every three or four months, which fills a certain space, but it’s not enough to 
survive, so you work and fill in those spaces,” explains George, an older IDP man. “We 
don’t trust the government because they’re not offering us the help we need, which we 
need because this descomposición [breakdown] happened because the government didn’t 
offer us security as is mandated by the Constitution. They didn’t defend their population, 
they didn’t build security in time when everything started to fall apart. Now they’re trying 
to pick up when they can, they’re trying to fill that space, but it’s very slow.” 
The majority of my respondents expressed disappointment and disillusionment 
with the local offices responsible for IDP aid, and often connected that frustration with a 
lack of trust in the national government. “Can you imagine, I was number 312 in line and 
I got to the UARIV at 8AM in the morning,” says David. “I left at 3:30PM. A whole day 
waiting in line…The national government is not offering any help. The only ‘help’ they 
offer is la prórroga [postponement] and making you wait.” 
3. Keeping up with changing legal norms 
The complexity of the aid process is not only a barrier to IDPs seeking help but 
also to the proper and effective administration of the law by public officials. The lack of 
coordination between the multiple entities responsible for the wide variety of public 
services and assistance programs is only exacerbated by the sheer volume and complexity 
of overlapping international, national and municipal policies (CODHES 2012). Even for 
those who think they have a solid grip on the rutas de atención [pathways to access aid], it 
is frustrating and time consuming to keep up with long, complex and ever-changing 
policies and laws (Taylor 2010).  
“It’s difficult because of the quantity of laws and rights,” says one Comité 
member. “It limits our capacity to teach people what their rights are and where to claim 
them because each day there is a new law, and the next month there’s another law that 
overrules the first one, and so on. When you’ve worked so hard to learn one decree or 
law, and then it gets overruled by another, we have to start all over again. So we go to a 
capacitación [training session] and when we’re finally starting to get it, boom! There’s a 
new law!” 
One law professor I spoke with tells me, “The constant creation of new norms in 
the country is one of the biggest challenges to empowering IDPs to know their rights and 
the mechanisms of protection.” As a result, IDP liderezas have to spend more time 
learning the new laws than diffusing them among their peers, she explains.  
Often even public functionaries whose job it is to know the rules can’t keep up, 
creating frustrating situations for IDPs seeking aid. In Maria’s case, her declaration was 
stalled because of confusion about the terms that define someone as a “victim” of the 
conflict and therefore deserving of public aid. Specifically, there were concerns about how 
long ago Maria had been displaced. The public administrator at UARIV dealing with 
Maria’s case was operating under the false assumption that only those who had been in 
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Cartagena for less than a year were eligible for aid.92 So, when Maria, who had already 
been in Cartagena for 10 years, went to declare, she was told, “‘Ma’am, you are not 
displaced. You are not displaced, and we will not accept you,’” recounts Carolina. “That 
limited our access to justice. It was very hard to get clear and concise information.” In 
addition to discrimination, a big obstacle to aid is lack of knowledge of the law among 
public administrators. 
In a LIMPAL meeting during which the members reviewed a veeduría93 of 
Cartagena public officials, the conclusion was that the knowledge of laws protecting the 
rights of female victims of the armed conflict was weak and sometimes entirely absent. 
This veeduría interviewed functionaries at a wide range of public entities, including the 
Comisaria de Familia [Family Commissioner], the city police department and several 
Casas de Justicia [Houses of Justice].94 As one LIMPAL staff member sums up, turning to 
the IDP community leaders in the room: “You all have more conocimiento [knowledge] 
than the public functionaries!”95 
4. Prioritizing needs-based aid over rights 
One of the most significant constraints on the effectiveness of state-provided IDP 
assistance is its myopic time scale, which places heavy emphasis on immediate and short-
term emergency assistance without supporting long-term sustainable local integration 
(Ferris 2008b). The lack of long-term vision is clear in the typical IDP assistance cycle: 
IDPs declare their status, register, receive a basic package of emergency goods (essential 
household items, hygiene kits, basic food supplies, etc.), and are offered a few months of 
rent subsidies and small financial incentives. Aid can be extended on a provisional basis 
according to the vulnerability of the household, but usually not for longer than six 
months. While there have been significant improvements in terms of IDP access to some 
public social services like health and education (both of which are free and universal in 
Colombia), housing and socioeconomic stabilization are severely lagging behind (ICRC-
WFP 2007; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011a). 
The end of the assistance period not only means a rather sudden drop-off in aid 
but also can result in even greater vulnerability than before. When state-provided 
subsidies or seed grants run out, and no attempts have been made to establish long-term 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 Under the Victims’ Law (now the prevailing law regarding IDP assistance) a “victim” is defined as any 
person who has suffered grave violations of human rights or international humanitarian law as a result of 
the conflict since 1985 (Summers 2012). This wording was specifically chosen to avoid the confusion that 
Maria experienced during her declaration.  
93 A legal tool that allows civil society organizations to monitor and produce independent reports on 
government agencies. For more information on the legal basis for veedurías in Colombia, as well as the 
results of this specific veeduría, see (LIMPAL 2011).  
94 Casas de Justicia are one-stop-shop service centers that include representatives from the Fiscalía, the 
Defensoría and Personería, among other agencies. 
95 This can make for uncomfortable situations when IDPs demand the rights guaranteed by law but 
unknown to front-line service providers. One IDP woman told me about a visit to a health clinic when she 
discovered that her own knowledge of the policies regarding preferential treatment for IDPs was superior 
to that of the public functionaries there. “They said to me, ‘What are you, a lawyer? How do you know so 
much?’” she recalls. 
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support structures, IDPs often find themselves evicted, back on the street and without 
income, as described in Chapter 3. Short-term, needs-based assistance can thus 
paradoxically lead to longer-term displacement if it creates the sorts of destabilizing 
situations that defeat local integration.  
It is not an option to continue providing housing subsidies or entrepreneurial seed 
grants ad infinitum, but the lack of a transition program from assistance period to 
sustainable integration is problematic. For example, Manuel thinks that paternalistic 
emergency aid programs prevent the scripting of new life projects for IDPs. “This 
humanitarian aid has converted the campesino [peasant] who has come here displaced into 
a limosnero [beggar],” he says. “But the idea is that we go back to producing, that they 
give us back our land, that they give us reparations and that the state guarantees that 
these things will never happen again.” 
Humberto of APRODIC says that public policies are designed in such a way that 
they encourage asistencialismo [paternalism or handouts] rather than a clear focus on 
rights. “Communities get used to being given everything, and that also demobilizes 
them,” he says. Without framing IDP assistance around the Constitutional and human 
rights that have been violated, the government (whether intentionally or not) suppresses 
collective action around making rights-based claims. Emphasizing needs-based solutions 
(e.g. emergency food supplies, housing subsidies, etc.) objectifies the needs of IDPs, 
rather than recognizing and awarding them “agency to determine what they are entitled 
to as they struggle for rights” (Grabska and Mehta 2008, p. 12). 
 More recently, the passage of Auto 092 in 2008 and the Victims’ Law in 2011 
could represent a shift in thinking about IDPs in relation to the state, at least in the 
official language. Both of these policies begin to address the wider implications of justice 
for victims of the conflict that go farther than narrowly defined humanitarian and needs-
based aid to also address rights to truth, justice and reparations (Meertens 2012). Both of 
these policies have given fuel to the fire of social movements in Cartagena and around 
Colombia because of the specific way in which they are framed around rights rather than 
needs.   
Social networks as loci of rights  
As LIMPAL sets up for a workshop with IDP women from Cartagena and San 
Jacinto, a neighboring town, one staff member introduces the day’s activity by reminding 
everyone in the room: “Somos sujetas activas, no sólo víctimas [We are active subjects, not 
just victims].” 
The language she has chosen to frame the workshop from the outset is reflective 
of the broader discourses of active citizenship that are pervasive within IDP 
organizations. In addition to emotional support, information sharing, and economic 
opportunity, social networks also play the important role of creating a space for the 
diffusion of rights discourses and a collective re-visioning of the state.  
Social capital has more recently been acknowledged not just as a tool for 
individuals to gain resources from social connections but also as a “mechanism for 
resolving otherwise pervasive collective action problems” such as resource management, 
community governance and climate change on a broader scale (Woolcock 2010). In other 
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words, social networks are not valuable just for the individual members but also as a 
collective unit that can act together towards a common end.  
Learning rights and collective action 
When Carolina’s family first arrived in Cartagena, they didn’t know how to name 
what had happened to them. They didn’t understand their own situation as part of a 
much wider context of armed conflict and displacement. Ideas like “human rights 
violation” didn’t factor into their initial understanding of what was going on. “When we 
arrived to Cartagena we didn’t have the political tools or the participation tools,” says 
Carolina. “We now have the empowerment to access many things, but back then we 
didn’t know the laws, we didn’t know the agencies, we didn’t know the government, we 
didn’t know anything, not even how to declare! We didn’t know that we had suffered a 
violation of our rights. We knew that nos despojaron [they dispossessed us] and that we 
had to go and save our lives, but back then, we didn’t know that what had happened was 
a violation of our rights and that the state had to safeguard those rights.” 
How does anyone take on rights-based language in the first place? Carolina’s story 
charts the transformation many IDPs undergo when they begin to understand themselves 
as right holders and victims with agency. It requires a dramatic shift in one’s 
understanding of self-worth and personal identity, as well as one’s place in a wider 
community, a global one even (Merry 2006; Tate 2007).  
Back on the patio in the shade with Isabel, Liliana describes the personal 
transformation that takes place as IDPs acquire the language of rights through their 
interactions with social networks and organizations in Cartagena. Women who used to 
stay at home in their rural villages, who used to have very little interaction with the 
government “are now knocking on doors in the Mayor’s office, participating in a sit-in, 
making pronouncements, and going to offices to say ‘I have my rights,’” she says.  
Isabel interrupts to say, “I used to be one of those women.” 
“Isabel was a woman who cried easily, who was isolated, who didn’t have a 
position, who remained silent,” explains Liliana. “But with the passing of time, as you 
take on positions and do some deeper critical reflection, and with formación [education], 
you see new spaces opening up to be able to demand ‘No more!’ That’s when you can see 
those processes of change…These are the women who have felt the violence through 
their bodies, and these are the women who have to take the decision in their lives to say, 
‘Okay, this happened to me, but I can go on. I can be a woman who will serve her 
community with what I learn.’ She learns to understand her problemática [predicament] 
but not get trapped in feeling sorry for herself or resorting to begging. She has to make 
the decision about who she wants to be and take that power to generate a 
transformation.”  
In other words, in order for an individual to begin taking actions to make change 
in her own life and in the lives of others, she must first recognize her own agency, which 
is not limited just to victimhood. This can be achieved through interaction with social 
networks that provide the spaces for the critical reflection and the kind of formación that 
Liliana says is so important. Then, that learning has to be passed on to others in the 
community. Just as information does not stagnate in social networks, neither does 
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transformation.  
“The ideal is to empower other women and other people so that they too build 
that knowledge, and they begin to understand the rutas [routes of attention to 
government aid], so that they are the ones who velen por sus propios derechos [guard their 
own rights],” Carolina says. “This is a chain, a chain where each person can be given the 
opportunity and the capacity. It’s not all me – it’s not that I am the leader, the facilitator, 
everyone knows me. No, it’s that each person has the capacity to do it themselves.” 
Individuals are empowered through these interactions, and through the “chain” of 
change, they help empower others, as well. Setting the stage for deeper political 
engagement may be considered an achievement in and of itself, especially for women or 
other marginalized groups who have never actively participated in political processes 
before (Vidal López, Atehortúa Arredondo, and Salcedo 2011).  
Carolina explains the process by which social organizations empower their 
members: “We begin by training, by teaching about the distinct laws, the distinct autos 
[ordinances], the rights of women and men. Then from there we start teaching about the 
themes of exigencia [demanding rights], of plantones [sit-ins], of how to write up a 
document, a petition, a tutela [a writ]. Then we teach where to go and which are the 
entities that can attend which rutas de acceso [routes of access]. We become facilitators, so 
that they can have a full knowledge of their rights and so that they can arrive to those 
public entities to demand their rights or ask for information. They are no longer 
vulnerable – they have gained the tools to safeguard their own rights.” 
As Carmen sees it, the taking on of rights-based discourses emerges as a result of 
social interaction, whether initially political or not. The kinds of networks and 
organizations described in Chapter 4 and 5 set up the conditions for IDPs to realize their 
rights and to recognize the role the state has played in either the violation or protection 
thereof. “When IDPs see the need to group together, to communicate between each 
other, to invite new people and each one brings another and another person, that’s when 
they recognize the need to know their rights,” Carmen explains. “That’s when they 
recognize that what has happened to them has been a grave violation of their human 
rights. This is why I keep saying these are not displaced women but women living in a 
situation of displacement and armed conflict that the state has caused alongside the 
armed groups. They begin to see themselves as women, women with rights, and they 
begin to feel that they can build an organization.” 
This process of recognizing common grievances and common paths to create 
change is what many social movement scholars call the “framing process.” In order to 
mobilize a social movement “at a minimum, people need to feel both aggrieved about 
some aspect of their lives and optimistic that, acting collectively, they can redress the 
problem” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996, p. 5).  
Rao and Walton (2004) add that collective action improves the “capacity to 
aspire” for marginalized groups through “collectively envisioning their future, and their 
capacity to shape this future, through influencing other groups, the government, and 
other factors in their physical and social environment” (p. 25). It is not just about 
common grievances, but common hopes, as well.  
Once united in social networks and organizations, the power of collective action 
allows for claim-making of wider scale, scope and impact than individual capacity would 
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allow. This can take a variety of forms, including high visibility actions like marches, 
protests and public awareness campaigns, as well as more coordinated behind-the-scenes 
actions like negotiations with public officials. “All of this work of resistance that we’ve 
done – mobilizations, formación [education], sensibilización [sensitizing public officials], 
lobbying, participating in the writing of public policy, going to the District Council, to 
the Commissioners, to the Mayors, to the Fiscalía – it’s all so we can access our rights due 
to us,” says Luisa, the coordinator of one of the main IDP umbrella organizations in 
Cartagena.96  
Building vertical social capital and state-society synergy 
 All of this talk of rights only matters if there is institutional support for 
recognizing and fulfilling them. As Merry (2006) writes, “seeing oneself as injured by a 
human rights violation requires entering into a new terrain of opposition and risk. Rights 
offer a new vision of the self as entitled to protection by the state, but this promise must 
be made good” (p. 217). Rights consciousness requires a feedback mechanism that 
reinforces both the rights holders and the rights bearers.  
 In situations in which the state fails to deliver on these claims, frustration or a 
retreat from active citizenship or claim-making is not uncommon (Merry 2006). “It’s fine 
for us to talk about rights, but we also have to talk about how that knowledge of rights is 
affecting me or benefitting me,” says Carmen. “That benefit can also become una contra 
para mí [a count against me]. What do I do with all these rights in my hands if I’m still in 
the same situation as before?”  
 Citizens only hold rights in so much as the state bears those rights. “It has to be 
clear that our position is that el pueblo es el que marcha diciendo, pero el Estado es el garante 
de los derechos [the public marches but the state is the one to guarantee our rights],” says 
Carmen.  
In other words, the vertical connections between citizen and state or community 
and state – what Woolcock (1998) calls social capital “synergies”97 – are essential to the 
capacity for realizing rights. Understanding the dynamics of these linkages is a way to 
recognize both limitations and opportunities in civil society-government relationships. As 
Woolcock (2001) writes: “A social capital perspective recognizes that exclusion from 
economic and political institutions is created and maintained by powerful vested interests, 
but that marginalized groups themselves possess unique social resources that can be used 
as a basis for overcoming that exclusion, and as a mechanism for helping forge access to 
these institutions” (p. 16). 
Re-establishing trust to overcome the ley de silencia 
 
“As we lament what’s happening, we have to lament the silence with which we treat 
what’s happening. Words are the last tool we have to create change!” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 This source requested that I keep both her name and the name of her organization anonymous because 
they had received threats recently.  
97 Woolcock develops this idea based on Peter Evans’ concept of “embeddedness” (Evans 1996).  
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– IDP woman in Cartagena 
 
 Given the multiple reasons for loss of trust in the state, why would any IDP 
organization wish to engage by creating these vertical linkages? Why not simply give up 
on the state entirely? As one ICBF government official explains, “trust between the 
public and the government emerges and se teje [is woven] as a product of necessity.” 
 “Look, no tenemos a quién más pedirle [we don’t have anyone else to ask],” explains 
Luisa. “Lamentably, this is what we have. We have to comply with the constitutional 
norms, which is to demand our rights of those who have the duty to protect them. We, as 
the displaced population, as the victims of the armed conflict, have to demand that of the 
state, because the state is responsible for the restitution of our rights that have been lost.” 
Even when there is little trust in public institutions, there is little choice but to continue 
working with what state there is. You either walk away or you continue pushing and 
struggling to reshape the state for the better, says Luisa.  
Back in the hot room in the Corvivienda building, the Comité meeting turns to a 
discussion of the role of the state in their work.  
“It’s not that we’re enemies of the government or of the state,” says one woman.  
 “Why do we keep insisting and insisting? Because we can’t quitarle esa 
obligatoriedad [take away the obligation] of the state to recognize our rights,” says another 
woman. “That’s an obligation of the state, so what do we do? We insist and insist and 
work to pass laws.” 
 “The most important thing,” says the first woman, “is that we are united and 
organized and can continue organizing even more.” 
 “We have to open up that space,” says a third. 
Eduardo explains it as a duty of citizens to continually push government actors 
and institutions to be better. He offers the example of why it is important to report sexual 
and domestic violence even if the police and other public authorities don’t respond 
adequately. “We have to keep calling and denouncing and insisting because that is the 
only way they’ll get used to the community speaking up,” Eduardo says. 
Building careful alliances 
Within the broader human rights community in Colombia, there are some 
concerns about co-optation of victim engagement or IDP organizations for the benefit of 
public relations and image improvement campaigns for the Colombian government. 
Those who express these doubts see connections between the state and IDP movements 
as superficial or opportunistic (Tate 2007). 
In a meeting with APRODIC, one IDP man tells me that community leaders 
who become beholden to government officials in exchange for personal favors can no 
longer effectively demand their rights or their community’s rights from the state. One 
time at a sit-in at a government office, he saw a public official pull aside one IDP leader 
and tell him not to speak because he had paid for his children to go to college. “The 
government comes and gives you whatever small job, whatever vaina [small meaningless 
thing] and there, now you are no longer working for your community but instead for 
private businesses or the government.”  
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Humberto, responding to this anecdote, says, “It’s the lack of knowledge that 
people have rights, that they see this as some sort of prebenda [perk] and they feel 
obligated to that public official for it.” 
“They think it’s a gift,” adds Gloria. 
“And then they feel comprados [bought], obligated, and then no exigen porque si 
exijo me quitan la ayuda [they don’t make demands because they fear their perks will be 
taken away],” says Humberto. 
Along these same lines, Carmen expresses concern about politicians who promise 
to deliver programs or resources to community organizations in exchange for thousands 
of votes, which she says can result in a loss of autonomy and authority to make demands. 
Selling votes in this way effectively weakens the organization’s and the individual citizen’s 
ability to make claims on the state. “The Mayor has to deliver, the City Councilor has to 
deliver, because that is their obligation, whether I voted for him or not,” she says. “We 
have to build alliances with the government, but if those alliances take away your identity 
or your autonomy, then no armemos y recojamos y vámonos [we don’t build those alliances, 
we pick up and we leave]!” 
Political connections like this can grant community leaders access, influence or 
economic resources, but there’s a liability to this asset. Such vertical capital can also limit 
IDP mobility and voice if those political connections are understood as “gifts” rather than 
as rights. Vertical linkages are important, but so are the manners in which they are 
forged, negotiated and maintained.  
Recognizing these risks, IDP organizations take the tactic of identifying those 
distinct state actors or institutions that could be potential and true partners, forging 
careful alliances. “Through these alliances we’ve been able to build up trust with certain 
state functionaries and certain entities,” says Carolina.  
This requires a more nuanced understanding of the “state” not as a homogenous 
entity but as a network of agents within which there may be opportunity for 
differentiated trust. Perhaps rebuilding trust in the government is too much to ask; but 
rebuilding trust in specific parts of the government is a legitimate possibility. As political 
sociologist Peter Evans (1996) writes, even for oppressed or excluded groups, “the state 
may often be the enemy, but only in exceptional circumstances is it monolithically the 
enemy. Even in relatively authoritarian regimes, alliances with ‘reformists’ within the 
state can offer resources to popular organizations that are unavailable anywhere else” (p. 
205). 
Forging careful alliances requires a learning process with a steep curve. “We’re 
always going to find filtrados [leaks],” says Carolina. “We’ve developed so many proposals 
and plans and projects [with state agents] that have been desviados [thrown off course]. I 
can’t tell you exactly who the filtrado or the corrupt person was, but we’ve learned through 
this work to identify the entities that we don’t want to work with because we now don’t 
trust them. We have that very clear: If I don’t trust this or that entity, this or that 
organization, this or that institution, then we don’t work with them.” 
But, says Eva, “we have to run that risk. We want a change. If we don’t know the 
politics, we won’t see that change!” 
 Carolina says that negative experiences can’t turn civil society organizations away 
from the state entirely. The bad still doesn’t outweigh the good. “Building alliances with 
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the government can make them commit to really satisfy our expectations. We also can’t 
treat the state like an enemy. Through these alliances we have achieved positive outcomes 
in many ways,” she says. 
For example, Taylor (2010) found that IDP community and organization leaders 
in Bogotá who had connections to public officials had a much easier time getting access 
to government services or aid programs. There is also evidence for mutually-reinforcing 
horizontal and vertical social capital. In Mexico City and Medellín, two cities that have 
long struggled with urban violence, Davis (2012) found that community organizations 
that developed vertical bonds with local government authorities were also able to 
strengthen the horizontal cooperation among community members because of increased 
access to resources. In other words, strong connections to the state can help build 
stronger connections to each other, enhancing bonding and bridging social capital as well 
as vertical linking capital.  
These vertical linkages also play the important role of boosting morale and 
creating the space for envisioning a different and better future. As one ICBF government 
official explains, building a relationship between the public and the state “te hace renacer la 
esperanza, te hace renacer la fe con respeto a que las cosas si se puedan dar [revives hope and 
faith in the idea that things can change].” 
Redefining citizenship: Activating la palabra muerta [the dead word] 
 In her comprehensive study of human rights defenders in Colombia, Tate (2007) 
describes the re-envisioning of “citizenship” and “state-building” through human rights 
discourses in the following way: 
 
Human rights claims are made against the state; the state is party to the multilateral 
treaties that enshrine rights, and it is the state as an institution that promises specific 
protections to its citizens. In the making of human rights claims, activists thus articulate 
their vision of the ideal state and the kinds of relationships that should exist between state 
and citizen. Nongovernmental activists work to create a public imaginary of a state 
invoking the Weberian ideal of a state monopoly on violence. Though relatively 
powerless, these activists use human rights claims as a means to force state representatives 
to claim responsibility for abuses and thus enact an accountable state (p. 5). 
 
Drawing on ethnographic studies of marginalized groups in violent societies and 
their interaction with political processes, Das et al. (2001) write that “engagement in 
collective action then moves resentment from the arena of private conversations towards 
the making of a counter public sphere within which notions of citizenship may be 
renegotiated with the state" (p 10). It is a way of broadening the conversation beyond 
personal anger or tragedy into a project of large-scale change.  
 The constant pressure to push the government to perform at a higher level is one 
way in which IDP organizations help re-envision and reshape the state, says Carmen. 
“It’s a way to wake up the state through these organizations that have been created. There 
are some empowered organizations with lots of knowledge that know how to navigate the 
political context, that know the laws, that know how things happen in Colombia and in 
the city,” she says.  
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 On another level, this idea of citizenship is not just about interacting with formal 
law or public officials. It incorporates a wider range of actions, activities and attitudes 
about how to engage both with the state and with communities. The LIMPAL veeduría 
(2011) states: “Political will at this moment has just been proposals and words, but 
despite these challenges, IDP women exercise their citizenship through la formación 
[education], la convocatoria [convening], mobilization of communities, the work of 
incidencia política [political monitoring], peace initiatives, coordination of their actions 
and participation in networks” (p. 11).  
In other words, “citizenship” can be conceived of as far more than going to the 
polls on election day or paying taxes. Citizenship is not only participation or interaction 
with the state (as per more traditional understandings) but also participation or 
interaction with communities and social networks. Rebuilding trust in public institutions 
in societies in which the state has been discredited on a number of levels can take years 
and requires the construction of mutually-reinforcing norms not only codified into law 
but also in cultural change (Stromseth 2008).  
Rights as “footprints” 
Though many laws in Colombia are “paper laws,” they have far more chance of 
implementing social reforms than if no policy at all is on the books. Law can set the tone 
for the diffusion of change and the translation of “politics” into daily life, explains 
Carmen. “You don’t just ‘do politics’ when you’re in political office. You do politics 
through incidencia [follow-through] in the neighborhoods, through your way of acting, 
through your demanding, through your presence, through your manner of being. That is 
also doing politics,” she says.  
Law can be a site of control or a site of resistance, but above all it can be a “site of 
engagement” for a wide range of social actors with different political projects, even in 
societies that have developed a mistrust of state institutions, as in Colombia (García-
Godos and O. Lid 2010). Progressive laws (whether well-implemented or not) can send a 
“a signal about national priorities and the meaning of citizenship” while also “furnish[ing] 
incentives for the mobilization of social movements” (Htun and Weldon 2012, p. 551). 
Laws like Auto 092 and the Victims’ Law create new categories and definitions of 
“victimhood” and associated rights that provide a “normative strength and legitimacy” to 
IDP movements that make reference to those legal and policy frameworks (García-
Godos and O. Lid 2010).  
In other words, law can still be a galvanizing and legitimizing force even if it is 
ineffective in practice. It can create a rallying point or a common discourse and language 
or a point of pressure to continually engage the state. “There’s a something, a something 
that can be a tool for people in situations of displacement,” says Liliana. “Lamentably, 
there hasn’t been the political will to carry out these programs, but even with those vacíos 
[holes], it has still created the spaces for political stakes, for organizing people in councils, 
for involving IDPs so that they can seek solutions to their problems.” 
 The symbolic meaning of a right can both anchor and transform legal 
consciousness through the power of storytelling in communities. Rather than seeing 
rights as “precedent” in the traditional legal sense, Perelman and White (2010) propose 
the idea of rights as “footprints,” or shared remembered facts or values. Through the 
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collective understanding, mobilization and re-telling of what rights are and what they 
mean in the day-to-day lives of community members, these rights are “decentralized and 
democratized, making meanings outside of the institutional normative system of 
legislation, regulations and adjudications. The primary focus of the rights as footprints is 
on meaning-making by and for communities themselves” (p. 136). Rights as “footprints” 
still require the formal legal system, but rather than placing the entire burden upon the 
state to interpret and administer such rights, Perelman and White see great power in how 
rights are filtered through community social networks and are “repeatedly retold through 
shared but shifting frames [that] generate multiple pathways toward justice" (p 139). 
Seeing rights as flexible and dynamic in this way retains their potential to be 
“disruptive, creative and locally responsive” (p. 142). Thus, the unique power of collective 
action can expand opportunity structures and “pry open institutional barriers through 
which new demands can pour” (Tarrow 1996, p. 58). 
Many past attempts at policy reform in conflict or post-conflict contexts have 
failed because of too much emphasis on formal institutions and a lack of attention paid to 
the perceptions and interpretations of ordinary citizens and the importance of a societal 
and cultural commitment to change (Stromseth 2008). Changing the culture of war as a 
social condition is a constant process of struggle and engagement with the state as well as 
with one’s own family, neighbors and communities. As one LIMPAL staff member says, 
“Peace processes don't need to be in the atmosphere way up there. They can be at home, 
in school, in your communities.”  
Summary 
“The process of displacement unites us,” says Carolina. “It makes us build these 
organizations and these alliances because we are the people who have suffered and who 
are demanding our rights that have been violated. These alliances and unities create 
equality between us and allow us to take a stance in front of an unjust state that hasn’t 
implemented the laws that address our needs. It’s not an easy task. It’s been an arduous 
process of exigencia [demanding], of empowerment, and of continuing to educate and 
empower others who still don’t know their rights so they can join us to build a better 
tomorrow. Maybe we won’t know a different country within our lifetimes, a country full 
of peace and equality, but we are building that country for our children and for our 
grandchildren.” 
In societies recovering from or still embroiled in ongoing violence, hope for the 
future relies upon the ability to challenge the status quo to envision a better world. As 
Das et al. (2001) write:  
 
The recovery of the everyday, resuming the task of living (and not only surviving), asks 
for a renewed capacity to address the future. How does one shape a future in which the 
collective experience of violence and terror can find recognition in the narratives of larger 
entities such as the nation and the state? At the level of interpersonal relations, how does 
one contain and seal off the violence that might poison the life of future generations? 
How these goals are secured is complicated, for it asks for the simultaneous engagement 
of political and judicial institutions, as well as families and local communities (p. 4). 
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 This chapter reviewed the international, national and local policies that deal with 
internal displacement in Colombia before reflecting upon the inadequacies of the 
implementation of such policies. Facing frustration and a lack of trust in the state, IDP 
social networks, organizations and movements make the choice to continue engaging 
with formal structures of power and policy. They do so by establishing careful alliances 
and vertical linkages as well as diffusing the law through “rights as footprints” in their 
communities.  
 The final chapter will consider how policymakers in Colombia can learn from the 
survival and social network strategies of IDPs to design and implement better policies for 
long-term and sustainable urban settlement.  
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Chapter 7 
Durable solutions?  
Addressing internal displacement  
and urban settlement in Colombia  
 
It remains to be seen how the current peace negotiations between President 
Santos’s administration and FARC will or will not represent a move towards laying down 
arms and creating a peaceful future in Colombia. But in the meantime, for the millions of 
IDPs who have begun their lives anew in cities and for the thousands who continue to be 
displaced each year, waiting is not an option.  
The previous chapters have provided detailed descriptions of IDP resilience 
strategies and the formation of social networks, organizations and broader movements 
that satisfy both individual and collective needs in urban settlement. This concluding 
chapter will reflect upon potential directions for policy change and other public responses 
to internal displacement. As we have seen thus far, the state sometimes not only behaves 
in ways that are oblivious to the lived realities of IDPs but also in ways that inadvertently 
exacerbate tensions because of poorly designed and poorly implemented policies. It is 
ultimately the Colombian state’s responsibility to protect those forcibly displaced by the 
armed conflict. By working in collaboration with IDPs and by learning from their 
resilience strategies, Colombia has a far greater chance of laying the foundation for a 
more just and sustainable peace.  
Redefining “durable solutions” 
According to the UN Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced 
Persons (2009), a “durable solution” is realized “when former IDPs no longer have 
specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and such 
persons can enjoy their human rights without discrimination resulting from their 
displacement” (p. 10). It is defined by the following characteristics: 
  
a. Long-term safety, security and freedom of movement 
b. An adequate standard of living, including at a minimum access to adequate food, water, housing, 
health care and basic education 
c. Access to employment and livelihoods 
d. Access to effective mechanisms that restore their housing, land and property or provide them with 
compensation 
e. Access to and replacement of personal and other documentation 
f. Voluntary reunification with family members separated during displacement 
g. Participation in public affairs at all levels on an equal basis with the resident population  
h. Effective remedies for displacement-related violations, including access to justice, reparations and 
information about the causes of violations. 
 
 The most glaring hole in this definition of a durable solution is its failure to 
account for the importance of social networks. It imagines a solution on a person-by-
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person, IDP-by-IDP basis rather than a solution for groups or entire communities of 
people surviving and even thriving together.  
As we have seen throughout this thesis, even if IDPs secure housing, even if they 
find employment, even if their stolen property is restituted, even if they actively 
participate in politics, none of this is worth much without supporting the communities 
within which they live. A truly durable solution for IDPs would see them not just as 
individual victims but also as agentic members of social networks, organizations, and 
movements, all of which contribute greatly to urban integration. The “assistance and 
protection needs” that the UN identifies are very often satisfied not just by the state but 
by these social networks, as well. Therefore, “durable solutions” will emerge from the 
productive interaction of both state and civil society actors working together with and 
learning from IDPs.  
Policy from the ground up: Learning from IDP resilience  
What are the sorts of policies and laws that can better address internal 
displacement and urban settlement?  IDPs know better than anyone what they need and 
how to achieve it. They are not simply victims – they are also the agents of innovative and 
adaptive responses to displacement. Policymakers would do well to learn from the ways in 
which IDPs integrate into receptor cities, developing economic, social and political 
survival strategies. Along these lines, Davis (2012) suggests “turning attention to the 
ways individuals and institutions at the level of the community carve out spaces for action 
even in the most dire of circumstances” (p. 29). 
What follows are a few key takeaways on how to learn from IDP resilience: 
focusing on long-term integration, supporting IDP community organizing, and 
reframing policy to target social networks rather than individuals.  
Designing solutions for long-term urban integration 
Above all, there must be a clear recognition that local integration of IDPs is an 
ongoing process that will require ongoing support. As IDPs build new lives, communities 
absorb and incorporate large influxes of vulnerable populations, municipal authorities 
adjust to shifting needs of their constituencies and the national government continues to 
struggle with the persistent violent conflict, the solution is not to be found in short-term 
emergency assistance but rather in long-term, comprehensive support.  
Policymakers are too often swayed by the trends in international policy that do 
not take into account the local context. International pressure to enforce the “right to 
return,” for example, can skew state policy towards return instead of compensation and 
support for local integration into new host communities (Smit 2012). For example, much 
of the 2011 Victims’ Law is directed towards return when the fact is that around 80% of 
Colombian IDPs report preferring local settlement into cities (Carrillo 2009). Providing 
public assistance for urban integration should not be secondary when the vast majority of 
IDPs prefer it. As Albuja and Ceballos (2010) write, “development support is 
indispensable in the long run in cities [because] the bulk of IDPs appear to have the same 
aspiration as migrants, that is, to remain in the city permanently...If settlement in the city 
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of displacement is to be a durable solution, it requires realization of the entire spectrum of 
rights of IDPs, without discrimination” (p. 10). 
When is a period of displacement over? For the generations that grow up in cities 
of reception and may never return to their communities of origin, displacement is by no 
means a short-term experience. Understanding and responding to the lived dynamics of 
IDP settlement over longer periods of time can prevent the kinds of emergency aid 
programs (like housing subsidies that run out) that are unreliable, temporary and 
ultimately destabilizing. Real local integration will require the continuous support of 
municipal authorities (and not just national policymakers) as well as the active 
participation of IDPs who live out the consequences of policy and aid programs (Ferris 
and Halff 2011a). Furthermore, municipal policies should be designed in a way that can 
effectively target IDP-specific needs without antagonizing or further marginalizing host 
communities (Davies and Jacobsen 2011). 
Some of these long-term interventions could include livelihoods programs for the 
kind of socioeconomic stabilization that has thus far been lacking for IDPs. To avoid the 
mistakes of past programs that have exacerbated tensions within host communities and 
only increased competition for a limited and generally impoverished clientele, policy 
makers should focus less on individual entrepreneurship and more on collective or 
cooperatively-owned businesses. Community-oriented economic development recognizes 
that the wellbeing of a household is interdependent on that of the wider community. 
Collective businesses (e.g. agricultural cooperatives, artisan associations, etc.) serve not 
only economic functions but also create the conditions for social support, as well. 
Supporting on-the-ground IDP community organizing 
Confronted with limited municipal human and financial resources for IDP 
assistance, the Colombian government should take advantage of an important partner in 
this work by focusing on the ways in which they can bolster the groundwork already 
being done by IDP community organizations and movements. Recognizing the obstacles 
these organizations face in balancing the triple jornada, in securing safe meeting spaces, in 
bearing the transportation and opportunity costs of organizing and in confronting armed 
actors is the first step to building better and more supportive public policies. The 
provision (and protection) of safe and free or subsidized community spaces, 
transportation98 and/or childcare subsidies for community organizers and community-led 
security initiatives in response to threats are all viable possibilities.  
Reframing communities as units of intervention 
Perhaps the most interesting and challenging implication for policy arising from 
the study of IDPs and urban settlement is the need to shift the focus to “communities” 
(in the form of spatially organized personal networks) as the units of intervention. At the 
root of displacement is the breakdown of social networks. Rather than providing aid on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 As Davis (2012) sums up: “While one can develop programs to build social capital or employment 
capacity by engaging citizens in a variety of new activities and networks, if the recipients of these programs 
are prevented from the free movement in space necessary for acting upon their new connections, the 
development and utilization of social capital can only go so far” (p. 13). 
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an individual or household basis with little regard for the ripple effects this may cause in 
the wider community, stronger IDP assistance policies require the consultation and 
participation of all members of displacement-affected communities (including both IDPs 
and non-IDPs). Rao and Walton (2004) call for community-based interventions that 
move “from a focus on individuals to a recognition that relational and group-based 
phenomena shape and influence individual aspiration, capabilities and agency” (p. 30). 
Household-targeted public policies that bear no reference to or acknowledgement of the 
relationship between individuals and a wider web of actors lose out on the opportunity to 
bolster and enable community cohesion or collective action (Davis 2012). 
One way of refocusing policy on communities would be to expand service 
provision beyond direct assistance to IDPs to include their non-IDP neighbors also living 
in extreme poverty. Community-level needs assessments, monitoring, and evaluation 
tools can more directly capture the full impact of urban settlement on both IDPs and 
non-IDPs and initiate the reconstruction of social bonds (Moser 2000; Singh and 
Robinson 2010; Ferris and Halff 2011a). A broad-based approach could lessen tensions 
between IDPs and the historic poor, diminish the pressures placed on the IDP-only 
system and potentially prevent armed actors and other profiteers from preying off of 
IDPs for their assistance funds. As Ferris (2008a) writes, “the state has to understand that 
displacement is not a problem for a particular group, but for the whole society” (p. 8). 
Community building and social cohesion can in turn become mutually reinforcing 
for future conflict prevention and mediation (Frederico et al. 2007; Christensen and 
Harild 2009). As Colletta and Cullen (2000) write, “the admonition to ‘get the policies 
right’ may still be valid, but it is not sufficient. ‘Getting the social relations right’ is 
necessary for avoiding violent conflict" (p. 108).  
Even beyond preventing future violence, a social networks approach is cognizant 
of IDP resilience strategies that rely on extended social ties to connect to economic and 
political opportunities. Recognizing the power of family, friendship, community and 
institutional relationships is central to building better cities not just for IDPs but also for 
all those who make their homes there.  
So, what would community-based IDP policy look like? Unfortunately, there have 
been few concrete examples. A few experiments in community-based IDP aid have been 
implemented in a handful of countries, including Sierra Leone (Richards, Bah, and 
Vincent 2004), Indonesia (Mooney 2005), and the Philippines (Frederico et al. 2007), 
but it is still a relatively young field of policy innovation that is certainly worth further 
development and study.  
Some examples of place-based programs that target spatial communities in which 
IDPs and non-IDPs live side by side include upgrades in urban infrastructure (e.g. water 
and sanitation, schools, health facilities) and the creation and maintenance of safe family-
friendly spaces, community centers and other public spaces (Davies and Jacobsen 2011). 
However, targeting the more diffuse IDP social networks that most likely cross 
neighborhood boundaries is a more complicated task because such physical interventions 
are limited to those who live close by. One option would be to actively support the 
information-sharing function of these networks by providing trainings to community 
leaders on the most up-to-date national and local policy frameworks. Another option 
policymakers could consider, in addition to providing support for existing IDP civil 
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society organizations, would be to directly facilitate coalition-building and learning 
between these organizations.  
Whatever the program, policy or intervention, municipal authorities should work 
in collaboration with IDPs, their neighborhoods and their organizations. This co-
production of both knowledge and action can also help rebuild trust between the public 
and the state.   
Rebuilding trust in public institutions 
The international community can provide financial and technical support to the 
state efforts, but outside actors should ultimately not be designing solutions without local 
partnership. Emergency humanitarian aid may be necessary in the short-term for newer 
waves of IDPs, but by and large these stop-gap interventions by international actors 
should not take precedence over the importance of establishing long-term durable 
solutions that should emanate from the state and local civil society (Davies and Jacobsen 
2011). This is the difference between humanitarianism and development.  
In the end, it remains the state’s responsibility to address durable solutions to 
internal displacement, and all levels of the Colombian government should consider 
rebuilding trust in public institutions as an investment in working towards sustainable 
peace. Even if the current peace negotiations between President Santos’s administration 
and FARC end in a full resolution of all hostilities (which is highly unlikely), the 
aftermath of the conflict will still loom large as millions recover from violence, trauma 
and displacement. Rather than letting this suffering and misery linger and potentially 
serve as the hotbed for future tensions and conflicts, the government should act now and 
consider building stronger relationships with IDPs and IDP organizations as a 
preventative measure at the very least, if not a basic responsibility to their own citizens. 
There are a number of specific ways through which the Colombian state could work to 
rebuild trust.  
Where policy design meets implementation:  
Training and sensitizing front-line service providers 
 One of the major flaws in the way the 1991 Constitution established the current 
government institutions is the incomplete decentralization of authority and resources 
between the national government – where IDP policy is designed – and the municipal 
government – where IDP policy is implemented (Ibáñez and Velásquez 2008). Though 
law remains powerful for its role in developing a common language between civil society 
and state actors, in sparking social movements and in creating the basis for “footprinting,” 
it would be much more powerful if it were actually implemented.  
 Addressing internal displacement in Colombia could be described as a “complex” 
problem because it requires solutions that are “highly transaction intensive, require 
considerable discretion by implementing agents, yield powerful pressures for those agents 
to do something other than implement a solution, and have no known (ex ante) solution” 
(Woolcock forthcoming, p. 11). The design of the IDP policy is important, but so is its 
implementation – so much can get lost along the way from words to actions.  
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  Training and sensitizing front-line service providers and municipal authorities to 
better implement current policies would be a relatively easy first step to rebuild trust in 
public institutions. The role of front-line service provider discretion has been explored 
ever since Michael Lipsky’s breakthrough book Street-Level Bureaucracy (1980), and it is 
worth considering the gateway power that municipal officials hold over the interpretation 
and implementation of IDP policy. As described in Chapter 6, the front-line service 
providers and public functionaries responsible for translating national IDP policy into on-
the-ground IDP assistance are often discriminatory, ill-informed or simply overburdened 
by the quantity and complexity of requests.  
But, if properly trained, supported and empowered, these very same service 
providers could become more effective agents of peaceful and sustainable urban 
settlement for IDPs. National authorities should provide the training resources to equip 
municipal officials with the most accurate, up-to-date information on IDP policies. They 
should also require mandatory sensitivity training for local service providers to prevent the 
discriminatory and offensive behavior that so many IDPs have witnessed upon seeking 
aid. The national government should provide the accompanying funds and personnel to 
ensure proper administration of national laws so that municipal authorities don’t feel they 
are sacrificing one population (the historic poor) for another (IDPs).  
Since most IDPs only come into face-to-face contact with these front-line 
providers, these are the people that in many cases come to represent “the state.” The 
better the relationships with functionaries in UARIV, Corvivienda and other city offices, 
the greater the trust that is fostered between IDPs and public institutions.  
Meaningful participation of IDPs in policy design and implementation 
Another important way to build trust in public institutions is to offer IDPs a real 
stake in how they are treated and protected by the state. It is not enough to simply offer 
IDPs a place at the table – that place needs to mean something, to translate into actual 
outcomes. Though it is beyond the scope of this thesis to review the long literature on 
participatory and inclusive urban governance,99 it is worth reaffirming that the substantive 
participation of key stakeholders – in this case, IDPs – can improve outcomes, 
satisfaction with and sustainability of policies. It can also serve as an important 
opportunity for the exercise of citizenship, thereby actively building the vertical linkages 
that can serve as the basis for a newfound trust in public institutions. 
Consultation on projects in which IDPs ultimately have no final say is not 
enough, says Humberto of APRODIC. The concern is that the advising councils set up 
by the government are just thinly-veiled token inclusion of IDPs. “That advice is just 
advice – it is consultation that doesn’t oblige the state or the public officials to do 
anything,” Humberto says. Without action and without teeth, these advisor councils are 
false or superficial forms of public participation. 
If IDPs are to be included in a substantive way, their proposals need to be fully 
supported not just with political will but with money, as well, says Carolina. “What we 
are looking for is for our proposals to be included in the development plans of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 For some key readings on this topic, see (Arnstein 1969), (Fung and Wright 2003), (Fung 2004), (Smith 
2009). 
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government so that they can be assigned real resources and they can finally be 
implemented,” she explains. “We want to build mesas políticas, mesas de concertaciones 
[political councils, cooperative roundtables] with the government so from there we can 
make demands on the duty to implement the laws that have already been passed. The fact 
that IDPs today can benefit from humanitarian aid and from recognition on the part of 
the government is because we’ve worked hard to achieve these things. The fact that we 
can recognize ourselves as victims and as subjects of rights is because we have achieved 
atravesar un poco esa barrera [crossing that barrier a little bit], not as much as we would 
like, but through these movements, the state will wake up. The state will begin to see us 
as subjects, to give us the space for political participation, to not discriminate against us. 
We have achieved a lot, but we still believe the violation of our rights is the state’s 
responsibility.” 
One way for the state to act upon that responsibility is to follow through on these 
demands for active and substantive participation of IDPs in the design of assistance 
programs as well as in the allocation of resources. 
Conclusion 
 With over 28.8 million IDPs in the world today because of conflict, human rights 
violations and generalized violence, forced displacement is widely recognized as a tool of 
war and territorial control. Land and power shift hands, and millions are dispossessed and 
forced to find refuge on the periphery of urban areas. The internal armed conflict in 
Colombia is no exception. As many as 5.4 million Colombians are living in a state of 
displacement in host cities around the country. But as new generations of IDPs grow up 
far from their rural communities of origin because of the impossibility of return, host 
cities become home cities. Protracted conflict means protracted displacement, and IDPs 
are forced to forge survival strategies to get by in the short-term and the long-term. 
Taking Cartagena, Colombia as a case study of IDP settlement, this thesis has 
charted the processes of urban integration from individual and family survival to social 
movement mobilization. Upon arrival, IDPs must satisfy basic survival needs (shelter, 
food, income), deal with trauma and navigate shifting personal and collective identities in 
the aftermath of displacement. The strategies that IDPs develop to respond to these 
multiple challenges ultimately necessitate joining existing or forming new social networks 
for information sharing, economic support and emotional connection. Despite obstacles 
to community organizing (including direct threats and violence), these social networks 
sometimes coalesce into coalitions among IDPs and between IDPs and non-IDPs, which 
serve as the basis for broader social movements that make claims on the state.  
This thesis is a small contribution to what will hopefully become a much larger 
literature on the processes of IDP urban settlement and resilience. Much remains to be 
understood about the complex dynamics of internal armed conflict and its impacts not 
just on those directly in combat but also on those who live war as a social condition. In 
the meantime, there are several concrete steps that Colombian policymakers can take to 
develop truly durable solutions to internal displacement not only for IDPs but for their 
host communities, as well.  
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Glossary  
 
[Note: For most laws and policies mentioned in the thesis, see Chapter 6 for more information] 
 
APRODIC 
Asociación para la Promoción del Desarrollo Integral del Caribe 
APRODIC is a community development organization that works in Cartagena and 
several other municipalities in Bolívar. Under the three main platforms of human rights, 
democracy and development, APRODIC works with marginalized and vulnerable 
communities, including both IDPs and historic poor residents of city slums.  
 
Asociación Mis Esfuerzos 
This IDP women’s organization (known commonly as Mis Esfuerzos) works closely with 
LIMPAL. It is run by the women of Revivir de los Campanos, an IDP neighborhood in 
Cartagena. 
 
Auto 092 
A compliance ordinance passed in 2008 to protect IDP women under the 2004 
Constitutional Court of Colombia ruling Sentencia T-025. Auto 092 required the 
government of Colombia to create and implement thirteen specific, tailored and gender 
differential programs to guarantee the rights of IDP women. 
 
La Casa Úrsula 
A national arts program for women’s rights established after UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 and sponsored by the Corporación Colombiana de Teatro [Colombian 
Corporation of Theater] and FOKUS Foro de Mujeres y Desarrollo [FOKUS Forum for 
Women and Development]. 
 
Comité de Seguimiento del Auto 092 
The Comité is a group of IDP women community leaders from different neighborhoods 
around Cartagena. It was formed in 2008 in response to the passage of Auto 092, an 
ordinance issued by the Constitutional Court of Colombia to highlight the 
disproportionate impact of violence on women in the armed conflict.  
 
Corvivienda 
Fondo de Vivienda de Interés Social y Reforma Urbana del Distrito de Cartagena 
The local government entity responsible for housing and community development within 
the district of Cartagena. Literally translated, its full title is Fund for Social Interest 
Housing and Urban Reform in the District of Cartagena.  
 
Defensoría del Pueblo 
The Ombudsman’s office, a central governmental human rights agency responsible for 
assisting victims of abuse. It was established by the 1991 Constitution, though it lacks 
specific investigative and enforcement powers. 
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Fiscalía General de la Nación 
The Attorney General’s office, established by the 1991 Constitution. 
 
FUNSAREP 
Asociación Santa Rita para la Educación y Promoción 
A community organization in Cartagena dedicated to the promotion of human 
development, social justice, solidarity and diversity, with a particular focus on the Afro-
Colombian community. 
 
Gender 
Gender refers to socially-constructed and socially-maintained relations between men and 
women (including behaviors, expectations, norms and institutions), all of which are 
contingent upon the particular historical and cultural contexts within which they are 
located. 
 
Grupo Espejo 
A Cartagena-based non-profit organization that uses theater and art to teach people 
about non-violence. 
 
Internally displaced person (IDP) 
As defined by the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, IDPs 
are “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their 
homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the 
effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violation of human rights or 
natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internally recognized 
State border.” 
 
LIMPAL 
La Liga Internacional de Mujeres por la Paz y Libertad 
A branch of the international NGO Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom. It has worked for the past 12 years in Colombia to promote and defend 
women’s human rights, with a particular emphasis on the rights of adult and young 
women affected by the internal armed conflict. LIMPAL has offices in Bogotá and 
Cartagena.  
 
Mesa DESC 
Mesa de Derechos Económicos Sociales y Culturales  
An umbrella organization comprised of women community leaders from around 
Cartagena and broader Bolívar. It is primarily an advocacy group that trains its member 
organizations in human rights and places pressure on public policymakers.  
 
Sentencia T-025 
This sentencia [court sentence] was passed in 2004 by the Constitutional Court of 
Colombia, which declared an “unconstitutional state of affairs” in the Colombian 
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government’s failure to adequately address the impacts of internal displacement. It 
established the dominant normative framework for providing state-based aid to IDPs by 
requiring that national and local authorities adjust their budget priorities to reflect IDP 
needs and by allowing the participation of IDP groups in monitoring government 
progress in correcting the “unconstitutional state of affairs.”  
 
Social capital 
The form of capital that arises from relationships between individuals, families, groups, 
communities, institutions and hierarchical structures of power that provides access to 
valuable benefits and/or resources. It is often analytically divided upon several axes, 
including (but not limited to) bonding, bridging and vertical linking social capital.  
 
Social network 
A set of voluntary direct and indirect relationships, communication and exchanges. These 
horizontal (though not necessarily equal) links are built on reciprocal trust. Social 
networks are adaptive, evolving and transforming over time to meet changing mutual 
interests or goals. 
 
Procuraduría  
The Inspector General’s office, responsible for investigating official misconduct by state 
agents, which was established by the 1991 Constitution. 
 
Red de Empoderamiento de Mujeres de Cartagena y Bolívar  
The Network of Women’s Empowerment in Cartagena and Bolívar is an umbrella 
organization that works with 11 smaller organizations on issues of women’s rights, access 
to justice and ending violence against women.  
 
UARIV  
Unidad para la Atención y la Reparación Integral a las Víctimas  
The Unit for the Attention and Integral Reparations for Victims, formerly known as the 
Unidad de Atención y Orientación a Desplazados (or UAO), is the local government office 
for IDPs under the cross-cutting agency known as Prosperidad para Todos (formerly 
known as Acción Social). 
 
The Victim’s Law 
Ley 1448; Ley de Víctimas y de Restitución de Tierras 
The largest victims’ rights and reparations law in Colombia’s history, with sweeping 
provisions for land restitution, compensation and a wide range of guarantees of services 
like preferential housing subsidies for victims of the conflict. For more information, see 
Appendix B. 
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Appendix A: 
Gender and forced displacement in Colombia 
 
Worldwide, women are disproportionately impacted by armed conflict and 
displacement, often as targets of sexual and gender-based violence or as those left behind 
to pick up the pieces of shattered families and communities. Women and children make 
up the vast majority of the world’s IDPs and refugees (International Committee of the 
Red Cross 2004). In 2009, of the 40 million people worldwide displaced by war that year 
alone, 80% were women, children and youth (Cahn, Haynes, and Ni Aolain 2010). 
Women are by no means the only victims of the conflict, but their experiences and needs 
are often overlooked, their voices silenced by insecurity and fear, lack of political clout, 
and systemic power imbalances (Walker 2009; Lykes 2010). 
Within the literature on forced displacement, there has been significant research 
on how the experience of migration affects gender relations. In the Colombian context, a 
fair amount has been written on the gendered implications of displacement broadly 
speaking (to take a few examples: Osorio Pérez and Breña 2008; Tabak 2011; Meertens 
2003, 2012; Human Rights Watch 2012). Much less has been written on how gender 
relations reciprocally impact the social dynamics of displacement and eventual integration 
into urban host sites (Lubkemann 2008).  
The majority of my sources were women, most of whom had some connection to 
the women’s rights movement in Colombia. Sexual and domestic violence, frustration 
with the lack of women’s participation in political and peace processes, and the gendered 
experiences of migration and resettlement among IDP women were common themes in 
my interviews. Unfortunately, only five of my sources were IDP men, so I cannot provide 
as full of an account of their experiences. A more in-depth exploration of the experience 
of masculinity in displacement would be an important addition to the literature in the 
field.  
In 2007, the Constitutional Court of Colombia identified 18 specific ways in 
which forced displacement disproportionately affects women, including the increased 
risks of sexual violence, labor exploitation and obstruction of property restitution 
(Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2011b). According to the most recent 
statistics available,100 women and girls make up 52% of the Colombian IDP population 
(compared to 51% of the total population) and, of displaced families, 43% are headed by 
women (compared to 30% of the total population). Moreover, of the households headed 
by women, 68% have no spouse present, shifting the burden of family care entirely to the 
single mother (Meertens 2012). These single-headed households are the households in 
which the largest relative poverty is found among IDPs (ICRC-WFP 2007).  
Forced or voluntary recruitment into armed groups, disappearances, kidnappings, 
and deaths of male family members leave behind women-headed households with smaller 
income streams and many mouths to feed (Moser 2001). In many parts of Latin America, 
it is often said that women are faced with a triple jornada (triple workday) because, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Compiled in 2008 by the Comisión de Seguimiento (Monitoring Commission of the Public Policy on 
Internal Displacement). 
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particularly in displacement, they are tasked with the three burdens of providing financial 
support, caring for the family and (re)building community life.101 Because of this triple 
jornada, the deliberate or incidental wartime disruption of “the fine fabric of everyday life, 
its interlaced economies, its material systems of care and support, its social networks, the 
roofs that shelter it” has strikingly gendered consequences (Cockburn 2004, p. 35).  
Understanding the gendered dynamics of social networks and social capital can 
help uncover underlying trends in how IDPs cope and survive in the midst of violence. 
With this in mind, Moser (2001) identified the unique kinds of social capital that men 
and women tend to cultivate, particularly in conflict zones. For example, while women 
are more vulnerable in the moment of displacement itself, they have been shown to adapt 
better than men during the period of resettlement and urban integration, largely because 
of their access to informal support networks. In comparison, men continue to rely more 
on formal institutional support. This kind of support comes much more slowly than the 
informal aid that most women pursue because formal institutions, like state agencies 
responsible for distributing emergency humanitarian supplies, are very often overtaxed, 
under-funded and under-staffed.102 Women, in the meantime, spend less energy on the 
all-too-often futile search for formal support because they are “too busy with questions of 
daily survival, which requires a lot of personal networking: For whom is she going to 
work that day? Which neighbor will look after the children? Who can she ask for some 
food or a loan?" (Meertens 2001, p. 144).  
Apart from gangs and armed groups (both of which are forms of social networks), 
IDP women are often the leaders of community movements and associations. “Even 
though they are in marginalized and poor neighborhoods, it’s almost always the women 
who dedicate themselves to improving the wellbeing of the community,” says Gloria, co-
founder of APRODIC, a human rights organization in Cartagena. “It’s the women who 
organize themselves and who form organizations.” Women take the initiative and the 
primary responsibility for the trabajo de base [the groundwork], but machismo still dictates 
that men often hold the top leadership positions in most co-ed community organizations. 
Men tend to take on the visible public roles, while women handle the bulk of the 
organizing without much of the credit, says Gloria. 
It is sometimes argued that conflict can in fact empower women because of the 
shake-ups in gender relations (including, for example, shifts in household bargaining 
power and community leadership roles, skills building among women, and even improved 
levels of self-esteem). However, those gains are generally superficial or short-lived 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 As one IDP woman I met joked: “Nosotras las mujeres tenemos el nombre de ‘Soyla.’ Soy la que plancha. Soy 
la que cuida a los niños. Soy la que cocina.” [We women are named ‘Iamthe.’ I am the one who irons. I am the 
one who takes care of the children. I am the one who cooks]. 
102 For example, one study in capital city Bogotá showed that it can take up to two years between arrival in 
the city and first receipt of the humanitarian aid mandated by law. As a result, many IDPs in this study 
preferred informal support networks to satisfy their needs (Albuja and Ceballos 2010). One woman I met 
in Cartagena said she had been waiting seven years for a housing subsidy. Though this may be an extreme 
case, it does illustrate the fact that IDPs cannot simply wait for assistance to come to them – they are forced 
to engage in their own survival and coping strategies in the delay or absence of more effective government 
assistance.  
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because men still control financial resources (including land), political power and cultural 
dominance (Mertus 2003; Cockburn 2004; Calderón, Gáfaro, and Ibáñez 2011). 
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Appendix B: 
A closer look at the Victims’ Law 
 
Colombia’s Victims and Land Restitution Law, passed in 2011, has been lauded 
for being one of the most far-reaching attempts at transitional justice in the world. What 
follows is a brief exploration of the potential impacts and challenges to implementation of 
the Victims’ Law.  
Transitional justice and property restitution 
The Victims’ Law has only been on the books for a little over a year, but this is 
not the first time that a country in conflict has attempted to broker national 
reconciliation and peace through legal and institutional mechanisms like truth 
commissions, criminal prosecutions for past wrongs, reparations programs and 
governance reforms. In conflict and post-conflict situations, land ownership and 
occupancy is one of the first casualties. Forced displacement and migration, scorch and 
burn techniques and shady land transactions are common, leaving behind a patchwork of 
abandoned, destroyed and stolen property. In light of this, transitional justice 
mechanisms often take a property rights approach, attempting to restore pre-conflict 
property rights through land restitution or the “right to return.” This symbolic right 
originated with the intention of returning refugees to their homes of origin, but has since 
been applied to internally displaced persons, as well.  
The right to property restitution in post-conflict situations, while not firmly 
grounded in binding international law, has been extrapolated from the principle of right 
to return. It is a conception of right to property that has evolved in the past few decades, 
and international law has begun to develop new languages and norms around property 
restitution, though it may take more time for that movement to fully crystallize (Smit 
2012; Ballard 2012). In 2005, a sub-commission of the United Nations Human Rights 
Council (UNHCR) endorsed a series of guidelines on post-conflict property restitution 
called the United Nations Principles on Housing and Property Restitution for Refugees 
and Displaced Persons, more commonly known as the “Pinheiro Principles.” Borrowing 
heavily from the experience of property restitution in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 
early 1990s war in former Yugoslavia, the Pinheiro Principles propose a legal, 
administrative and enforcement framework for the design and implementation of 
property restitution processes in the wake of conflict (Ballard 2012). The Principles are 
guidance, not binding law. As Mohan (2011) writes, “At best, the Principles can be 
considered 'soft law,' but more accurately they are a series of best practices” (p. 476). 
What the Pinheiro Principles do represent, however, is an international recognition of 
and commitment to property rights as a means to transitional justice.    
 That said, the results of property-based transitional justice have been mixed. 
There have been few “pure successes” in implementing the right to return for refugees or 
IDPs through housing and property restitution legal mechanisms because of the lack of 
political and financial support and “conceptually flawed strategies, biased policies and 
ineffectual institutions,” as the former UN Special Rapporteur on Housing and Property 
Restitution for Refugees and Displaced Persons said in 2004 (cited in Smit 2012, p. 45). 
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As Unruh (2005) writes based on the experiences of restitution in Mozambique, post-
conflict property restitution is a "delicate and potentially volatile issue" in which 
"problems of legitimacy of governance and institutions (formal and informal) merge with 
reduced state capacity, scarce financial resources, animosities connected to the conflict, 
and overlapping claims" (p. 12).  
These resource and political constraints present a significant challenge to successful 
property restitution implementation, especially in contexts in which land registries might 
be outdated, inaccurate, corrupted or, quite often, non-existent. Ballard (2012) lists the 
following logistical challenges for IDPs or refugees who wish to return home:  
1. Proving a right to occupancy in light of inadequate property records 
2. Confronting intentional or collateral destruction of physical structures 
3. Overcoming abandonment laws that may deprive those who have fled of their 
property rights  
4. Confronting secondary occupation (others who have come to occupy the home or 
land in their absence). Secondary occupiers may be individuals, families, groups of 
people, or even private companies.  
Addressing these concerns is no small task for the administrators of a property restitution 
mechanism. There may be millions of IDPs or refugees making claims that are often 
difficult to prove, directly in contest with others’ claims, and just generally overwhelming 
for any bureaucratic system, let alone one struggling to rebuild itself after or during 
conflict.  
In addition to the problems of implementation, critics point out that though 
simplifying the goals of transitional justice to supplying housing and property restitution 
makes the huge task seem more manageable, it begins to lack relevance to the lived 
realities of victims. There is an uneasy disconnect between property rights restitution, 
which emphasizes ownership, and right to return, which emphasizes long-term livability 
(Williams 2005). A home is necessary to begin life anew, but so is sustained security, 
economic opportunity, access to education and medical care, and social integration into 
supportive communities. As Ballard (2012) writes of property restitution in Bosnia, “‘the 
house’ became the measure of success of the return process rather than the actual welfare 
of the people displaced from their homes" (p. 493). Property restitution is a good 
beginning, but it alone is not enough.  
There is also the problem of scale: Most property restitution mechanisms 
(including those based on the Pinheiro Principles) are designed for individuals or 
households who can assert their individual rights to return. Rights-based solutions that 
takes the individual as the unit of analysis are inadequate when it comes to designing 
appropriate solutions for entire communities of people who are displaced en masse 
(Ballard 2012), as has often been the case for communities of indigenous peoples or 
Afro-Colombians on the Pacific coast of Colombia.  
Furthermore, many property restitution schemes are too shortsighted. 
Implementation often ends with the humanitarian provision of emergency shelter, rarely 
moving past that to the re-assignment of property rights, impeded by the implementation 
issues mentioned above. The singular focus on a technical process of restituting property 
to individuals divorced from the political, social and economic contexts of post-conflict 
situations may actually exacerbate the underlying tensions that caused the conflict in the 
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first place. The emphasis on the Pinheiro Principles and other similarly technical 
guidelines for legal restitution processes can come at the detriment of longer-term 
security strategies that necessarily address the complex (and often highly contested and 
politicized) social, cultural, political and economic landscapes. Without that 
comprehensive, long-term approach, transitional justice based on property restitution 
may actually “undermine the sustainability of return and thus impair the legitimacy of 
a post-war state and the development of peace and stability" (Ballard 2012, p. 495). 
The Victims’ Law 
 The Victims’ Law, signed into law in June 2011, is still at the beginning stages of 
implementation, which is why it is so important to monitor its progress now. The process 
by which land claims are adjudicated and administered if determined “rightful” is quite 
complicated and beyond the scope of this paper.103 On paper, the Victims’ Law looks 
promising, and it seems the government has thrown some significant financial resources 
behind its implementation. The Colombian government anticipates paying over $26 
billion (US) to victims in the next ten years. In 2012 alone, the government expects to 
pay out $3.2 billion (US) in compensation and benefits to around 130,000 victims (an 
admittedly small percentage of the total four to five million IDPs) (Forero-Nino 2012). 
The first court decision based on the Victims’ Law awarded 14 families title to the land 
they lost in the Caribbean city of Mampuján in October 2012, but courts are clogged 
with the already over 27,000 claims for close to five million acres (Neuman 2012a). 
Judges are expected to decide around 2,000 land restitution claims this year. By 2014, the 
government hopes to return 4.9 million acres of stolen property (Forero-Nino 2012).  
That said, as past experience with transitional justice property restitution has 
shown, the hard part is translating the law (however promising it may be) into practice. 
From early reports on the Victims’ Law, restitution claimants are already coming up 
against some serious implementation obstacles. Inadequate property records, as Ballard 
(2012) has pointed out about other restitution schemes, can become a major hurdle for 
land claimants. The Historical Memory Group found that only 30 percent of displaced 
peoples in the Caribbean coastal area of Colombia had registered titles to their former 
lands (Meertens 2012). Another estimate says only around 19% of all IDPs in the 
country held formal land title prior to displacement (Ramakers 2012). The Victims’ Law 
has complicated provisions for exactly this situation, but the problem of lack of legal 
literacy rears its head when former property owners assume that entering the formal 
system established by the law is out of the question without that basic formal 
documentation in hand.  
Furthermore, the prevalence of conflicting claims to the same property will clog 
up the courts and challenge the legitimacy of ownership, with or without formal land 
title. This restitution process is beginning a decade or two after most displacement 
occurred –victims can make “rightful” claims only for displacement occurring after 
January 1, 1991  – so the property, in many cases, has since been owned or occupied by 
secondary users (Ramakers 2012). Choosing who is the “rightful” owner among many 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 For a full description of the Victims’ Law land restitution and compensation process, see (Ramakers 
2012) or (Summers 2012).  
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will be a decision left up to the courts, a potentially risky assignment of authority in a 
judicial system that has been accused of corruption (Summers 2012). This is particularly 
vulnerable to manipulation when perpetrators of forcible displacement have been shown 
to use shady legal mechanisms104 to obstruct restitution by covering up crimes and 
legalizing the dispossession of property (Andreu-Guzmán 2012).  
Another implementation problem is the state’s inability to guarantee security 
upon return. Colombia is unique in that this restitution process is taking place while the 
conflict is still ongoing, particularly in the rural regions from which many IDPs fled. 
Regaining legal possession of property may mean little if the prospect of return is 
overshadowed by insecurity and violence. Armed groups and the corruption and collusion 
of some public officials threaten safe return, and direct threats and violence against 
leaders of restitution movements and human rights efforts continue to generate 
widespread fear among potential claimants (Alviar García 2012). So far, around 300 
people have reported being threatened for making restitution claims, and the government 
has offered protection to 159 of them (Neuman 2012a).  
Beyond state capacity itself, there is also the question of political will to 
implement land restitution. The state goal of applying the Victims’ Law to guarantee 
land restitution can come into direct conflict with another state policy of using land and 
agricultural resources as engines for economic development. To achieve this latter 
objective, the government would want to obtain larger agroindustrial outputs through 
what it would consider the most efficient and productive use of land, most often large-
scale industrial agricultural. This clearly does not play well with the restitution of small 
and scattered plots of land to displaced small landholders. As Unruh (2005) writes about 
property restitution in Mozambique, the state must confront these ongoing and thorny 
questions about property rights between the many relatively large commercial interests 
(both foreign and national) and the indigenous or small landholders who can claim 
victims’ rights after a conflict. These two groups lay claim to the same lands or properties, 
but “under different regimes of authority, legitimacy and proof” (p. 148). 
 To soften this contradiction in state policy, the Victims’ Law includes special 
treatment and an exception for agroindustrial projects by which any land that would 
otherwise be restituted but is in use for an agroindustrial project can be leased to allow 
that project to continue while the title still goes to the victim claimant (Alviar García 
2012). When certain multi-national corporations have benefitted greatly from 
displacement in order to accumulate large swathes of fertile agricultural land for mega-
projects, agro-industrial projects or subsoil rights to gas and oil, this exception to the law 
may become a loophole that allows such abuses to continue. To reverse this process, 
political and economic measures (not just legal measures), as well as a vision for 
development that includes the agricultural and economic contributions of IDPs (rather 
than assumes their small landholding is unproductive), are necessary to complement the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Some of these mechanisms include successive purchase (to cover up the original perpetrator of 
displacement), revocation and subsequent reallocation of public land originally allocated to peasants under 
agrarian land reform because of accusations of “abandonment” (due to displacement), and the use of 
testaferros, or straw men, as stand-in current landowners actually working behind the scenes for perpetrator 
groups (Andreu-Guzmán 2012).  
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Victims’ Law, argues Meertens (2012). She writes that these conflicting state objectives 
of restitution and economic development point to “the need to create mechanisms to 
bring the displaced peasantry back into the organizational dynamics of rural development 
and to recognize the increasing female leadership in their organizations" (p. 15). 
There is perhaps a fundamental flaw within the design of the Victims’ Law: The 
assumption that most IDPs wish to return to their original lands or properties is 
misguided. International pressure to enforce the “right to return” can skew state policy 
towards return instead of compensation and support for local integration into new host 
communities (Smit 2012), when in fact, around 80% of IDPs report preferring local 
integration to return to place of origin (Carrillo 2009).  
The use of symbolic rhetoric and policy-making to appease the international 
community may force the restitution efforts to veer from more pragmatic and desired 
paths from the points of view of those supposedly benefitting from the Victims’ Law. 
Vidal-López (2012) argues that the Colombian state has used “the rhetoric of transitional 
justice” to create an image (aimed at the international community) of a country that is 
stable and post-conflict, when in fact the victims (and perpetrators) of the conflict know 
that not to be the case (p. 14). This image-conscious rhetoric may actually impede the 
realistic and effective implementation of restitution.  
At the heart of the critiques of the Victims’ Law is the overemphasis on 
restorative justice and the missed opportunity to address the roots of the conflict. As 
Ramakers (2012) writes, within the Law, “structural violence and social injustice are seen 
as the context of the violence and not dealt with as causes of the conflict or the crime 
itself” (p. 11). Property restitution alone cannot address the accumulation and 
concentration of lands in the hands of a few, which in turn leads to social exclusion and 
unequal land distribution, which in turn causes (and further results from) the conflict.  
That said, even if the Victims’ Law cannot accomplish the lofty goal of justice for 
the victims of the sixty-year internal armed conflict in Colombia, the law can set a 
foundation for future struggles and social movements. It is not – and will never be – a 
panacea, but it can be at the very least a building block of transitional justice. As the 
Victims’ Law enters the next phases of its implementation, public officials, policy makers, 
researchers, civil society actors and the Colombian people will have to activate the law 
from paper to practice.   
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Appendix C: 
Forging a women’s rights movement in Cartagena 
 
In late June 2012, a 19-year-old woman in Cartagena was brutally beaten with a 
machete and burned alive by her ex-boyfriend.105 Her death was the most recent in a 
string of horrific abuses and murders of women in Cartagena, and it generated enough 
public outrage that the Mayor’s office agreed to set a public meeting to address the city’s 
responses to violence against women.   
It is standing room only in the meeting two days after the young woman’s death. 
The Mayor, the Chief of Police and various city officials sit around a long table in the 
front of the meeting hall. Folding and office chairs have been assembled into rows facing 
the table at the front, and the seats are packed with representatives from IDP and 
women’s groups from across Cartagena, including all of those mentioned in the course of 
this thesis. 
The purpose of the meeting is to plan a symbolic protest march that will take 
place in three days time. In addition to talking through the logistics of permits and police 
protection, the meeting turns into an open forum. The crowd in the audience sits and 
stands intermittently, passing a microphone around to deliver impassioned speeches, to 
press for policy changes and to respond to the Mayor’s statements. The energy in the 
room is high, and speakers often interrupt each other. Press cameras flash from the back 
of the room.  
Two hours later, the meeting is officially over, and the administration has decided 
that the march will culminate in a speech given by the Mayor at the gates of the colonial 
city under the famous Torre del Reloj. This year’s contestants for the Reinada, the annual 
Colombian beauty queen contest for which Cartagena is famous, will also attend to show 
solidarity (and presumably to act as publicity ambassadors for the city). The Mayor 
requests that everyone wear white. 
On the day of the march, hundreds of women, men and children gather outside 
the walls of the colonial city. The road is closed off on the route to the Torre del Reloj. 
Upon the signal to start, everyone begins marching, chanting and waving homemade 
signs that denounce not just violence against women but violence in general.  
Very few people are wearing white, as the Mayor had requested. “We are doing 
our resistance,”106 explains Carmen. “The administration is wearing white, but we’re the 
community, and we’re all wearing purple instead. They [the administration] say they’re 
doing it one way, but it has to be our way. They said this and that person have to give 
speeches, and I said, ‘When is it our turn to speak?’ But no, we don’t get a spot on the 
stage. So we are speaking from the ground, and if they don’t give us sound, we’ll bring 
megaphones!” 
When we finally make our way to the Torre, the Mayor, the Chief of Police and 
the beauty queens await our arrival from their post on the stage. The crowd in purple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 For more information on the specific circumstances of and reactions to her death, see the original report 
in the local newspaper El Universal in (Pallares 2012). 
106 As James Scott theorized, these small acts of “subtle, ‘everyday’ forms of resistance” can “moderate the 
authority of dominant groups without completely overturning the system” (Rao and Walton 2004, p. 24). 
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shouts and sings and cheers over the official speeches. They did, in fact, bring their own 
megaphones. 
 
In the past few years, the women’s rights movement has gained momentum by 
bringing together a number of formerly separate organizations and communities. It is 
built of IDPs and non-IDPs, women and men, Afro-Colombians and indigenous 
peoples, all coming together to fight for women’s rights in the face of ongoing and very 
visible violence against women in Cartagena and across Colombia. 107 “Each organization 
has their own agenda, but we also have something in common, which is defending 
women’s rights,” says Carmen, who is affiliated with FUNSAREP and Grupo Espejo. 
“That brings us together to hacer incidencia en política pública al estado [advocate for public 
policy].”108  
Carmen says a big turning point was the citywide celebration of International 
Women’s Day (which occurs annually on March 8) five years back. “A huge number of 
people marched that day, and we began meeting each other. We met Red de Mujeres, we 
met LIMPAL, we met Mesa DESC, we met FUNSAREP. We all met and from there 
we decided we needed a mesa [council] with two representatives from each organization 
in Cartagena.” The new council, known as the Mesa del Movimiento Social de Mujeres de 
Cartagena y Bolívar [Council of the Social Movement of Women in Cartagena and 
Bolívar], is comprised of 18 organizations, including all of those I have mentioned in the 
course of this thesis thus far. 
The first few meetings of the Mesa were spent with each organization laying out 
their own laundry lists of priorities and actions. “Each organization had its own agenda, 
its own way of working, its own identity, its autonomy,” explains Carmen. Groups of 
groups do not always work well together, particularly when there is territoriality between 
different neighborhoods or community organizations of IDPs. Some groups make claims 
of being the “first” or the “original” displaced, says Carmen, refusing to engage with 
newer IDPs or newer organizations. “Se pelean la bandera [They fight with their flags],” 
she explains. “I’ve heard people say ‘my women’ as if those women were their property.”  
These rivalries are about marking off and laying claims to territory, to people and 
to causes. Such competition is counterproductive, worries Carmen, who thinks providing 
aid or support to IDPs is not about forcing them to identify with one group or another 
but rather about helping them gain access to information that they can decide to accept, 
to reject, to transform, or to apply to their own lives as they need or desire.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Rates of violence against women in Cartagena at the time of my fieldwork in 2012 were high and 
climbing. For example, in just the first two months of 2012, there were 169 reports of domestic violence in 
which the man was the aggressor and the woman was the victim (compared to 161 from the same period in 
2011) (Cardona 2012). Across the country, it is estimated by the Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal that 
two women are sexually abused or raped every hour, for a total of 17,935 cases each year. By the Medicina 
Legal estimates, eight women are hit every hour and one dies every three days ("Todas somos Rosa Elvira"  
2012). While I was in Cartagena, a horrific case of a young woman who was raped and burned alive by her 
male partner took the city by storm. In response to this attack, the Mayor’s office hosted an emergency 
meeting attended by women’s rights organizations from around the city and a public march was planned as 
a protest. More information on this march will be detailed in Chapter 6. 
108 Chapter 6 will go into more depth about how IDP organizations raise political consciousness and re-
define understandings of citizenship, ultimately leading IDPs to make claims on the state. 
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“It’s been a learning process,” says Carmen. “In the beginning, it was hard to agree 
that in a given moment not everyone can raise their own individual flag. Instead, you 
have to take all those flags and colors, wash them and bring them back together in one 
single color and one single flag, which brings us all together.” 
 The process of negotiating how the Mesa operates has been saddled with tension, 
and it has been an uphill battle to convince individuals to give up their “flags” for the sake 
of the whole, explains Carmen. “There have been moments when we thought everything 
was going to explode and the Mesa was going to stop and nothing would be left. There 
have been times that were so tense that we said ‘Okay, this is over’ or ‘This is a disaster’,” 
says Carmen. “But we say that we are positioning ourselves around diversity and 
difference, and that’s where you need to understand how to confluir [come together] 
around that diversity and difference to come to a consensus. All of the organizations 
wanted to get final say, to put their own agendas forward, to say ‘qué salga el mío’ [let 
mine come first]. But we had to say ‘No, now it’s not about mine, it’s about the 
collective.’”  
This makes joint decision-making a difficult task, to say the least, but it also 
allows for the creation of a sense of unity without erasing individual identities. Carmen 
offers the example of International Women’s Day: “If on March 8, an organization wants 
to do their own internal event, that’s fine, as long as they don’t forget that they are part of 
something bigger, too.”  
Organizations have managed to build conflict resolution tools to manage the 
divides between them. Isabel says clear communication is the biggest priority for 
coordinating multiple groups. “I think that we are on a path to rights, to real rights, to 
defending women, to equality of rights, and so why should we fight with our compañeras 
[colleagues or friends]?” she says. “As an organization, communication is the most 
important because without it, that’s where conflict comes from.” 
For example, once, when a press reporter covering an event gave credit to one 
organization rather than to the Mesa, the mistake caused tension within the group as a 
whole. Their solution was to designate the secretary of the Mesa as the only official 
spokesperson. “This doesn’t mean each organization can’t continue to speak about their 
own work, just that only one person can speak for the Mesa,” clarifies Carmen. It’s about 
striking that balance between staying true to the independence and autonomy of the 
member organizations without compromising the broader agenda of the coalition-based 
Mesa.  
The experience of subsuming individual goals to contribute to a coalition is an 
exercise in trade-offs. What is gained from a larger movement (more political clout, 
access to more resources, more media coverage, etc.) has to make up for what is put at 
risk (individual ownership, specific agenda items, etc.) in order for it to be sustainable. 
This echoes the experience of IDPs in their transition from survival strategies to social 
network formation described in Chapter 4: Making the leap from individual to member 
of a group has to be worth it in the end, even if it means sacrificing some individual 
autonomy along the way.  
